THE

AMERICAN

CATHOLIC QUARTERLY

REVIEW.

Bonum est homini ut eum veritas volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantum sive confitentum.

S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD PASCENT.

VOLUME VI.

FROM JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1881.

PHILADELPHIA:

HARDY & MAHONY,

PUBLISHERS AND PROPRIETORS,

505 CHESTNUT STREET.

COPYRIGHT, 1881,

BY

HARDY & MAHONY.

70739

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

Vol. VI.—OCTOBER, 1881.—No. 24.

FREEMASONRY.

Les Sociétés Secrètes et la Société : Philosophie de l'histoire contemporaine. Par N. Deschamps, S.J. Quatrième edition. Paris: Oudin Frères. 1881.

The Secret Warfare of Freemasonry against Church and State. Translated from the German. London: Burns, Oates & Co. 1875.

ON the very first page of the introduction to the second work quoted at the head of this paper we read:

"That a society should exist in the midst of us, which has already extended its ramifications in all quarters of the world, and embraces at this time, as we have been told, above seventeen millions of members,—that it should be compacted in visible unity by a secret oath binding under the most terrible sanctions on each and all of its members,—that it should claim exclusive possession of an esoteric doctrine, unknown to the profane, by which the world is eventually to be freed from all its moral, social, and political diseases, and the universal brotherhood of man is to be regenerated into light,—that it should, while professing to tolerate all forms of religion, yet preserve a sort of theology and a grotesque ritualism exclusively its own,—that it should exact from all its adherents a blind obedience to orders mysteriously issued and secretly conveyed, is a phenomenon so startling, so pregnant with probable results in the future, as to demand the closest examination."

It is clear on the surface that this society cannot be only an association, having for its end merely social intercourse and friendly dinners, rendered still more pleasant by acts of benevolence and by the simple desire of alleviating human misery—as is generally believed by a great number of innocent people. But the simple statement of the writer just quoted, of which no intelligent man can have the least doubt, is calculated to excite in all readers the wish of ascertaining in all its details the ostensible working of this brotherhood, at least during the last two hundred years of its extraordinary activity. That this is possible cannot be denied, because, though it is professedly a secret organization, it cannot help showing its spirit and its aims in a thousand ways; and, besides, the books destined for its members, even of the highest grades, have lately become public property, and its adepts are now so bold that they do not seem any more to care if all its *secrets* are known at last to the *profane*. There is now a whole literature published in its favor and against it, and it is not at this day difficult to discover on which side the truth lays.

The last important work which has appeared on the subject in France is that of Father Deschamps, S.J. The author died before the last volume had gone through the press in 1876. Three successive editions of it had already been sold, and the writer had just prepared a new one more copious still, whose corrections and additions he left at his death in the hands of his friend, Mr. Claudio Jannet, well known in this country by a remarkable book on the United States. It is this fourth edition, published a few months ago, which I intend reviewing here. It forms two thick and compact volumes of large dimensions, and after having read it attentively, I am convinced that Freemasonry is now known in all its bearings on the Church and on society, and the object first is to point out the motives on which this conviction is based.

For the sake of brevity, and to confine the discussion to modern times—which is quite sufficient for the purpose—the question of the true origin of this society must be left aside. F. Deschamps furnishes strong reasons for believing that if the *mysteries* of ancient paganism never had any connection with it, still Gnosticism, Manicheism, the Albigensian heresy, and chiefly the secret doctrine of the Knights Templar during the crusades, were the true sources of Freemasonry. This is rendered extremely probable by the writer, but we have no time to discuss the point.

On account of the limits necessarily imposed upon us, the main object must be here to review particularly the second volume of this great work, which contains in a compact description of seven hundred pages the history of the sect during the last two hundred years, and also thoroughly explains the vicissitudes of Europe

during the same length of time. It is the most valuable part of this remarkable publication, though it cannot be denied that the documents quoted at length in the first volume, chiefly on the Freemasons' rituals, are full of interest, and throw a flood of light on so obscure a subject. This alone would prove the dark designs of a conspiracy against religion, gospel morality, the Christian family, the existing governments, and property itself.

The reader, however, must understand that very little can be said of Freemasonry in this country, though it might be demonstrated that the object is mainly the same. But fortunately for the United States the policy has been wisely adopted by the framers of its Constitution, and strictly kept ever since, to stand almost outside of the political orbit in which Europe moves. Our statesmen have implicitly followed the advice of Washington and his co-workers in laying the foundations of this republic, not to entangle ourselves with foreign politics and alliances of any kind, but to be satisfied with spreading civilization over the Western Continent. This is the true reason which has rendered Freemasonry in this country on the whole less objectionable to those numerous conservative men who sincerely wish to protect society against the baneful effects of all destructive principles, namely, through the want of connection with European sects.

Confined, therefore, to Europe, the whole question may be reduced to a single sentence: Freemasonry has fostered, propagated, and constantly developed more and more the disorganizing elements known under the general name of *revolution*. The history of Europe since the latter part of the seventeenth century has notoriously been a series of political, social, and anti-religious uprisings, which continue to this day, and constitute the universal aspect of modern times. This has been chiefly due to Freemasonry. Such is the main idea of Father Deschamps's book, and in our opinion he has thoroughly demonstrated his thesis. There might be here and there some slight statements which could be controverted. Taken as a whole the argumentation is rigorous, the conclusion irresistible; it can be called a scientific demonstration.

He relies first on many recent facts which cannot be historically explained except on the supposition of a dark and universal plot embracing the whole earth. This is *intrinsic* evidence based on a convincing generalization. In a second place he brings forward an immense number of Masonic documents kept formerly secret, but which now have become public property, and also avowals and even boastings of the heads of the sect. This is *extrinsic* evidence, which would have no weight if it was reduced to a few facts, if it relied only, for instance, on the boastings of M. Louis Blanc, or

some such man of the same party, but which carries conviction as soon as the same is true of a great number of influential men without any preconcerted action. Then the premises and the conclusions being clear and logically deduced, the book is thoroughly scientific, and conviction unavoidable.

With regard to the first point—intrinsic evidence—this is the broad statement of the writer found in the first edition of this work: "Being born a Catholic, ordained a priest through an interior call,—*vocation*,—firmly attached to the Church, and observant of the duties she imposes on her ministers, I never have belonged to any secret society, never bound myself by the oaths required of its members, nor received from any of its adepts disclosures prompted by any motive whatever. Still I am convinced—and many Masons must share this conviction with me—that I know more of Freemasonry and its various sects than most of its members, even of those who apparently belong to its highest grades.

"I owe this knowledge chiefly to the observation and to a thorough study of all modern French and European revolutions, of the various steps through which they have passed, of great events, political constitutions, and laws which issued from them, of popular assemblies, and eminent men who contributed to their agency. The deep study of all these revolutionary elements, chiefly of their relations to each other, and the final explosion of their results, revealed to my sight, without any fear of error, the primary cause, the mysterious source of their influence, not for my own individual profit only, but that I might convince of it all men of good faith who should peruse these pages."

The reverend author has fully demonstrated the bearing of this intrinsic evidence on all the religious, political, and social events which form the web of modern history, as we shall have occasion to state briefly further on. For a complete demonstration, however, nothing can replace the reading of the book itself. But he has also given, with innumerable details, the *extrinsic* proofs of it, which can be reduced to the following compendious enumeration:

First. There are numerous authoritative documents, namely, Masonic constitutions and statutes voted and agreed upon in the general *convents* of the order, written originally for secret use in the lodges, but now easily attainable; Masonic manuals or *tuileurs*, containing official rituals of reception, instructions, catechisms, formularies of oaths, signs, pass-words, songs, etc. All these books were formerly strictly forbidden to be given to the public and sold to the profane. But it is now comparatively easy to obtain them. If the doctrine explained in these documents often seems to be only of a benevolent and humanitarian character, there are always expressions denoting further designs of a revolutionary and dis-

organizing nature, which many Masons, no doubt, did not perceive though they were clearly intended by the heads of the association.

Secondly. Many adepts could not be prevented from writing and giving their personal views, which always had a great influence over other members. Their books were not authoritative, it is true, and on this account they were openly published. They often came from Masons of the highest grades, and soon were in the hands of all the men most active in the party. These works are particularly those of Clavel, Ragon, Bagot, Redares, Willaume, and Teissier. In the same enumeration must be included the avowals and open boasts of notorious public men belonging to the order, such as Crémieux, Louis Blanc, Henry Martin, the historian, George Sand, the novelist, Lamartine, the wayward poet, etc. If these declarations are considered only as boasts, they cannot be called empty bragging, on account of the want of motive on their part. These persons were very serious when they thus wrote or spoke. Their intention could not have been to deceive, and their hearers or readers, most of whom were at least acquainted with some of the designs of the party, fully admitted the truth of it. It would be idle to suppose that the language uttered by these men should be used when speaking of a simply benevolent and humanitarian association.

In a *third place*, there is the numerous class of writers who have opposed Freemasonry, many of whom are worthy of the greatest respect, none of whom could be called credulous, and who certainly said what they thought and what they had good reasons for believing. At the head of this list must be placed the Popes who have denounced this sect to the world, warned the princes against its wiles, and openly deprived the Catholic Masons of the participation to the sacraments of the Church, without making any distinction among them. They saw in the bosom of that association a vast conspiracy against Church and State, and no one can pretend that they were either swayed by passion in denouncing it, or using their authority in ignorance of its real object. No Catholic, at least, can imagine it. Still, they spoke as strongly as Father Deschamps, or any other similar writers did, without, however, entering into so many details. After the Popes came a great number of Catholic bishops. It suffices here to quote a few of the most recent and well known, such as Ketteler, of Mayence, Dupanloup, of Orleans, and Cardinal Deschamps, of Mechlin. The list of other writers who took the same view of the subject could fill a large page of this paper. They were either clergymen such as Barruel, in France, during the last century, whom many at that time refused to believe, but who is now found to have spoken the

naked truth; or laymen of note—some of them Catholics, others Protestants—such as Count Haugwitz, in Prussia, who had belonged to the order; De Haller, in Switzerland; lately E. E. Eckert, of Saxony. This meagre catalogue must suffice here; the work under review alone can give a true idea of the number and the weight of these authorities.

And it must be remarked that Father Deschamps never is abusive in his language, and does not embrace all the Masons in the same category. He repeats here and there that a great number among them do not even suspect the real object of their leaders. They nevertheless concur unconsciously in the baneful effects of this association, and are unable to extricate themselves from its meshes when the time of action arrives, and they must obey orders to which they have blindly subjected themselves. This is often for them a cause of remorse when it is too late, but they are to blame for not having perceived from the beginning that it was not lawful for them to promise obedience to men whom they knew not, and for ends with which they were totally unacquainted.

This preliminary matter being disposed of, and the question of its primitive origin being set aside in this paper, the spread of Freemasonry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, must be first accounted for, in order to ascertain with more precision its main object in this age, which is the main purport of the present discussion. In this modern phase of its existence—within the last two hundred years—did it originate in Germany or in England? Opinions differ on this point. Some think that as a secret society it came from Great Britain to the Continent, toward the end of the seventeenth century, and that its first organization was due either to the Jacobite party in England, whose object was merely political, or to the well-known set of free thinkers,—namely, Collins, Tyndal, Bolingbroke, David Hume, etc.,—who had chiefly in view, the undermining and final destruction of Christianity. But though there are strong reasons for adopting either of these theories, the celebrated charter of Cologne, in 1535, seems to point out its modern origin as going so far back as the beginning of the sixteenth century, Germany as its cradle, and the destruction of the Catholic Church its main object.

The charter is a most important and curious document, kept at this moment in the head lodge of Amsterdam; and its Latin text, translated into French, is given in full by F. Deschamps, with the proofs of its authenticity. The almost only objection raised against it is the supposition that its Latin style is not that of the sixteenth century, as if all the documents of that age were written in the same style. The last editor of Melanchthon, C. J. Breitschneider (1838), fully admits its authenticity as well as Pachtler. Mr. Janssen,

the renowned author of the best *History of the Germans*, is in favor of the same opinion; and this alone would suffice.

That celebrated manuscript is subscribed with the names of nineteen men, well known among the founders of Protestantism, such as Hermann, of Cologne, Nicholas Van Noot, Jacobus, of Antwerp, Coligny, Philip Melanchthon, etc. It supposes that the order existed anteriorly under the title of *Brothers of St. John;* and it is thereby recognized under that of *Brothers Freemasons of St. John.* According to this charter there were already lodges in London, Edinburgh, Vienna, Amsterdam, Paris, Lyons, Frankfort, Hamburg, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Venice, Ghent, Kœnigsberg, Brussels, Dantzig, Middleburg, Bremen, and Cologne. Many of those lodges must have been founded during mediæval times, when the Cathedral builders formed a well-known society spread all over North and Central Europe; and their object was altogether Christian and Catholic.

As reorganized in 1535, its aim was declared to embrace the whole *world*, and to substitute for *superstition* (that is positive religion) the practice of *natural virtues* on which all men could agree. Thus, independent morality, as it is called in this age, was offered to mankind in place and in lieu of divine revelation.

The great objection that might be raised against the genuineness of this document, in my opinion, consists in the fact that Protestantism at that time did not appear to deny positive religion, since it had formularies of faith. Still, owing to the multitude of sects which immediately sprung up, there was no possibility of forming among them a *universal* society without coming directly to setting aside all positive tenets, and proclaiming independent morality as the only bond of union. It is precisely what is done by liberalism at this day; the men of the sixteenth century could well foresee the necessity of it, and a little later on, Bossuet proved it to be a fact in his *Histoire des Variations.*

On the other side, a strong proof that this was already the case among Protestants in 1535, is derived from the early spread of Masonic doctrines all over *Germany* (including Northern Italy), and soon after in *England.* It is well known that Masonry has always insisted on the suppression of dogma, and the simple adherence to *natural virtue*, whatever may be understood by these words. The chief propagators of this doctrine, so strongly expressed in the charter of Cologne, were, in Germany, Amos Commenus, from Bohemia; the pantheist Spinoza, from Holland; the brothers *Rose Croix*, chiefly Meier, whose doctrines are identified by Mr. Eckert with those of Masonry. The famous Campanella, in his book *de Monarchia Hispanica*, points out this main object of the Rose Croix as being "a systematic attempt at the subversion of

society." This prepared the way in Germany for the *illuminism* of Weishaupt during the eighteenth century, whose disorganizing system was closely connected with the so-called philosophy then in vigor throughout France, as is demonstrated by Father Deschamps.

In *England* the ancient societies of Masons who erected the magnificent cathedrals of Great Britain, and were then thoroughly Catholic, began toward the end of the seventeenth century to admit into their ranks men who did not belong to the builders' craft; and this soon became the occasion for introducing into these associations the chief feature of the charter of Cologne. This was still more clearly expressed in 1717, when the *Book of Constitutions* was republished in England with important alterations. Since that time this book has become the catechism of *Rationalism.* The author of the *Secret Warfare of Freemasonry* says pointedly (page 201): "To England appertains the honor of giving birth to Deism, and bestowing it as a birthday gift on the secret society, to celebrate its entrance, in 1717, upon a new stage of its existence, the three persons chiefly concerned in the transaction being out and out deists. This shallowest of all so-called systems of philosophy only recognizes the existence of such objects as can be seen and handled; it is a fungus growing upon the decaying trunk of Protestantism, and refuses absolutely to acknowledge whatever is supernatural and immaterial. . . . . It recognizes, at most, a higher Being; who has made the visible world, or who, as architect of the universe, has constructed the things we see around us out of pre-existing matter; who, His work once finished, troubles Himself no more about man and his doings."

This explosion in England, as was just seen, culminated in the sect of *freethinkers* at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries. These men—Toland, Tyndal, Collins, etc.—attacked, openly, Christianity; but it does not seem that their oath bound them to spread anarchical principles against governments, as did the Rosicrucians in Germany, according to Campanella. The *Pantheisticon*, however, of Toland, is by itself a proof that the British deists formed a real Masonic lodge. The *Book of Constitutions* had been printed for their use in 1717, and six years later appeared the "General Constitutions of Masonry," which, says F. Deschamps, "have remained ever since, the basis of all Masonic statutes in all countries." Voltaire, then in England, and a particular friend of the "freethinkers," was received Mason in one of their meetings; and directly after his return to France he published his *Lettres sur les Anglais*, which contain his first open attack on Revelation. There can be no doubt that France received Masonry with infidelity from England.

At the moment of studying the secret spread of those doctrines which were the main cause of the French Revolution,—the abuses of the *ancien régime* being but secondary, as shall be proved—a general remark of great importance must be insisted upon as a confirmation of what precedes. This consists in calling the attention of the reader to an historical fact which cannot possibly be explained except on the supposition of a previous Masonic agency all over Europe of such nature as has been described.

The French Revolution, which was first applauded with enthusiasm everywhere, produced afterwards a recoil of horror when Jacobinism and Sans Culottism showed itself in its true colors. Still it is a well-known fact that, whithersoever the French armies penetrated, even during and after the Reign of Terror, they found ardent friends in all European countries except in England, which they could not *invade*. People commit a great error when they directly point out the German Tugenbund, and the Spanish guerillas which, in truth, checked, with so great a heroism, the victorious career of the French. For this happened only at the end of Napoleon's reign, when his ambition and despotism had estranged all nations from the French, and turned into disgust the former universal admiration. But during the whole period of the Republic, and the first half of Napoleon's sway, the French armies were considered by a great part of the European populations as liberators and friends. Father Deschamps gives numerous and convincing proofs of it. This, I repeat, cannot be explained, unless secret doctrines had already been spread in all those countries favorable to revolutionary ideas, which the French troops represented so thoroughly. Otherwise the anarchy in France would have indisposed people against revolution. In general, the higher and middle classes sympathized with the invaders; and on several occasions the generals commanding the troops of German, Italian, and Spanish states, acted precisely as if they had been in collusion with the enemy, and had turned traitors to their own country. This has been still much more remarkable in this age, as shall be pointed out in the proper place.

After this preliminary remark, the history of Freemasonry in France during the last century cannot but be of great interest. The author under review, in the first chapter of his second volume, proves the identity of Masonic doctrines with those of the so-called "philosophers," and then passes on to their propagation. Lodges were organized from the beginning of the eighteenth century, by Englishmen, in Dunkirk, Mons, Paris, Bordeaux, Valenciennes, and Havre. These were first disconnected bodies until the Central Lodge took the name of *Grand English Lodge of France*. But in 1743, on the solicitation of the Paris Masons, the Grand Lodge of

England gave out a diploma for a peculiar French organization, and a Grand Master was placed at its head. The object of the writer here, expressed in his own words, is:

"1st. To prove by facts, that Freemasonry spread in Continental Europe, from 1721 down to the latter part of the century, and its progress coincided with the impious propaganda of philosophers.

"2d. To establish the Masonic affiliation of those infidel writers, and show by their writings the sufficiently visible marks of a common plot.

"3d. To demonstrate that from the middle of the century downwards, there existed a well-developed conspiracy, having for its object the destruction of the Papacy, of Christian civilization and institutions, of the legitimate power of kings; and on the part of some of the leaders, dark projects against the family and property."

It is not just, therefore, to pretend that Father Deschamps's argumentation relies only on the simultaneity of Masonry and infidelity. This is but a small branch of his demonstration, and the *identity* of doctrines is particularly insisted upon. The writings of Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert, and others, are abundantly quoted and compared to the tenets of the Masonic sect. Barruel at the end of the last century had taken exactly the same view of the subject when he published his *Mémoires du Jacobinisme*, a powerful book, which produced a deep impression on many sound minds, though it was afterwards taxed with exaggeration by some others. It must now be admitted that he had told the truth and pointed out the secret spring of the revolution. But in this age a writer very different from Barruel, a rationalist and positivist, the most celebrated critic of French literature in our day, Sainte-Beuve, has also admitted a real conspiracy among the philosophers undistinguishable from that of the Masons. It is important to quote some of his most remarkable words, and I prefer here to give them in the original French:

"Toute la correspondance de Voltaire et de d'Alembert est laide; elle sent la secte et le complot, la confrèrie et la société secrète. De quelque point de vue qu'on l'envisage, elle ne fait point honneur à des hommes qui érigent le mensonge en principe, et qui partent du mépris de leurs semblables comme de la première condition pour les éclairer."

But if those *sects* and *secret societies* used dissimulation, hypocrisy, and *lies*, when it was not safe for them to speak openly, as soon as the Revolution broke out in full and became the arbiter of France, there was no more need of concealment, and the adepts of both philosophy and Freemasonry openly boasted of their former plots which had so admirably succeeded. Then the lodges were changed

into *clubs*, particularly those of the Jacobins and the Cordeliers, and it was in the open light of heaven that the total demolition of society was undertaken and carried out, and that the extremist designs of Freemasonry received their anarchical and bloody execution. This is admirably proved by Father Deschamps's book.

It is true, there was for a long time on the part of historians a tacit understanding, as if they had agreed together not to speak of secret societies as having had any influence in shaping public events, and being a real factor in the vicissitudes of nations. M. Taine himself, the last and probably the best historian of the French Revolution, does not even mention Freemasonry. But as to him at least there is an excellent reason for it. Being a decided evolutionist, he always regards public facts from the surface only, and describes them in their visible and tangible action. Any one who has read attentively his *Origines de la France contemporaine*, must have been struck with this peculiarity. He never speaks of the secret movements whence this exterior action is derived, because the great principle of evolution is simply *mechanism*, that is, materialism. But other modern historians begin to see the importance of not neglecting in their narratives the hidden springs of recent history, well known by this time to all intelligent men. M. Henry Martin, in his *Histoire de France*, has consecrated an important chapter of it to this consideration. But not having read nor even seen this long and important work I am unable to characterize it satisfactorily.

A very important part of Father Deschamps's description of Freemasonry in the eighteenth century is contained in the third chapter of the second book, at the very head of the second volume, in which he speaks of the lodges of adoption, and of the relations of Masonry to the French Parliaments. These are two very interesting paragraphs full of curious details—short but spicy. The first may excite a smile in this masculine age, and to hear, for instance, that Pompadour was a Mason may change the smile into laughter. But any one who knows something of the influence exerted by women at that epoch for the spread of *philosophical* doctrine, which, beside hatred of Christianity, insisted so much on liberty and equality—the great motto of Freemasonry—will not feel inclined to throw ridicule on so important a factor of the Revolution of 1789. The salons of Madame Geoffrin, Madame du Deffant, Madame Necker herself, were the putrid hot-beds on which grew the noxious weeds so industriously cultivated by Helvetius, d'Holbach, Diderot, d'Alembert, and a host of other "philosophers." Father Deschamps has surely proved that these men were all Freemasons, and if Frederick of Prussia, who was also one of them, received a few Jesuits in Silesia after their suppression,

he surely thought that this would not resuscitate the society, of whose destruction all his friends openly rejoiced in their letters to *His Majesty*. He well knew that a few dozen Jesuits buried in that distant province could not oppose a great obstacle to the spread of his dear infidelity. All he wished was to please his Polish subjects, lately stolen by him with the concurrence of Russia and Austria, and prevent them from complaining too much. Perhaps also he saw in it a good practical joke against the Pope who had suppressed the Jesuits.

At any rate, the *lodges of adoption*, in which women were admitted together with men—so that they were called by the ugly name of *androgynes*—cannot be ignored at this day as having flourished in France during nearly the whole of the eighteenth century; and they must have powerfully contributed to the spread of immorality and unbelief, which brought about the convulsions of 1789 and 1793. Father Deschamps speaks briefly of their object, their ritual and ceremonies, also their nocturnal feasts, which must have often ended in refined orgies; and no one can suppose that these were only freaks of good nature, altogether disconnected from the darker plots of the brethren in their strictly masculine assemblies.

The paragraph entitled, "The Lodges and the Parliaments," is of importance as throwing a strong light on the destruction of the Jesuits, of which the author under review speaks later on. The French Parliaments were not originally political assemblies as many Americans might suppose from the name; but only courts of law, with their counsellors, advocates, and inferior officers. When the States General of the nation ceased to be convened by the kings for national, political, and administrative objects, the Parliaments arrogated to themselves, with the tacit consent of the monarch, who had never been until that time absolute, the right of remonstrance against the abuses which might creep unperceived in the administration of affairs. Thus they acquired a great importance in the civil and ecclesiastical branches of the government. They often meddled with the Church, owing to the spread of *Gallican* principles, always prevalent among them. They nevertheless were often of great service to the nation, and for a long time their body was greatly honored by the French, and formed a most important branch in the constitution of the nation. But from the beginning of the eighteenth century their interference in political and ecclesiastical affairs became often baneful, particularly under the long and disastrous reign of Louis XV. There were, no doubt, honorable exceptions among them, and Father Deschamps does not pretend to say that all the French magistrates joined in the Freemason conspiracy. But in few words he gives the

proof that many had. It is too late at this day to deny, for that epoch, their general spirit of opposition against both the Church and the king, and chiefly the ardent Jansenism of many of them. Perhaps no body of men in France contributed so much as they did to throw discredit on the clergy, and make it contemptible in the eyes of the people. What Voltaire did by his pen they accomplished by their decrees, and the detestable *hatred of religion* which prevailed at last in France was the result of both. The single fact, known now to everybody, that they actually obliged the parish priests to carry the blessed sacrament to dying heretics, as the Jansenists were, by sending troops of soldiers and policemen, in open contradiction to the censures threatened by the bishops for so doing, would have sufficed for throwing ridicule on the most sacred rites of religion. The good people who at this time imagine that the Parliaments of France in the eighteenth century were mainly composed of dignified magistrates and sincere Catholics, would do well to read the biography of Christopher De Beaumont, the heroic Archbishop of Paris. It has been lately written, and contains many useful lessons.

That, moreover, they were the main instrument for destroying in France the Society of Jesus, is an historical fact of the most glaring nature; that most of the accusations—if not all—brought forward in France against the Jesuits in 1762 by the Parliaments (when Clement XIII. at that very time was speaking so highly in their favor), were calumnies known to the magistrates as such, is clear from the very words they used; that the Parliaments were highly applauded on this account by all "philosophers," and all "Freemasons," is the result of a single glance at the writings of those men, which have since been published; that they continued in their blind fury until the fatal storm which destroyed them, as well as all the other institutions of France, is a most instructive page of the French Revolution. They disappeared at last, but not sooner than the proclamation of the short-lived constitution of 1791; and most of their members perished on the scaffold with many less illustrious victims. We may be allowed to use here a French phrase very common at that time, though it is somewhat pagan: *Paix à leur cendre!*

The details brought forth in the volumes under review on the conspiracy of the sect of philosophers and its identity with the Freemasons' plot, are of such nature that by themselves they could suffice for bringing on conviction in the minds of all impartial readers. But the whole question is strictly connected with the true origin of the French Revolution, and of all those that followed, and if this origin is considered in the proper way, the conviction becomes perfectly irresistible. The reverend author em-

phatically declares that Freemasonry furnishes the only key to the knowledge of modern history in Europe. Is he right? Many other writers look for the causes of this fearful upheaval of society in quite different directions, and most of them find an abundantly sufficient one in the abuses of the *ancien régime.*

Much can be said, no doubt, on these *abuses.* But first, the frightful disorders, bordering on anarchy, which accompanied the outburst of the revolution in 1789, cannot be attributed to them, though they are often represented by historians as their immediate result. M. Taine, who has given the most graphic and appalling picture of these outbreaks, shows that their chief causes were: 1st, The famine, which itself was the consequence of previous bad harvests; 2d, the inclemency of the seasons, particularly the severe winter of 1788–89; 3d, the unnatural hopes inspired in the people by the birth of a revolution which they supposed would make them at once free to do what they pleased, and henceforth happy because rescued from all evils; 4th, in fine, the weakness of the government, lodged at that time in the Constituent Assembly, which witnessed unmoved the anarchy, but was afraid to use any means of repression. No mention is made in this part of M. Taine's work of the abuses of the *ancien régime* as being the cause of the anarchy in 1789.

This first sophism of historians being cleared up, the consideration of the *real* abuses of former times comes in order. The worst statements I ever saw on the subject are contained in the republication of the *Moniteur Universel,* of which two successive editions were republished about twenty years ago. The first volume of both is a thick quarto, which serves as an *introduction,* and pretends to give in full the true causes of the revolution. Whatever M. de Tocqueville wrote on this subject is found in that book, with many more strictures against the abuses of the old regime. I have read it in full, and was not convinced. I cannot possibly enter here into a full discussion; but there are two principal reasons which prevented me from accepting the conclusions of this writer, and of all others who have insisted on the paramount influence of previous abuses. Perhaps these reasons may suffice for the conviction of other sensible people.

The first is the evident exaggeration of those broad statements which most of the time were made in order to extenuate and even entirely justify the frightful excesses of that extraordinary epoch. The thick veil thrown over the French mind by such historians as Thiers, Mignet, Louis Blanc, and other writers of the same school, is still at this moment a pall through which light cannot penetrate; and most of the modern republicans of France imagine to this day that the first revolution was a boon, and the *ancien régime*

a curse. For them France has no history before 1789, and they have entirely turned their back on the former glories of their great nation. This most strange phenomenon of despising their own country in former ages, cannot be seen anywhere else in Europe. In France it is glaring and almost universal, and in my opinion it is mainly attributable to the distorted pictures of previous history drawn by popular writers. Thus has the mediæval epoch been calumniated and condemned. Thus to Catholicism in France have been attributed the butchery of St. Bartholomew's day, and the expulsion *en masse* of Protestants by Louis XIV. For three hundred years, as has been remarked, "history has been a conspiracy against truth," and it continues to be so for many minds. M. Taine, who has written the best history of the *Origines de la France contemporaine*, has convinced, I am afraid, but few of his countrymen, who seem to recoil from accepting the truth. Still M. Taine has proved that most of the abuses justly reproached to the *ancien régime* scarcely deserved that name, and were only the necessary outcome of previous history; and that whatever deserved to be called an abuse was not of such a nature as to necessitate such horrible convulsions.

But a still more powerful reason for believing that the excesses of former times could not be the adequate cause of the *total subversion of civil, religious, and social institutions* which then took place, results from the well-known fact that Louis XVI, from the beginning of his reign, was himself strongly in favor of reforming everything which called for reformation. For this he called Turgot to be his chief minister, from the conviction that this man was the best adviser he could choose for such a purpose as this. He was undoubtedly mistaken, but who could blame him for it? It was certainly a proof of his sincerity. The *Assemblée des Notables* in 1787, was another step in the same direction, and the act of calling to himself the Frenchmen best informed as to the necessities of the time was undoubtedly the best means of healing the wounds of the nation. Finally the meeting of the States General in 1789, with whom the king wished to concur entirely for the good of the people was the most convincing proof of the facility with which abuses would have been corrected, if previous excesses had been the chief difficulty of that epoch. The whole conduct of the French leaders in the revolution, on the contrary, demonstrates that the former abuses were only a pretext for starting theories of government entirely based on the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau, and subversive of all possible order. But these pet theories were perfectly in accord with the Masonic doctrines which had already been proclaimed in the lodges for about seventy years, and it is impossible to see any flaw in the argument of Father

Deschamps when he established that identity. This, it must be firmly believed, is the only true key to the history of those times; and if Freemasonry has not been the only cause of this stupendous upheaval of society, it has certainly been the main one. M. Taine himself openly proclaims that the *Contrat Social* was the mainspring of the legislation and new constitution then imposed on France, which he utterly condemns. If he never speaks of the secret societies, it must be for the reasons previously stated.

It is well known at this time that France did not wish all the former institutions of the country to be unmercifully abolished in order to construct a new edifice. If Tocqueville has remarked that "on reading the demands drawn up by the three several orders,"—nobility, clergy, and third estate,—"before assembling in 1789, and noting many points contained in them, a systematic abolition of every law and every custom prevailing in the country, might be included in the list," he knew, as every one now does, that another longer and stronger list might be made of other demands prescribing the contrary. All wished the monarchy to be maintained, and the king to have a real power. But the maintenance of the king supposed the preservation of the other institutions, without which the system of a monarchy cannot subsist.

Everything being well weighed and considered, the only sufficient cause which can be perceived of the complete overthrow of all order was the disorganizing doctrine of the "philosophers," who alone with their disciples called for the destruction of religion and monarchy. *Ecrasons l'Infâme* was their well-known motto, and by *l'Infâme* they understood Christianity and every institution which upheld it. Freemasonry had obviously the same object. The ground had been thoroughly prepared for carrying it out, and it was but the terse and pithy expression of the truth which Abbé Proyart used for the title of one of his works, namely, *Louis XVI. détroné avant d'etre Roi.* The correction of all abuses would not have prevented him from falling.

This must suffice with regard to the real origin of the French Revolution. With respect to the governments which followed it, the author of *Les sociétés secrètes et la société* proves that the lodges reappeared in France as soon as Napaleon I. obtained the supreme power. They had ceased to exist under the Terror, being superseded by the clubs, but under the empire they resumed their full sway. Was Napoleon a Mason? Father Deschamps, with many others, believes it, and Joseph De Maistre had very early at least some suspicion of it, since he wrote at that time (under the empire) in his *Mémoires diplomatiques:*

"A most remarkable phenomenon is the resurrection of Freemasonry in France, so much so that a *brother* has just been solemnly

buried at Paris, with all the attributes and ceremonies of the order. The actual master of France is too well known to allow any one to suppose that this could be done without his permission. . . . How can this be explained? Is he himself the chief or dupe (perhaps the one and the other) of a society which he thinks he knows, and which laughs at him?"

It is certain, at least, that a great number of Napoleon's high officers, marshals, generals, senators, etc., had been initiated; and the emperor's policy was often strangely in accord with the well-known plans of the sect, such as the persecution of the Pope, state education, opposition to religious orders when they attempted to reappear, the various measures in fine directed against the Church in the *articles organiques*, which he surreptitiously added to the *concordat*. His personal despotism, no doubt, did not allow full scope to the anti-social plans of the party, and on this account the author of *Memoires diplomatiques* thought he might have been a "dupe."

From the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814, during the fifteen years which followed, the open conspiracy against the dynasty, and the still more open opposition to religion, which has been called *la Comédie de quinze ans*, is best explained by the underground plots of Freemasonry. This cannot be denied; and it is now a well-ascertained historical fact, that the great majority of *liberal* politicians, at that epoch, were Freemasons. But it is particularly from the French Revolution of 1830 to our own days, that it would be folly indeed to deny it; and it must be considered as demonstrated that the only key to the history of these fifty years is found in the universal agency of the secret society.

Here the field embraced is the whole of Europe. The scheme of the plot, it is true, always aimed at a universal spread; and from the beginning there was such a strict unity in the plan that not only Europe, but many countries outside of it, particularly in Central and Southern America, were brought under the dictation of the leaders. But until recently it was not easy to perceive it, owing to the deep secrecy strictly enforced on all the members; and what came to the surface appeared often to be only spasmodic and disconnected efforts which could scarcely be referred to a single head of the plot. As has been already remarked, during that long period of time, no historian, no publicist, scarcely any journalist, ever made mention of this society as having the least bearing on public events; and even after the whole world had been for more than a century subject to its decrees and machinations, everybody seemed to think that this was not matter of history. It looked as if it were either too sacred, or too awful, or perhaps too

puerile to be considered as connected at all with the ordinary play of human affairs.

But since 1830 there has been an immense change in that respect. Many members appeared to think that secrecy was no more necessary for a success which seemed already secure. And the sanction of death threatened against those who should reveal what they had seen or heard in the lodges, could no longer be enforced. Any one who should now refuse to acknowledge the tremendous power openly displayed before our eyes, would be as blind as any man who dared to deny the existence of the sun at noon. Nay, I am persuaded that the Freemasons themselves not only would contemptuously smile at this blindness but rather consider it a want of respect for their almighty control over human events. They, in fact, cannot object any more to be known as Freemasons, and the greater is the estimate of their boldness, their activity, and influence, the more they must be flattered by the well-deserved compliment. They openly now meddle everywhere with politics, religion, society, all the concerns of mankind; and though some of their books mention still their pretended abstention from the discussion of political and religious subjects in their lodges, they understand that this is only for credulous and unsuspecting people. Their overt acts are too flagrant for the supposition that they wish this childish belief should continue among any class even of the profane. Their books themselves speak in the most open manner; and the solemn prohibition formerly made under the most awful penalties, seems now to be a perfectly dead letter in their statutes.

Consequently the book of Father Deschamps assumes, as it were, a new aspect from 1830 down to our own day. Revolution, which before had been mainly confined to France, becomes universal in Europe. Partial efforts, indeed, had been made anteriorly in Italy, Spain, and Germany. They were only spasmodic, as was said, partial, and in the end they were defeated. But in the interval from 1830 to 1848, preparations were secretly made for a universal uprising, which succeeded everywhere at this last epoch (1848). These preparations are sketched in the ninth chapter of Father Deschamps's book. A new society is introduced on the stage of action. This is the branch of the Italian *Carbonara* under the lead of Mazzini, very different from the former one called *Alta Vendita*. The Freemasonry which had ruled until that day was mainly composed of those who have been called since "conservative masons." These men wished especially the enslavement of the Church; but as to governments, they wanted to establish only constitutional monarchies, whose destinies would remain in their hands, so as to keep the rabble under proper subjection. This middle class aimed

thus at establishing its power forever over the aristocracy and the mob. Their motto was *Liberty and Order.*

The new Carbonara, and Mazzini, its chief, had another object in view. This was the foundation of a universal republic, in which *plebeians* would rule, and the middle class itself fall under their sway. The eighteen years during which Louis Philippe appeared to govern the French nation, was therefore only the period of a fight between two powerful factions led by two sets of antagonistic lodges. The one most consistent and conformable to the original charter of Cologne, and to the former open programme which had brought on the Revolution of 1789, was sure to succeed, as it did in 1848. So that the ultimate result was a party more compact than ever, bent on practical atheism and utter radicalism, as we see it at this day, and most suitable to the leanings of the mob. It is important to examine closely the starting-point of this new life in the sect, in order to see how modern history is evolved from its secret agency.

The men in France who witnessed the Revolution of 1830, as I did, without belonging to any secret society, were at once startled by the sudden cry for a republic. This form of government had never so far been advocated by the *liberals* who had conspired against the elder Bourbons, and appeared fully satisfied with the substitution of the branch of Orleans with a new charter. But another party had suddenly arisen; and proclamations from Saint-Simonians, Fourierites, and some more ominous *republicans* without any other name, were posted everywhere, with open programmes, differing *in toto* from that of the successful insurrectionists of July, who had proclaimed Louis Philippe king. All knew that these last *insurrectionists* were the outgrowth of a Masonic conspiracy, elaborated in the conventicles of bankers, merchants, manufacturers, all Freemasons, and all belonging to the wealthy middle class. But all people read in the proclamations which were posted everywhere, that the object of a new *couche sociale*, as the French say, was socialism and communism for France, and a universal republic for Europe. I only relate what I myself saw in 1830. The most blind among the witnesses and readers, could not but conclude that the country had been undermined for a simultaneous double explosion, one in favor of moneyed men, who wished to substitute themselves in place of the former nobility; the other introducing on the stage of action the proletarian class, with its system, now openly proclaimed, embracing the destruction of the old society, and the creation of another antagonistic to the first.

The conflict between these two Masonic factions could not be but a dreadful one, and it began in France a few months after the Revolution of July, to continue throughout the eighteen years of

Louis Philippe's government. History has registered, as usual, the open facts of this *conflict;* but the secret springs by which everything was set in motion, not only in France, but likewise in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and other states, are totally unveiled by the author of *les Sociétés Secrètes et la Société.* The documents he quotes, the authorities he points out, the facts he discloses, must bring conviction to every candid mind. One single remark would suffice to prove his veracity: when, after the final explosion in France, in February, 1848, the Revolution suddenly broke out all over Europe, and in a few months all thrones were shaken as if they had been made only of pasteboard, no other cause could be assigned to such an extraordinary and stupendous overthrow, than the one Father Deschamps proclaims, and of which he gives so many convincing details.

In this country, in 1848, the arrival of every steamer from Europe announced a new rebellion; and people imagined, no doubt, that this came only from the aspirations of European nations toward a greater amount of liberty. A little reflection would have immediately refuted such an impossible supposition. A single nation cannot pass at once from a state of profound peace, as was then the case, to a state of open war between rulers and subjects. It requires more than a few days to make the necessary preparations; and if an attempt at insurrection is made by a simple mob gathered all at once in the streets and squares of the chief city of an empire, such as was that of Austria, for instance, a few squadrons of cavalry, followed by half a dozen regiments of infantry, are amply sufficient for sending back the silly citizens to their homes. But the ludicrous story becomes still far more absurd when it is not confined to a single nation, but embraces nearly the whole of Europe. It suffices to mention the supposed fact to render its possibility incredible to the most thoughtless hearer. History, reduced to this absurd form, is worse than a legend or a myth. It has not the amusing tone of a fairy-tale, yet it partakes of its flimsy nature.

Independently, therefore, of the documents furnished by Father Deschamps, simple reason suggests that the causes of the revolutions of 1848 are to be found only in the new lodges of a plebeian cast which had come into existence in Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and France, immediately after 1830, if not before. Eighteen years were employed in preparing the mine which was to "explode simultaneously all over Europe!" A great Masonic *convent* met at Strasburg in 1847, to make the last arrangements. The Saxon, Eckert, a very competent man, gives a list of the chief delegates from France and Germany, and says he was prepared to furnish the whole catalogue, which he had received from Berlin through an unimpeached chan-

nel. The names he gives are all very different from those who formerly ruled the lodges, and the first victory in Paris, the following year, was, in fact, a complete success of the lower Masonic element under the lead of Leon Rollin and Crémieux, over the more refined sect which had placed Louis Philippe on the throne, such as Lafitte and Casimir Perrier.

It is known that soon after began the first application of socialistic measures in favor of the lower classes, by the new government in France; but with regard to the universal uprising all over Europe, the brief narrative of Father Deschamps deserves to be quoted, because, in a very short compass, it describes most accurately, the quick process of it, with all its vicissitudes, such as took place. Paris had begun at the end of February:

"On March 10th Vienna is in open rebellion. The support of Louis Philippe's government, Metternich, is upset.

"On March 18th there are barricades at Berlin, frightful popular commotions, to be shortly followed by a German Parliament, in which President Gagern shall proclaim the sovereignty of the people.

"The same day terrific explosion at Milan.

"The 20th of the same month, revolution at Parma.

"The 22d, republic at Venice.

"Before the end of the same month, Naples, Tuscany, Rome, at the instigation of Palmerston's envoy, Lord Minto, and Piedmont likewise, had their parliamentary constitutions, preparatory to the republic in Rome, under Mazzini and Salicetti; in Florence, under Guerrazzi and Montanelli. Piedmont, meanwhile, was at open war with Austria.

"'It arose in Italy,' says Zeller, 'like an impetuous wind blowing over an incendiary fire.'

"'From the Pyrenees to the Vistula,' adds the translator of Eckert, 'the Revolution has unsheathed its dagger, and is brandishing its incendiary torch.'

"The universal republic prepared by Mazzini, with his young Europe, seemed to be triumphing everywhere. But the movement was, in fact, premature. Austria and Russia soon put an end to these attempts. . . . The Prussian dynasty refused, this time, the Imperial crown offered by the Assembly at Frankfort. In France, the bloody days of May and June brought on a conservative reaction, etc."

Disappointed in their hopes, after such an astonishing success, the lodges began again their underground working. Prince Louis Napoleon, who became, by his *coup d'état*, Emperor of the French, had formerly belonged to the new Carbonara in Italy, and this society considered him still bound by his oath. They were firmly

resolved to obtain from him the realization of their programme at least in Italy, or to inflict on him the usual penalty, death. They must have given him a warning, which he did not heed at first, and several attempts were made on his life. This is substantial history; but no proof of a Masonic plot, in these murderous attacks can be given to this day. The secret has been so profoundly kept, that only conjectures can be brought forward. The agency of Palmerston, in England, which is sketched in so masterly a manner by Father Deschamps, and accompanied with so many details, can be taken by the reader for what it is worth, since it mainly relies on the avowals of Misley, one of the conspirators, who might have had some private motive for speaking as he did. Still the contemporary history of England gives it a great air of probability.

It cannot be denied that the Palmerston and the Gladstone ministries helped efficiently the plots of Italian revolutionists. Garibaldi succeeded in Sicily and Naples, because England held the Mediterranean Sea by her fleets; and the calumnies spread against the governments of Naples and Rome were industriously kept alive by powerful speeches in the British Parliament. The memory of these facts cannot be erased from the minds of those who witnessed them. But the last attempt on the life of Napoleon III., by Orsini, in January, 1858, and what followed immediately after must carry conviction in all candid minds, on account of the proof given of it by the author under review. Among them is quoted at length an article of the *Giornale di Firenze*, in 1874, which has never been contradicted, and which fully revealed the plot and its main object, namely, the destruction of the temporal power of the Pope, and the unification of Italy, for ulterior designs,—all this through the agency of Napoleon III.

If the intrigues of Cavour, the letter of Napoleon III. to Edgar Ney, the declaration of war against Austria, are not considered by a captious critic sufficiently clear for giving an historical basis to the plot, there is a particular circumstance of the private interview between Napoleon and Orsini, which has received an official publication by the French government before a court of law, and also in the columns of the *Moniteur*, and which in itself suffices for thorough conviction. In that renowned interview, which Napoleon himself asked of Orsini, after his sentence, the Emperor bound himself to procure "the deliverance of Italy." It was agreed between both that Orsini would write a letter, which the Emperor would publish, and in which the programme of Italian unity should be proclaimed. This was sent to the official paper of the government, where it appeared; and it was afterwards read before the judges who had tried the would-be assassin. All this was to be rewarded by the safety of Napoleon. It is to be hoped that after

this astounding disclosure, no one will deny that Masonry or Carbonarism has some influence over European politics. Orsini was so sure that his last will and testament, contained in this letter, would be executed, Italy united and the Pope discrowned, that on ascending the scaffold, he exclaimed, "*Vive l'Italie, Vive la France!*"

Father Deschamps lays great stress on the policy of both Napoleon I. and his nephew, Napoleon III., as a part and parcel of the Masonic programme. We would not, perhaps, go as far as he does on several points. There are occasionally small facts, or words, or little incidents, which are made a great deal of, and which by themselves, might not have a great weight for many minds. But the complexion of the whole is always striking, and there are often deep remarks, which cannot be set aside as unimportant in the question. It is certain that Napoleon I., in his youth, was a Jacobin, and favored the policy of Robespierre. When Emperor, he tried his best to suppress the whole edition of his *Souper de Beaucaire*, in which he supported the atrocious system of the *Montagne* in the Convention. But the Jacobin policy was the thorough explosion of all former Masonic plots, and its *clubs* were only lodges working in the open air. Even after the French Emperor became a despot, he always asserted that he was the faithful representative of the Revolution, and if he occasionally persecuted some obscure Jacobins who plotted against him, he always felt a secret leaning toward others, whom he loaded with honors and lucrative positions in his court. As to Napoleon III., if he was more reserved in his words and actions, and appeared on the throne to have given up the plots of his youth, it was, as he said in the Orsini affair, *for the preservation of his dynasty*. But during the last ten years of his reign, he certainly worked actively for the benefit of the sect. One might think that he did it only through fear of his life. Enfantin, the old Saint Simonian and secret worker for the same object, has several times repeated, in letters quoted by Father Deschamps, that the Emperor was still at heart what he had been openly before; and Enfantin being one of his familiars, must have had in private conversations numerous proofs of it. But this, after all, is of little importance. The fact remains; Napoleon III. made Italy what it is, and was mainly instrumental in destroying the temporal power of the Papacy. It is, besides, a matter of notoriety, that under the second Empire, undoubtedly with the connivance of Napoleon III., Masonry was all-powerful in France. The Emperor sanctioned, openly, the existence of the secret society, at the same time that he abolished, by decree, the Association of St. Vincent de Paul, which Masonry alone detested in France, because by its benefactions it was acquiring too great an influence over the lower

orders. The policy of the new Carbonara, more radical than the old *conservative* Masonry, wished to prop itself on the rabble, which is at this day nearly altogether under its control.

If there remained still some doubts in reflecting minds, of the sad truth advocated by Father Deschamps, the ominous events which followed the downfall of Napoleon III. in 1870, would more than suffice for entirely dispelling them. The Masonic societies do not work any more under ground, but in open air. If they wish to keep anything secret, it is only their ultimate object, of which they do not boast, though it is sufficiently apparent. This is the design of radically destroying the old Christian society based on revealed and spiritual truths, and of substituting in its place the universal rule of materialism and naturalism. The dogmas of faith of the Christian, even the natural truths preserved by the spiritualistic philosopher, must disappear and be replaced by the aspirations of pure animalism, reducing the destiny of man to the base passions of this sublunary world. Man is made to enjoy on this earth, and he is a fool if he looks up to heaven. The universal republic which is contemplated must be an admirable mechanism, dispensing altogether from the belief in Providence and from the agency of a superior world. Public institutions, morality, the education of the young, all the details of life, must be remodelled on this new pattern. The institution of marriage for the family, of an authority derived from heaven for the state, of spiritual guidance for the flock of the Divine Shepherd, must be replaced by the indefinite license of divorce, by the sovereignty of the mob, and by the fierce independence of undisguised atheism.

As to morality, you may choose between either the easy-going play of the passions, free, if possible, from gross excesses, but independent of a threatening God, and thus altogether deprived of sanction, or (which is now the tendency), the open denial of all moral rule, leaving man to his brute appetites, and society to the absolute control of the strongest. In this system the practice of the decalogue and the gospel law are low superstitions, which must disappear in presence of the rights of man.

The most important object to be secured consequently is the education of the young, to accustom them from infancy to the new *laws* or rather *forces* which must govern modern society, and determine all the details of life. This must be done through *secularism*, which is, as every one knows, the main aspect of the great battle going on at this moment all over the world between the Church and the secret societies.

It is not pretended that all Freemasons, or even socialists and communists, have adopted this programme in its entirety, or even see any of these projects in the associations with which they have

allied themselves. A great number of them are altogether innocent of these open designs. But it is too clear that such plan of action is at this moment the programme of the leaders of the movement, and the last ten years of European history afford a complete demonstration of it. There are other men also who without being Freemasons advocate secularism and reject *in toto* whatever is supernatural. These are the positivists and agnostics, so powerful at this time in England and Germany. But they have evidently received their social system from the doctrine of the lodges, which was already in full sway long before the positivism of Comte and the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer were elaborated and offered nakedly to the world as the only true account of human life and destiny.

We cannot, unfortunately, furnish here all the proofs which Father Deschamps has given with full details in his book. It is, however, sufficient to point out in general the well-known facts which have lately transpired in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain, as well as in Germany. Everywhere the plan sketched a moment ago as the open programme of Freemasonry is carried out by fraud, intrigue, and at last open force and violence. The object cannot be any other than the destruction of positive religion, but chiefly of Catholicism, in order to organize a new society based on the satisfaction of animal passions, without any other restraint than the brute power of a godless state. Material enjoyment in this world, the complete independence of man from any superior law, the rigid subjection of spiritual authority under the full control of state autocrats, previous to the total extinction of supernatural belief and worship, is the prospect offered to all Europeans in a near future. The only hope of mankind is derived from the knowledge that God is stronger than the devil; and the Christian relies on Christ's promise as the firm support of that hope.

The plan is visible in the laws which are now enacted in the various states above mentioned. The family is threatened by projects of indiscriminate divorce; authority is declared to have its source in man, not in God; the spiritual guidance of mankind is openly rejected as a superstition; morality can have no other sanction than the penal code; and the education of the young must be confided only to an infidel state, or to laymen imbued with the same spirit.

These measures have been undoubtedly planned in the lodges, and are carried out as far as can be under the pressure of Freemasonry. The Kulturkampf of M. de Bismarck, in Prussia, which is the most perfect example of this impious design, seems at first sight to be independent of Masonic action. But it is well known

that when he first proclaimed it in 1873, he was not yet afraid of socialism, and on the contrary favored it by encouraging the efforts of many professors in the German universities. He has since thought, it seems, that he could keep his system in existence as the most potent arm against the Church, and at the same time oppose socialism itself as a secret political sect. In this he deceives himself, because socialism must necessarily prevail wherever the chief measures of the Kulturkampf are openly advocated.

In all other European states the plan which has been sketched a moment ago is openly that of Freemasonry. We had an occasion to say a word on the subject in a previous article of this Review on the "Ferry bill" in France; and some statistics were given in relation to the power of the sect in that unfortunate country, and to the influence they exert at this moment for the spread of infidel education, and in support of the strongest measures adopted against the Catholic Church. There is no doubt that similar statistics could be furnished for other European states, at least on the continent, and the *Civiltà Cattolica* has for many years back proved it to be eminently the case for Italy. It appears, however, according to this well-informed periodical, that in the Italian peninsula the Jews combine with the Freemasons for the same object. It seems certain that many Hebrews, in all countries, are initiated in some lodge or other; and if they do not hold a prominent position in Masonic designs except in Italy, it is chiefly owing to their universal dispersion, which prevents them from acting in any given state as a body in social or political events.

At the end of the work under review several important paragraphs give some details on the "Internationale," and on "Nihilism," the two latest expressions of secret societies; and their affiliation with Freemasonry is demonstrated.

It is the firm belief of the author that the "Internationale" is far from being dead, as some pretend, and that the next outbreak of revolution in Europe will bring it forward again for its destructive work. At the downfall of the Paris Commune in 1871, the "Internationale" broke up into two factions, one accusing the other of having sacrificed the communists in France to the will of Von Bismarck. Carl Marx fell into discredit; Bakounine placed himself at the head of his opponents, and the two sections of the party, under the name of Marxists and Bakouninists, formed temporarily two distinct organizations. But that these extreme sects of *anarchism*—for one of which this word was coined—belonged in fact to Freemasonry, was the patent result of their division on the subject of the Paris commune. To have abandoned it to its fate was in their eyes a crime, to have endeavored to secure its

power was a virtue. Masonry meanwhile had indorsed the excesses of the communists in so flagrant a manner, and had openly glorified them in terms so eloquent, that the union of both in the same designs could not be put in question. Ten thousand Masons with their regalia had gone to the Hotel de Ville, in Paris, to recognize the legitimacy of this bloody insurrection, and a few days later they went to plant their Masonic standards on the ramparts of Paris, not to oppose the Prussians, who were camped almost in sight, but to prevent the Versailles troops under MacMahon from marching against the anarchists. The speeches that were delivered on both occasions had no other theme than to proclaim the identity of doctrine between Masonry and Communism.

The "Internationale," therefore, which at that time ardently labored for the same Masonic object, and was nearly decomposed as an organization by the supposed treachery of a branch of it, must be considered a friend and ally, and the two placed in front of each other must be called in the words of the Latin poet, *par nobile fratrum.*

But the author of *Les Sociétés Secrètes et la Société* shows that these two branches of the party, which had been separated a moment in 1871, were reunited at Gotha in 1873. And it is, it seems, this fact which frightened M. de Bismarck and provoked him to a hostile attitude against socialism, as has been the case ever since. He saw the disciples of Lasalle and Bakounine, as well as those of Marx, ready again to attack the Prussian monarchy, and to give a fatal blow to that Germanic empire, which had cost him so many labors and taxed to the utmost his talent for intrigue and unscrupulous diplomacy. He felt that even his power, which had placed him at the head of Europe, was insecure in front of a dark plotting sect, which was undermining the ground under his feet. This alone would prove the political and social influence of Freemasonry, and force the most incredulous to acknowledge that now at least the secret societies furnish the key to the understanding of modern history.

The "Internationale," therefore, is stronger than ever, and its strength is chiefly derived from the fact that economical as well as political and social questions are embraced within its scope. In this it differs from previous Masonic sects, which meant only to interfere with religion and politics, and on this account did not even make an attempt at securing the co-operation of simple workingmen. It is, on the contrary, among the now potent class of proletarians that the Internationale endeavors to find adherents by spreading among them its *economical* doctrines. Hence all the trades unions in England and this country are naturally attracted

towards it, and are at least tempted to share in its destructive maxims concerning politics and religion.

On this account, probably, the general council of this universal society was for a short time transferred to New York, in 1873, at the time of its reorganization. This, however, did not last, and the reason of it was never divulged. It is not rash, nevertheless, to suspect that it was soon found that if in this country new economical maxims can easily affect trades unions, the other part of the Internationale's programme could not so easily be adopted on this continent, owing to the great number of Irish workingmen, who would never consent to become political revolutionists and anti-religious sectarians. I remember that about that time (1873), periodicals in this country spoke of the usual Irish stubbornness on both points.

The last chapter of Father Deschamps's book gives most interesting details on Russian Nihilism; and the connection of this last monstrous organization with the other secret societies seems to us at least demonstrated. It is a new revolutionary element entering the field of modern history, connected certainly with the previous ones, and better calculated than any other to strike with awe and terror. Rochefort, it is true, who has lately taken the trouble of going to Geneva, where at this moment many Nihilists sit openly in conclave against the Russian Czar, pretends that he has ascertained all the details of this new conspiracy. He spoke of it in a recent number of his *Intransigeant* paper, published in Paris, and says that Nihilism does not proceed by the usual method of lodges and secret cabals, but has simply formed disconnected *committees*, to which any individual Russian, desirous of sacrificing his life for his country by killing the Czar or his minions, applies for employment in such laudable enterprise. That is all, according to him. But even if reduced to this, the origin and subsequent history of Nihilism shows that it came from German professors, admitted into the Russian universities by the infatuated Alexander II., who had himself been educated in Prussia, and who has just fallen a victim to it. The doctrine of the "Internationale" was secretly professed and advocated by many of those instructors of the Russian youth, and is now bearing its fruit. To pretend that the Nihilists confine their aspirations to a parliamentary government in Russia, and that the new emperor Alexander III. will allay the storm, save his life, and make his people happy by liberal concessions, is only a delusion, which public events will soon falsify, and on this we must conclude here this discussion.

Thus far little, if anything, has been said of Freemasonry in England and this country. It has been demonstrated, it is true,

that it was carried from England to France at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It is somewhat doubtful if it primitively originated, in its recent form, in Great Britain or Germany. But it is certain that its spread, two hundred years ago, was mainly effected in France, Switzerland, and Northern Italy, by the exertions of Englishmen, who founded many lodges in those various countries. It is sure, moreover, that in this age a great portion of the Masonic doctrine is adopted by a large party of Englishmen, as far as the spread of revolution is concerned. This has been particularly visible in Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

After all these facts are admitted as they must be, there remains a practical question, which has been discussed, and seems to be still pending, namely, Is there a discrimination to be made or not between Freemasons in England and on the continent of Europe? Many, even among Catholics, think that there is. And as this country follows the lead of Great Britain on this point, the answer to this question must affect the United States as well as the mother country.

First and foremost, the Church does not admit any difference between them, and the English or American Freemason must renounce his allegiance to the sect before he is admitted to the reception of the sacraments. The reasons which can be brought forward to prove the necessity for this exclusion are discussed at some length by the writer of the second book quoted at the head of this article. Though his name is not given, and his work is only a translation from the German, he is evidently an Englishman of intelligence and sound views, and perfectly well acquainted with his country. He decidedly is of opinion that Freemasonry is in the main the same in England as on the continent of Europe; though the British temper of mind, being more conservative and less given than the French or German to abstract utopias, the last secret of the sect must be known in England to only a few men comparatively. It is proper to give here a brief abstract of the view he takes of this question, though the force of his argument must necessarily be greatly weakened by even the best condensation, and before this is done it is just to remark that this English book was printed in England in 1875, and the preface was dated January 4th, 1873. It is, moreover, only a translation from the German, which must have appeared before this last date. The first edition of Father Deschamps's book, therefore, being posterior, could not be known to the British writer. Still, it is surprising how both works agree together. The same main facts are quoted in both and the same conclusions drawn, though there does not seem to be any connection between them. The last edition of F. Deschamps's is four times as large and copious as the English

work; this is the only perceptible difference between them. If the French writer has presented Freemasonry in too dark colors, the same must be objected to the British translator, and also to the German book, which he has merely given in an English dress.

His reflections, however, on the identity of Masonic designs in England and on the continent are his own, and are given in his introduction. The following are the main points: *First*, the Church has condemned Freemasonry in England as well as anywhere else. What could have been her reasons for it? Every Catholic must believe that she could not exclude her children from the scheme of redemption by excommunicating them, except for the most urgent motives.

Secondly, the first of these motives must have been the universal requisite for entering a lodge, which cannot but be utterly condemned by the true teacher of morals,—the Church. The members of the craft in English-speaking countries, as well as anywhere else, bind themselves by an oath on their first entering the precincts of a lodge, to submit to an unknown authority, and to obey implicitly its order, whatever may be the object. This is obviously immoral; for individual responsibility cannot be transferred without sin, save to an authority constituted by God himself, and then only so far as is permitted by an express divine sanction. In a Freemason sect any member is exposed to be commanded to do what his own conscience forbids. How will he act if the case occurs? This cannot be compared to the obedience required of a religious toward his superior, in which the supposition of a command directly opposed to the law of God is always expressly excepted. Freemasonry, in fact, establishes a hidden empire within the empire, a hidden family within the family, a hidden sect within all religious communions, though it pretends to leave to its adepts freedom of belief.

In a third place, it is certain that if Freemasonry in English-speaking countries does not go so far as to aim at the destruction of government and society, it is absolutely antagonistic to Rome and the Papacy. The overthrow of Romanism as it is called, is undoubtedly one of its aims everywhere, and no one will deny that since the establishment of Anglicanism by Acts of Parliament England has mightily labored for that great object. It would be almost insane to pretend that English Freemasonry, satisfied with the phantasmagoria of the lodges, remains indifferent to the still mighty power of Rome. And it is but natural it should be so, since the French lodges were first founded by Englishmen, and the most prominent feature of Freemasonry in France last century was the thorough destruction of Catholicity, so well expressed by the philosophers' motto, *Ecrasons l'Infâme*. How could Catholics

in English-speaking countries think their conscience is not interested in obeying blindly men who must have still that great object in view, and sufficiently show it by aiming everywhere in this age at opposing the progress of Catholicity both in Europe and out of it? The relenting of the penal laws and the more liberal treatment of Catholics in England was imposed on the leaders of the nation by circumstances which could not be controlled, but there are still many signs of a silent opposition which must be chiefly efficient in the Masonic ranks. There are undoubtedly many Protestants of the British type who feel no hatred against the mother Church, and who frequently manifest a truly liberal spirit. But this cannot be said of a great many others; and it is quite significant that at this moment the opposition to Rome becomes rampant among the leaders of the ritualists' party, which at first appeared to be the highest exponent of the "High Church." Opposition to Rome is therefore a characteristic of the British mind.

Fourthly, even non-Catholics in English-speaking countries cannot in conscience bind themselves by an oath without knowing its object; and if the craft was confined to the spread of philanthropy and human brotherhood, that oath would be perfectly useless. Protestants, therefore, cannot join in it, because the designs which it naturally fosters do not embrace Catholicity alone, but Christianity likewise, or rather positive religion, including Judaism and Mohammedanism, as is well proved by the author. The difference of sects among Protestants is precisely the reason assigned in all the lodges for establishing, first, complete indifferentism, previous to schemes of destruction against all *sects* alike, in order to found everywhere, the reign of *reason* on the ruins of *faith*. This is plain from many authentic documents quoted by the British writer.

In a fourth place he proves that Freemasonry in England has precisely fostered the measures best adapted to sap the Christian religion, and the stability of the state, by advocating most persistently *secularism in the schools*, which is the best means of doing away with positive religion; and the complete *liberty of the press*, including the most radical measures of government, so as to do almost entirely away with the sense of conservatism, which was formerly so firmly rooted among Englishmen of all classes. Society in Great Britain offers certainly now an aspect very different from what it was thirty years ago; and it almost amounts to a revolution, which must prepare further events of a still more radical character.

Finally, the writer proves that there is, at least at this time, a positive connection between the British lodges and those of the Continent. Documents are quoted from various well-informed peri-

odicals, proving that the conspiracy embraces now the whole universe, not excepting this country of America, North and South, namely, these United States, and the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies of the South. That many princes are at the head of the lodges—the Prince of Wales has lately succeeded the Marquis of Ripon at the head of those of Great Britain—is not a proof that the destruction of religion and society is not intended; because these high-born Masons, including, perhaps, kings and emperors, are not the real rulers of the sect, but only the tools of more cunning men, who in reality put the machine into motion.

It is, therefore, futile to imagine in favor of secret societies in England a harmlessness which not only the Catholic Church does not recognize, but which even the smallest share of the Christian spirit must necessarily deny. If all truly conservative men opened at last their eyes to the danger, the lodges would be reduced to a contemptible body of fanatics, who could scarcely do harm to society on account of their small number, and of the instinctive repugnance produced, in general, among men, by their destructive, nay, loathsome and repulsive doctrines. If, on the simple mention of them, the question naturally recurs, "Is life worth living?" few, indeed, would be those who should consent to patronize them, when it would be reduced to these terms.

SOME OF THE ASPECTS OF THE WORK OF ENGLISH CONVERTS.

IN testing the fruits of what is called "a religious movement," we have rather to consider its impression on society than its visible or material work. To point to new churches, new schools, new associations, as a test of the vitality of any system, is not always an argument which is irrefutable; for there can be no doubt that many of the sects are mightily prolific in such offspring, while yet they possess no real vitality. The Church of England, as it is called, is as much busied at this time in spending millions on the expansion of its machinery as it has ever been at any period of its history, and possibly with as great a show of success. Yet the Church of England has nothing like the hold upon society which it had, say forty or fifty years ago, before the time when its new claim of being "Catholic" might be supposed to have enhanced its attractions. Dogmatically, the Church has lost much influence, from the fact that it teaches everything by turns, and, generally, several contraries at the same time. Socially, the Church has lost much influence, from the fact that the candidates for its ministry are of a lower social caste than in former years. Politically, the Church has lost much influence, from the fact that the new cry for disestablishment has already found an echo in high places. And yet, though the Church of England has lost influence,—dogmatically, socially, politically,—its new churches, "restorations," and flourishing guilds, show how strong is its desire to live on. The truth is, that in the shivered state of Anglican faith, Anglicans must do something to soothe their conscience; and that "something" takes the form of dipping the hand into the pocket to make material demonstration of being in earnest. The English middle classes being both wealthy and beneficent, it is only necessary to propose a "respectable" object, and the church or the school is at once built. This is the general meaning of the "vitality." It is, of course, only general, not particular; for it would be monstrous to impute motives to individuals. Yet it suffices to account for material growth. And it is for this reason,—because material growth proves but little, so far as the national appreciation is concerned,—that we must hesitate to apply a purely material test to the fortunes of Catholicism in England. True, there are noble Catholic churches in England where, forty years ago, there was a solitary "chapel;" there are superb establishments, conventual and educational, where, forty years ago, there

were but timid communities; there are "advertised" Catholic colleges and seminaries to the number of above seventy-five or eighty (and this within a few counties alone) where, forty years ago, there were only such historic retreats as, say, Ushaw, or Oscott, or Stonyhurst; yet such increase is not the test which a really thoughtful observer would regard as being paramount or final. It is rather to be accounted for by the grand earnestness of the few than by the tens of thousands of gifts of the many. If we could inquire: What is the "work" of the Catholic Church in England, or how much "growth" have her recent converts imparted to her? we would rather seek for an answer in the outward social impression than in the inward numerical gain.

It would seem ungracious to press the point that a noble work has been done by the little army of converts to the Catholic faith; because, as a matter of fact, *most of the hard work was done* before the converts began to be recruited. The hideous trials of our forefathers, their sublime patience and fortitude, their life-martyrdom of reproach and almost ignominy, these were the real seeds of the fruits of to-day,—the long winter which preceded the present spring. Let it be remembered that the converts brought with them into the Church that very status of social favor which was before lacking, the high rank of many of the converts making Catholicism to seem "respectable," that word so dear to the conventional Church of England man, the splendid intellects of some of the converts, and the at least educatedness of many of them, doing away with the old reproach of "Popish ignorance;" and even the wealth of some of the converts being thought so pregnant a social fact as to give suggestion for a grand romance by a prime minister. It is worth while to notice these separate features, because they have really much to do with the work done, and because they place the modern converts in an advantageous position, such as their forefathers scarcely ventured to dream of. If it be true that modern converts have accomplished a great work, and no one can deny that they have done so, it is at least as true that they owe something to "social accidents;" just as it is at least as true that "the burden and the heat of the day" had been borne by the obscure and the friendless, without whose meritorious, silent suffering there could never have been the new birth of prosperity.

And, first in the way of outward impression,—of effect upon the national apprehension,—there can be no question that the writings of the most distinguished of the converts have revolutionized the attitude of Protestants. Indeed, Protestantism may be said to have died out since it became impossible to "protest against the Church." So long as Catholicism was presented to the Protestant apprehension as equally superstitious and unscriptural, it was reasonable

to regard it with aversion; but when a Newman, or a Faber, or an Allies, or a Dalgairns, with a number of highly gifted associates, presented Catholicism to the astonished English conscience as equally intellectual and scriptural, it followed that to protest against Catholicism became really to protest against Christianity. Hence, to protest became obsolete or old-fashioned. An Englishman may be now a freethinker, a skeptic, a "modern thoughtist," or "unattached;" he may be indisposed to surrender opinion to authority; but he can no longer protest against the imperfectness of a system which he has perceived to be complete within itself. He is driven to fall back on the assertion of his independence, because if he accepts any authority it must be the Catholic. And this has been the most patent of the fruits of the new apostleship, new in its adoption by gifted converts, that it has dethroned and almost extinguished the old Protestantism. The only sort of Protestantism which now survives,—that is, among the educated classes,—is a sort of *odium theologicum*, or ill-will, such as we see in the writings of Dr. Littledale, or in the columns of some of the Ritualist newspapers. It is not pure Protestantism, because it is not pure prejudice; it is the disposition to reject the Catholic faith. Most educated Englishmen have read some of the works of modern converts, the profoundly spiritual treatises of Cardinal Manning, the intellectual unravellings of Cardinal Newman, the poetical aspirations of Frederick Faber, the scholarly sermons and concise books of Canon Oakeley, the learned historical treatises of Dr. Northcote, the devotional manuals or exercises of the Oratorians, the careful essays and treatises of Dr. Ward; nor is there one of the readers of any one of these authors who has not given up Protestantism pure and simple. The dark side to such half conversions is that the immense majority of them are negative. They stop short at the abandonment of delusions. Hence the shifting of the old ground of anti-Catholicism; hence the new reign of free thought in England! If the most ostensible of the fruits of the Catholic movement has been the killing of the old-fashioned English Protestantism (among the intellectual and well-informed classes) the most ostensible of the harms,—no fault of the new apostles!—has been the substitution of free thought for Protestantism.

It is no more blame to the new apostles that the mass of Protestants have not followed them than it was blame to St. Peter that he did not convert all the Jews, or to St. Paul that he did not convert all the Gentiles. Yet what the converts have done is briefly this: They have converted hundreds of thousands of English Protestants, who are now faithful members of the Catholic Church; they have diminished the old prejudice in high places, so that Lords, Commons, and the Press are now respectful; they have helped to

originate about two hundred parish churches, and about a hundred and twenty conventual schools, with some fifty literary societies and institutions, and perhaps the same number of refuges and orphanages; they have pushed their way into the highest literary grooves, and are now read in the *Saturday*, the *Spectator*, the *Athenæum*, the *Academy*, the *Contemporary*, the *Nineteenth Century*; they have made themselves heard as the champions of political rights, as well as the advocates of religious freedom; receiving from the government almost as much place and honor as if they were members of the National Church; and even succeeding in sending a Catholic peer to India to hold the highest position under the Crown. It was asked by a Catholic member in the House of Commons, during the contest about the obnoxious Mr. Bradlaugh, "whether in view of the general principle of absolute religious toleration in the government of this country, the Prime Minister was prepared to advocate the abolition of all remaining religious checks at present existing, such as those which prevent a Lord Chancellor or Sovereign of Great Britain being a Catholic?" The question, though doubtless put sarcastically, was suggestive of some very important truths. Since the passing of the Catholic Emancipation Act, all kinds of believers and unbelievers have pressed their way into high political position, and it must follow that Protestantism, in its old-fashioned sense, being politically, or as a test-point, dead and buried, cannot be pleaded any longer as an apology for intolerance towards the throne, or the woolsack, or Dublin Castle, and that it is monstrous for the Queen's Majesty to be compelled to be Protestant, when the Queen's Parliament may be skeptical or infidel. Even Mr. Bradlaugh would have the right, as a member of Parliament, to demand an audience of her Majesty at Windsor Castle; so that to compel her Majesty to be of one particular religion, while her faithful Commons may be of no religion whatever, or, at all events, of any religion they please, does seem to be invidiously severe. Moreover, since Jews may now sit in Parliament, the old idea of the essentially Christian constitution has obviously passed away out of England. It is lamentable to have to admit it, but the passing of the Catholic Emancipation Act, in 1829, presented this new question to the (Protestant) country: Shall we allow Catholics to have their political liberties, and refuse the same liberties to *anybody?* Add to the Catholic Emancipation Act the democratic Reform Bill, which succeeded it within the short space of three years, and we see how the new spirit of religious liberty,—with the growing political influence of the democrats,—threw open the flood-gates to all comers. In 1850, when the Catholic hierarchy was restored, the country had grown accustomed to wider liberties, but had not grown more

tender towards Catholicism; hence, there was a disposition to counterpoise Catholic liberties by an extension of liberties to non-believers. The Jews and the Quakers had become legislators; then why not the skeptic and the infidel? It was the inevitable sequence of the new spring of Catholicism, that it should either lead to the conversion of the nation or to a great spread of free thought and religious laxity. As it happened, it led to the latter. No blame again to the new convert apostles! The choice was offered to the nation and was badly made. So that we must reluctantly confess,—and it would be useless to try to hide it,—that one of the consequences of the new conversions, and of the new life of Catholicism,—from the date of the Catholic Emancipation Act to that of the conversion of Dr. Newman, and still more from this last date to the present time,—has been the loosening of the old moorings of thoroughly sincere Protestantism; and thus the giving an apology for a more than Protestant freethinking, for a freethinking which has destroyed Anglican traditions. There is no avoiding the conclusion that equal injury and benefit have been wrought by the new attitude of Catholicism, for in the proportion of the liberty given to truth has been the liberty given to every kind of error. Politically the Catholic Church has but gained ground *pari passu* with Judaism and sectarianism; nor has the increase in the number of the Catholics been so great as in that of the freethinkers. So that we have to lament over the development of "irreligious" liberty while we have to rejoice over the development of "religious."

Such a twofold development was a foregone absolute certainty, save on the hypothesis of a national conversion. And a national conversion was out of the question. The work of the converts might include an earthquake of the old establishment, but it could scarcely include the building of a new city. It could loosen, but it could but partially rebuild. In the language of poor Lord Beaconsfield, "The conversion of Dr. Newman dealt a blow to the establishment from which it still reels;" but the reeling establishment still covers the ground; and religiously, politically, socially, a thousand architects, who are none of them Catholics, are trying their hand at repairs. Meanwhile, the "Catholic body" is at this disadvantage, that while a vast number of its clergy are conspicuously gifted, not many of its laity are "leading men." Of the eighty-six Catholic peers and baronets; of the seventeen Catholic lords who are not peers; of the six Catholic members of the Privy Council; of the fifty-five Catholic members of the House of Commons; we may say respectively that there is no great man amongst them, who is capable of "leaving a mark on his age." This is, in no way, an impeachment of their merits; it is only an important social fact.

Yet it is "socially" that we must look for better days—that is, in the purely natural order. "Socially," the influence of a Newman or a Faber is felt keenly by High Churchmen and Ritualists; and, therefore, in the educated strata; but "socially" there are no lay Catholics—either born Catholics or converts—to whom English society looks up, as it does to many of the Catholic ecclesiastics. In these days there are such a number of highly-educated English noblemen, as well as of distinguished English commoners, that a Catholic grandee takes his place among the crowd as no better and no worse than his compeers. We have not a Count de Mun, a Herr Windthorst, a Signor Acquaderini, to make society listen, and even fear. We have a great many good men—no great men; and in these days a man must be pyramidal, or he has very little chance of being looked at.

Meanwhile there is the under current of influence, which it were simply impossible to measure. Who shall say what is the work, in the home life or in the club life, in the drawing-room, at the dinner-table, in the smoking-room, of the numerous convert barristers, solicitors, merchants, officers in the army and in the navy, press-men, artists, architects, and even actors? It would be in bad taste to mention names; yet nothing could be more easy than to trace the influence on London journalism (to speak of this one department alone) of five Catholic leader-writers on one paper, two Catholic reviewers on another, seven Catholic contributors to "comic" papers, as well as not a few editors and sub-editors. It would be easy to show exactly where the tone of a certain paper was, at least, mellowed, if not quite changed, by such influence. And let us remember, too, the advantage of mere protest. "Does that go into the paper?" asked a Catholic sub-editor, of a non-Catholic editor of a London journal. "It does," was the reply. "Then I will have nothing more to do with the paper," said the sub-editor. And he put on his hat, and walked out. This kind of influence is keenly felt. And so, too, it is well known that many of the exhibitors at the Royal Academy, many of the professors in the highest walks of science, as well as many popular entertainers of the better sort, are "converts to Rome," who have lost none of their old power by submitting their consciences to the Church. It is in such grooves that we must look for "convert work." Could it be possible to make exact computation of the influence of different classes of converts, it might be found that to the silent workings of the earnest and industrious, much more than to the few brilliant, exceptional men, is due the silent progress of Catholicism. And that such progress is a vast progress, though a silent one, is known especially to those Catholic priests who minister in English large towns. Thus it is calculated that there were sixty thousand com-

municants last Easter Sunday morning in London; that in Manchester, in the course of last year, there were five hundred receptions into the Church; while in Birmingham, the attendance in Catholic schools gave proof of the many conversions of parents. "To the poor the Gospel is preached." It is not reported in the newspapers that the artificer or the artisan has been received into the Catholic Roman Church; but such conversions take place every day; and though the ingathering be homely and partial, it is not without leavening effect.

So that, summing up what has been said, we may conclude that the work of the converts has been, briefly, in the following six grooves: it has completely changed the traditional character of the old Protestantism, "converting" it practically into skepticism; it has raised the social status of English Catholics, as it has raised the literary status of Catholic writers; it has spread the knowledge of Catholicism, and has begotten a respectfulness towards it, in the numerous circles of English social and homely life; it has extended Catholic political influence, and has at least ranked itself as a power in the state; and, materially, it has increased the working machinery of the Church, by almost innumerable new churches and institutions. Negatively, yet quite innocently, it has been *followed* by the increase of every sort of free thought and skepticism; for the simple reason that those who would not become Catholics had no rational motive left for remaining Protestants. This last subject is of such terrible importance, that it may be considered as to the (probable) future.

Taking the six points together—which we have just now enumerated—as fair divisions of the results of the new conversions, we may conclude that their significance will come hereafter to be developed in some such relation as the following: Conversion is not likely to march so quickly as its opposite national movement, freethinking; while the loosening of Protestantism, as the accepted national religion, will hasten the development of every error. The improved social and the improved literary status of the Catholic Roman religion in England, *plus* the acknowledged fact that the Catholic Roman religion is the *only* ecclesiastical force which can command respect, will cause the Catholic Roman religion to remain intellectually the supreme religious system of Great Britain. Material prosperity, in the way of churches and institutions, or of largely-revenued converts to the Church, will be auxiliary as increasing opportunity; but the use of the opportunity will depend on Protestant wills; and, from experience, we cannot augur much from them. The political elements will be developed by the religious elements, greater power following, naturally, on greater demand; yet the disposition to admit atheists to Parliament, with the disposition to

disestablish the English Church, looks a good deal more like a general break-up of *all* religions, than a tendency to give predominance to any *one*. So that the prospect is not cheering, though it is hopeful. The prospect is certainly better for the Catholic Roman religion than it is for any one of the sects; but it is only better because the Catholic Church is the *best* Church, and therefore claims more respect than the other churches. In other words, the Catholic Church will continue to grow in importance by the side of the many perpetually decaying sects, without necessarily growing greatly in point of numbers—that is, without becoming the National Church.

It need not be said that such an estimate is a purely natural estimate, and takes no account of the grace of God. But we are only considering the subject in its natural aspects, or as it presents itself to the natural reason. No one can presume to speculate by what agents, by what methods, Divine Providence may accomplish His own ends. As in individual conversions both the agent and the method are very often the very last which we should have anticipated, so in national conversions the agents and the methods may be the very opposite of what we should think to be likeliest. It is of the natural aspects alone that we have spoken; and of these with some words of regret. Yet the regret must come home to us with a judicial severity, when we each ask of ourselves, what is *our* work? Setting aside the splendid examples of devoted lives—of missionary spirit in the few—nay, in the many—would England remain long unconverted, if every Catholic did his best, by example and persuasion, to convert all his kinsfolk and acquaintance?

THE SPIRIT-WORLD.

De Deo Creante, Praelectiones Scholastico-Dogmaticae, quae habebat Camillus Mazzella, Soc. Jesu, in Gregoriana Universitate Studiorum Praefectus et Theologiæ Professor, Academiæ Romanæ S. Thomæ, AQ. Socius e Decem Urbanis. Editio Altera. Romæ, ex Typographia Polyglotta, S. C., De Propaganda Fide, 1881.

"THE work should praise the master," is the best eulogy that can be pronounced on Father Mazzella's De Deo Creante. Sparing the humility of the modest Jesuit only to give it the more effectually its most coveted reward, it may safely be said that his work worthily, if aught that is human can at all be worthy, gives back to God the glory of his wonderful works. *Verbum sat.* The volume has been so universally and favorably noticed by Catholic reviewers, that further commendation might easily be mistaken for flattery. It may not prove unprofitable, however, and certainly it is not unseasonable, to call the attention of the learned in a more special manner to Father Mazzella's Treatise (III.) on the Angels.

The belief in spiritual beings, which are inferior to God but superior to man, is one of the oldest and most universal in the human family. It is based upon that early manifestation which, according to the inspired books, took place almost in the first hours of man's existence. The tempter who wrought his ruin, and "the cherubims which the Lord God placed before the paradise of pleasure," could never be forgotten by the afflicted soul of man. The spirit-world was every way his enemy. One portion of it had in its tremendous crash and fall broken through the weaker fabric of his own world, and borne him down with it into the abyss of sin and its consequent woes; the other stood prepared "with wheeling swords of flame" to bar his return to the garden, and smite him with the wrath of heaven. Henceforth man's thoughts of that higher world are inseparable from the ever-present sense of his fallen condition; the history of the one cannot go down to posterity without the explanation of the other; error and vice may obscure and distort the ancient tradition, but can as little blot it from his mind as make him forget that he must die the death. This is not a demonstration of what should be, but a plain statement of what has been; not so much a philosophical deduction from the nature and condition of man, as a summary of his past history. Man has not been able to forget the spirit-world.

In that one and only true Church, which from the beginning was founded on the faith in the Saviour, the primitive tradition was not only preserved in its integrity, but so strengthened by the

apparitions of good angels and the possession of men by evil spirits, that it exercised a constant influence on the daily lives of the faithful. Under the law of fear, strong and holy men put all their trust in the protecting care of good angels, but dreaded to behold them in vision, "lest they should die;" under the law of love the very children not only long to gaze upon the face of their guardian angel, but do not even dread, once they know the virtue of the sign of the cross, the powers of darkness. According to the ruling dispositions of fear or love there is indeed a marked difference between the effects produced by the belief, but the belief itself is ever unchanging and the same. Still as of old "the two cherubim of beaten gold" stand within the sanctuary of God; still, as thousands of years ago, does many a venerable Tobias say to his disconsolate wife: "Weep not, our son will arrive thither safe, and will return safe to us, and thy eyes shall see him. For I believe that the good angel of God doth accompany him, and doth order all things well that are done about him, so that he shall return to us with joy." Tob. 5 : 26.

Outside of the Church of Christ the primal tradition became more and more obscured in proportion as the nations fell away from the worship of the true God and plunged deeper into idolatry and infidelity. But it was never entirely obliterated or lost. Hesiod's story of the wars of the gods, which in one shape or another recurs in all the mythologies of the Gentile nations; the countless lesser gods, good and bad, friendly and hostile, with which pagan fancy peopled every hill and forest, and river and sea; the household gods, and the infernal deities that were enemies of the *numen* and of man; what else are these but a debased picture of the scriptural battle in heaven, and all the good and ill it brought to man. Nor have the sects which retain the name of Christian proved an exception to that law of degeneracy which governs the realm of error. In their hands the spirit-world has assumed all the absurd forms that can possibly be imagined between the pantheistic emanations of the absolute being or the aeons of the Gnostics, and the dead men's ghosts of spiritualists, or the scientists' latent material forces energized under favorable circumstances. Yet, beneath all these vagaries, the ancient tradition and belief of a real spirit-world lie securely imbedded in the souls of men. Viewed historically, therefore, the primitive seed of tradition had struck such deep roots in the soul of man, that though error stunted it in its growth, and vice made it wax rank and poisonous, and pride of intellect trampled it under foot, not one of them nor all of them combined could ever succeed in killing its living roots in the heart of man.

Even our unscrupulous and unsparing age has not yet succeeded

in dislodging the spirit-world from the popular mind. It is indeed not strange that the old Church should show no inclination to change her mind; she is in secure possession of the truth. But it does seem unaccountable at first sight that the Rationalism and Materialism of the day, have not after a century of hard work succeeded in any appreciable degree in bringing that odious superstition into disrepute, even beyond the pale of the Church, and at least in their own domain laughing it simply away. The entire failure in the attempt cannot be attributed to a lack of will or energy in the fashionable enterprise of enlightening the civilized world; the missionaries of reason and matter have succeeded only too well in placing their idols upon the altars of the non-Catholic world. "But the old god," as a German proverb has it, "sleeps not." A reaction of the strangest and most formidable character has set in. In the very hour when Rationalists and Materialists compliment themselves upon the easy grace with which they have given the death-blow to the gruesome monsters of superstition, these themselves rise up in the shape of spirit-rapping, mesmerism, and spiritism, and with the vitality of hydras defy men to cut off their heads. Spirits have taken hold of the rebellious minds of men with vindictive hands; the most stubborn reason cannot shake off their unyielding grasp. Whether this frightful visitation be one of mercy or of wrath, whether in the eternal counsels it was meant to be a saving light out of darkness, or but keener lightnings to strike men blind in their worship of demons, certain it is that even professed agnostics and avowed infidels are rudely shaken from their ecstatic contemplation of the atoms of matter, and confronted with beings, impalpable, invisible, imponderable, they must own, but so real, so strong, so intelligent, that they laugh the self-deifying wise men to scorn. Vainly does the unbeliever, after his first shuddering confession of the truth, endeavor to cover his confusion with the excuse that he was frightened into it; vainly does he rack his brain for some high-sounding, but as usual, unintelligible explanation of those startling phenomena. He cannot find a parallel in nature's most mysterious and violent revolutions; even his hitherto unequalled self cannot stand with composure in the humiliating comparison with the unearthly visitants; do what he will, the world only smiles at his awkward discomfiture, and clings the more tenaciously to the undeniable reality of the spirit-world.

This unusual and extraordinary intrusion of the spirit-world into our every-day life, has awakened that anxious curiosity with which men are seeking to learn something more about its nature and history. But whence is the desired information to come? Where can they obtain it save in the teaching of the Catholic Church,

which alone has preserved the hoarded treasures of revelation and tradition from the rust and the thieves of time? She alone has existed long enough to be in a position to give the traditional history of the angelic world, and she alone, let it be borne in mind, can establish the claim of being the only divinely constituted, and, therefore, infallible, exponent of the revelations of God to man. A review, therefore, of the practical points of Catholic doctrine concerning the angels as set forth by Father Mazzella, in his *De Deo Creante*, will go far towards meeting one of the principal demands of the times.

The doctrines of the Church concerning the *existence* and *nature* of the spirit-world are clearly defined. The Vatican Council (*Constit. Dei Filius*, c. i.), repeating and confirming the words of the IV. Lateran Council, declares: "The true God alone . . . . at once from the beginning of time created out of nothing, both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, to wit, the angelic and the mundane, and then the human, as a common nature constituted of spirit and body;" and in the *fourth* and *fifth canons*, anathema is pronounced against those who deny that the spiritual creatures (the angels) were created by God, or assert that they emanated from the substance of God.[1]

Before the tribunal of the Church it would therefore be *heretical* to maintain, with the Sadducees of old or the Materialists of the day, that there are no angels at all; heretical, to assert with the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, that they are the mere outward manifestations of the energy of God, or, as the Pantheist now words it, real or ideal determinations of the undetermined absolute being; heretical to teach, with certain spiritists, that the angels are nothing distinct from the departed souls of men; heretical, to hold, with materialists, that they are only forces of matter; heretical, in fine, to claim that they were created from all eternity. The definitions of the councils go so far and no farther under this head; but the universal belief of the Church extends to many collateral points which are of divine faith. For instance, the councils defined that the angels are spiritual beings, but did not proceed further and determine the kind and degree of their spiritual nature; yet the universal Church believes, on the authority of Holy Writ and tra-

---

[1] "Solus verus Deus . . . . simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicit et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam" (c. 1).

Can. 4: "Si quis dixerit, res finitas, tum corporeas, tum spirituales, aut saltem spirituales, e divina substantia emanasse; . . . . anathema sit."

Can. 5: "Si quis non confiteatur, mundum, resque omnes quae in eo continentur, et spirituales, et materiales, secundum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex nihilo esse productas; . . . . anathema sit."

dition, that the angels are beings, not only of a much higher order than man, but entirely incorporeal and purely spiritual.

The superiority of angels over men is so universally admitted, that it is hardly necessary to do more than indicate their scriptural and traditional outlines. The angel "who went down with Azarias and his companions into the furnace, and drove the flame of the fire out of the furnace, and made the midst of the furnace like the blowing of a wind bringing dew;" the splendid one whom Daniel saw, "clothed in linen, his loins girded with the finest gold, his body like the chrysolite, and his face as the appearance of lightning, and his eyes as a burning lamp, and the voice of his word like the voice of a multitude;" the still grander one whom St. John beheld coming down from heaven, "clothed with a cloud, and a rainbow upon his head, his face as the sun, and his feet as pillars of fire;" the angel of the Lord who slew the first-born of all Egypt in one night; that other angel who stretched the army of Sennacherib dead on the plain; the evil spirits that tormented the possessed; Satan himself carrying our Lord to the pinnacle of the temple, and to the top of a high mountain, and showing him all the kingdoms of the earth; such, and so sublime are the mere outlines of the angels of Scripture. Christian tradition has not only preserved them, but filled them out with richer light and shade, to make the fully finished pictures of the guardian angels and the powers of darkness. In these, the tradition, and doctrine, and belief of the Church are brought to a double focus. In the one is embodied her constant belief in the salutary protection of good spirits, potent enough to avert dangers which men can neither foresee nor escape; in the other she is seen to enter the lists against malicious and destroying spirits in the divine might of her holy orders, and of that name at whose sound even the rebels against the Most High must bend the knee. The Catholic Church alone possesses the power of exorcism; she alone has fallen heir to that divine power over evil spirits with which her founder confounded the incredulity of the Jew and the pride of the Pharisee. Strange enough, while men are free to deny her claims, the demons not only are forced to respect them, but will not recognize pretenders. Like the evil spirit whom the Jewish exorcists conjured "by Jesus, whom Paul preached," they make answer to all such pretenders, "Jesus we know, and Paul we know; *but who are you?*" Acts 19.

The superiority of the angels over men is further evidenced by the fact that they are *pure spirits*. Their apparition under human form cannot be urged from Holy Writ with any show of demonstration to the contrary. The Scriptures, so far from telling us that the angels have bodies, call them simply spirits. St. Paul even expressly excludes flesh and blood from the angelic nature, telling

us that "our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against *principalities* and *powers;* . . . against the *spirits of wickedness* in high places." Ephes. 6. As circumstances never compelled the Church to define upon the point, it is not surprising to find some of her learned sons, in earlier times, boldly maintaining that the angels have bodies of a very subtle material texture. Traces of this adverse opinion may be discovered as late as the twelfth century. It is worthy of note, however, that very few, if any, of the Fathers seriously inclined to that novel view. The hesitancy with which some of them spoke in favor of pure spirits was not a concession to their opponents in the debate, but rather an admirable expression of their laudable fear of being too positive on an open question. It cannot be denied that some of the more ancient among them called the angels *bodies;* but in their day the idiomatic force of *corpus*, even in good Latinity, was equivalent to our English *substance*. Accordingly Tertullian called even God a body, though, to judge from his writings, he was very far from dreaming of a corporeal God. This usage will appear less strange if we advert to that of our English *body*, which word, though its first meaning is corporeal substance, is nevertheless transferred to the much higher signification of *person*, when we say *somebody*, *anybody*, *everybody*. All learned controversy on the pure spirituality of the angels ceased with the IVth Council of Lateran, in which, as may be seen in the words already quoted, the angelic nature was placed in direct opposition to corporeal substance, with the human compound as a mean between the two.

Going a step further, Catholics have always believed that world of superior pure spirits to be exceedingly populous. According to Holy Writ, the number of the good angels alone is beyond reckoning, and we know from the same source that Lucifer drew after him a third part of the original multitudes. When Job beheld the armies of the Most High, he cried out in amazement, "Is there then a number of his warriors?" St. John and the prophets give figures which were used by the Hebrews to express numbers that are indefinite. Some of the Fathers estimated the total number of the angels relatively to those of men as ten to one; others deduced from the parable of the good shepherd, the proportion of ninety-nine to one; many did not hesitate to give it as their opinion that the angels are as numerous as all the living things that shall ever people our earth, so grand, they conceived, even in the magnificence of numbers, should be the royal court of the King of kings.

Of the framework of that extraordinary society of spirits we know from Scripture and tradition that it is divided into three distinct *hierarchies*, each containing at least three kingdoms or *choirs*. In the first hierarchy the inspired writers and the Fathers place

the flaming Seraphim, the wise Cherubim, and the Thrones of God's justice, always in the same succession and gradation in rank and dignity. In the same way they invariably assign the two last choirs of the third hierarchy to the extraordinary and ordinary ambassadors of the Most High, the Archangels and the Angels. The lordly Dominations, the wonder-working Virtues, the Powers that baffle the demons, the Principalities that govern the republics and monarchies of the earth, must be distributed among the second and third hierarchies, but their relative position is wholly undetermined.

Whether the choirs represent as many distinct species of angels or not, is a disputed question. St. Thomas, upon the principle that "matter is a necessary condition for the multiplication of individuals of the same species," goes so far as to maintain that each individual angel constitutes a distinct species by himself. Be that as it may, the radical cause of the distinction and division of the choirs must be based upon some equally marked difference in their natural endowments, and above all in those higher gifts of grace which correspond to their capacity and the offices for which they were created.

Though the choirs are, in all likelihood, made up of as many species as they count individual members, and though those individual spirits differ as star differeth from star in splendor and magnitude, universal belief concedes even to the lowest of them such superior intelligence and extraordinary powers over matter as befit the highest creatures of the hand of God, even in the order of *pure nature*. They cannot, it is true, as limited beings, be omnipresent or omniscient, cannot naturally be in far-distant places at the same time, cannot unlock the secrets of free souls or fathom the mysteries of the inscrutable God; but within the range of that knowledge and power which is compatible with created nature, who shall tell how that Almighty hand which has made each tiny thing a wondrous world, chose to enrich the spirits that from lowest to highest it has set for a crown upon its universe. For, viewed merely and precisely as created beings that leaped forth from nothingness at the call of the Almighty Father, the angels form the highest and most magnificent sphere of the universe. Spirits of unimaginable grandeur, rejoicing in the strength of their sovereign intellects and wills, they would have been, even within the narrow bounds of nature, the deathless bards of the eternal King, singing beneath his barred palace-gates in myriad-voiced minstrelsy. Unfettered by matter they would have spurned space in their exploring flight from world to farthest world, and rising aloft from every newly discovered marvel, hymn unceasingly their Creator's praise. Their endless song would be their immortal happy being. The Father,

whom they would know so well and love so strongly, shrouded though his face forever be in the splendid cloud of his works, must always be the centre of their natural beatitude. But if left in the depths of created nature they could never reach Him, never see Him face to face. He dwells in light inaccessible. The highest possible creature is infinitely far away from Him; the divine order is essentially different from that of the creature; the walls of finite nature are vast, but they cannot be passed; the creature cannot of its own strength rise to the divine level with its God. But God can come to it, can lift it up in the hollow of his hand, and press it to his bosom, and wear it in his heart. He can infuse into the spirit a new and supernatural life, can breathe into it that *something divine* which is called *sanctifying grace*, in the strength whereof it can see the face of God and live.

It is Catholic doctrine[1] that God elevated the angels to that supernatural order of grace which was to introduce them into the splendors of the divinity after a trial of their free obedience. The duration of that trial is uncertain. According to some of the doctors of the Church it was long; according to St. Thomas, very short, for the reason that as beings already perfect in the order of nature they could compass the end proposed to them by a single and instantaneous act of perfect charity. The nature of the sin of the fallen angels is again a matter of dispute. Many theologians are of opinion that it was *envy*, either of the Word because He is equal to the Father, or of man who was destined to be a partner in their glory. Most divines, however, hold with the angelic doctor, that it was a sin of *pride*, but differ in explaining its precise nature. Some think that the rebellious spirits would have Christ adore them; others, that they presumed to be like God, not indeed in equality of nature, for they knew that to be an impossibility, but in some resemblance which was either altogether impossible, as in creative power, or if possible, deordinately coveted against the will of God, as for example, to know of their own power the free future actions of men. Be that as it may, it is of faith that the good angels obeyed and the wicked rebelled. That instant the ravishment of the beatific vision burst upon the eyes of the blessed spirit; instantly the cry of Michael was heard in heaven, "Who is like God!" At once the heavenly warriors went forth to execute divine vengeance, and Lucifer and his angels fell "like lightning from heaven," forever lost. There is to be no redemption for them: "there is no redemption out of hell." This is the mystery of divine justice that fills every Christian with terror and awe. Placed side by side with the ineffable mystery of man's redemption

[1] Catech. Conc. Trid., p. 1, de Duodecim Symb. Artic., a. 1., n. 20.

it only gains a more unspeakable horror. All the blood of the Son of God was shed for the worm of the earth; for the legions of superb spirits there was not to be one saving drop. The Fathers endeavored to account for the severity of the sentence by telling us that the angels were such great and therefore such highly responsible beings, that they had no bodies, no passions, no tempter, to lessen or palliate their crime. But these reasons are not sufficient to preclude a once possible redemption on the part of infinite mercy; they are at best only an attempt to explain what must always be a mystery. Sinner and saint alike must bow down and acknowledge that the fallen angels are the everlasting monument of God's justice; God willed it, and He is just; this much is evident, the rest is a mystery.

By the unspeakable mercy of God men are destined, if found worthy, to replace the fallen angels in heaven, and according to St. Augustine and many other fathers, the end of the world is to be heralded in by the triumphant entrance of the last sainted soul into the forfeited inheritance of Lucifer and his angels. If man, then, is expected to win the thrones of higher and higher angels that from every choir erst fell from heaven, what wonder that the generous children of the Church have at all times spurned the pleasures of this life and thought it folly to compare them with the glory that "shall be revealed in them hereafter." Who, they cried, shall ascend those heights of glory, who mount even to the spheres of flaming seraphim, what soul shall win the highest of angelic thrones, that which once was destined for Lucifer, the fallen star of the morning? Not men alone have asked themselves these questions. The same questions have caused the legions of heaven to come down to earth and fight side by side with the struggling souls of men; the selfsame questions are still repeated by Lucifer and his angels in the bitterness of despair, and they explain the intense hatred with which the fiends seek to wreak their vengeance on the low-born adopted sons of God, men.

The Fathers tell us that the legions of destroying spirits fill all the air between our earth and the skies. The least of them is mighty enough to evolve in an incredibly short time the potencies of matter; the weakest of them could make sad havoc in this material world of ours; the lowest of them could craze men with frightful apparitions. And more, these formidable spirits are leagued in concerted action. Bitterly and unrelentingly though they hate each other, impossible though friendship must ever be among those who have flung away eternal love itself, their common hatred of God and man nevertheless compels them to enter into a desperate coalition, of which the fellowship of the wicked upon earth

is a true but a very feeble imitation.[1] But that common cause levels their proud heads to the earth. They that rejected the mild government of the Father must writhe under the galling yoke of the most degrading despotism; they that aspired to be greater than the sons of God must be content to be slaves; they that were not satisfied with heaven's bonds of love are now chained together like felons in fetters of unyielding hatred. Hatred is now the soul of their life; they hate even their own selves. Yet, out of the depths of their degradation their pride only leaps the higher and with more embittered anger against heaven; for nothing galls pride more than enforced humiliation, and there is not a more relentless hatred than that which springs from a pride which has been utterly humiliated but not in the least humbled. Spirits of wrath such as these are singly and separately terrible enough; but their gathering must be as the coming together of as many violent storms. Woe were man if God were not above that storm; woe, if the natural strength of those enemies were not chained by his fatherly hand. As it is, He only permits them to tempt men, always for their good, if they will have it so, and never beyond their strength. Physical evils the demons may not inflict save by the express command of God, and the most remarkable among these is their possession (or obsession, which means the same) of the bodies of men. In our day, however, their external influence is chiefly noticed in *Spirit-rapping*, *Mesmerism*, and *Spiritism*, and it is of paramount importance to examine how these are viewed by the Church.

In spirit-rapping Catholic theologians draw a sharp line of distinction between the phenomena that might possibly be caused by the action of physical forces and those which as answers to questions necessarily suppose the intervention of intelligent agents. The latter are known to be of so scandalous, immoral, and often blasphemous a character, that they can in no wise be ascribed to the agency of sainted souls, or angels, or God. In their origin, therefore, such practices involve an at least implicit compact with evil spirits, into which no man can knowingly enter without making himself guilty of the grievous sin of divination. On the contrary, the phenomena of mere motion do not necessarily

[1] St. Thomas says (S. Th., 1 p. q. 109, a. 2, ad. 2): "Concordia dæmonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant, sed ex communi nequitia, qua homines odiunt et Dei justitiæ repugnant. Est enim proprium hominum impiorum ut eis se adjungant, et subjiciant ad proprium nequitiam exsequendam, quos potentiores viribus vident." And in q. 114, a. 1, he concludes: "Impugnatio quidem ipsa ex dæmonum malitia procedit; qui propter invidiam profectum hominum impedire nituntur et propter superbiam divinæ potestatis similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad hominum impugnationem, sicut et Angeli Deo ministrant in determinatis officiis ad hominum salutem."

argue spirit-power or divination (though in general no other explanation will suffice), but they are none the less unlawful by reason of their dangerous and scandalous effects.

Mesmerian magnetism is noted for the three induced conditions of violent comatose state, somnambulism, and clairvoyance. Somnambulism and clairvoyance imply a compact with the devil, and are positively prohibited by the authority of the Holy See. The violent comatose state was not mentioned in the condemnation, but is illicit, and that grievously, not only because it gives scandal, but especially because it is known to imperil the health and life, and, most precious of all, the virtue of the victim.

It is plain that the same censures must apply with greater reason to downright spiritism.[1]

To elude the damaging accusation of having dealings with the devil, the votaries of these fashionable forms of the black art protest before the public that their unearthly visitors are the blessed souls of departed friends. Any godfearing Christian can detect and expose this too palpable fraud; a man with any sense of religion in his soul will not hesitate to decide that those scandalous and blaspheming spirits are not "spirits of health," but "goblins damned." Driven from their first position, our modern wizards and witches still deprecate the charge of divination, on the ground that the spirits are at any rate not devils. In other words, they abhor dealings with the devil, but do not scruple to commune with those of his household. They lose sight of the fact that divination is criminal, not because it is a compact with spirits *as such*, but with spirits that are enemies of God and of man. Whosoever those enemies may happen to be, be they demons or lost souls, it is a high crime against God and against his own nature for man to make friends with them.

Far superior to man in the strength and breadth of their intellect, as his astute adversaries must be owned to be, it becomes a matter of great interest to the Christian warrior to determine the limits of their knowledge concerning himself. Can they of their own strength know those future actions and events that shall depend on man's free will? The Church says, no. Prophecy, according to scripture and tradition, belongs to God alone. Isaiah made it a formal challenge to the gods of the gentiles: "Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." "The diviners and the wise men, and the magicians and the Chaldeans" told Nabuchodonosor that none could tell his dreams "except the gods." In a word, that prophecy is universally held to be the seal of the divinity is evident from the very ety-

[1] Vide Gury, Theol. Moral., De I Decalogi Præcepto.

mology of the word *divination*. But can the tempters know the secrets of the human heart? Can they discover that which man is determined to conceal from them? The Church again answers in the negative. "God *alone*," says Holy Writ, "is the searcher of hearts." "He *alone* knows the hearts of the sons of men." Moreover, to give the demons such knowledge were little less than delivering man up to their power almost beyond the possibility of resistance. Man would no longer be master of himself and of his actions, no longer the free being that owns no subjection save to God and his representatives. The knowledge, therefore, of evil spirits cannot reach those innermost thoughts and desires which man will not so much as breathe even in his deepest dreams. They may by artful tricks make him give up his secret, may bring him to give some external sign wherein their practiced eyes at once read the mystery; but not Lucifer himself, not all the leagued powers of hell, can have a *direct* power over the soul to wrench from it the hidden thought. This Catholic conviction is briefly summed up in Hamlet's sublime challenge to the questionable ghost:

> "Why, what should be the fear?
> I do not set my life at a pin's fee;
> As for my soul, what can it do to that,
> Being a thing immortal as itself?"

Passing beyond the free future actions of men and the secrets of hearts, it would be difficult to determine *positively* the limits of angelic cognition in the order of merely *natural truths*. As the angels ascend stand higher on the Patriarch's mystic ladder, the horizon of their vision must indeed grow wider in proportion as they draw nearer to the omniscient God. But taking even the lowest choir for a common standard, theologians have generally admitted that the angels, good and bad, not only know the present and the past, but penetrating into the future behold events that are not yet conceived in the womb of physical nature. It is little for them to predict the sunshine and the storm for centuries to come. "Nature's infinite book of secrecy," in which we can read only a very little, is spread open before them; they scan the future with greater accuracy than we are enabled to study the past, "on the pages of the elements and in the volumes of time." In one word, in all that concerns the material universe, the only limit to their science would be the miraculous interference of God. Such is the vast science of the poorest of angelic spirits, and belike it was this thought that inspired St. Francis Borgia to take his stand before his God far beneath the meanest of the demons of hell.

Hearing that the angels know so much, the interesting little girl of the family would be bound to inquire, "Do the angels talk, and

how can they talk if they have no tongues?" Seriously considered the question is not a childish one. It must interest every man who has some thought of the life of his own soul hereafter, and though a child may make the query, sages have been at pains to find a satisfactory answer. Naturally enough nobody is inclined to believe that spirits are bereft of the power of communicating their thoughts one to another. Imagine that God would send us back our immortal Shakespeare, but strike him blind, deaf and dumb, and make him utterly incapable of uttering in any way his "everlasting thoughts divinely worded!" More intolerable still would be the thought of such perpetual imprisonment for the will, for love. Such a being, we say, is like that broken heart that can find no utterance; it must die of its own fulness. That the angels actually have the power of interchanging thought, is a scriptural fact which any one may verify for himself in the prophecies of Daniel and in the Apocalypse. They certainly can speak. Strong enough to make matter and its forces subservient to their purposes, it is as easy for them to produce vocal sounds in the air as to fashion for themselves the form of man. It is not hard, then, to understand how they manage to converse with men. But how they convey their thoughts one to another will always be a problem for even the acutest of human minds. On the one hand Scripture is silent on the subject, and on the other our *material* speech cannot furnish a basis of comparison when there is question of pure spirits. Some of the older schoolmen propounded the theory of *spiritual signs;* but waiving the difficulty of understanding what they mean by *spiritual* signs, the hypothesis is open to the objection that it jeopardizes, if it does not utterly destroy, that to a free being dearest privilege, of being the absolute master of its own secrets. In the closed sanctuary of free souls and spirits God alone has the right to dwell; the creature cannot so much as gain admittance without good leave. On this account the princes of Catholic theologians have almost to a man rejected the theory of spiritual signs. Every angel would at once see those signs; distance is no obstacle to angelic vision; given such signs, there could be no such pleasure as confiding a secret to a friend, there could be no privacy; the poor spirit would have to remain forever silent, or in every case be willing to harangue the hosts of angelic listeners.

Suarez is of opinion that angelic speech is effected by impressing the *species*, that is to say, the thoughts or ideas, as we commonly call them, on the intellect of the listening angel. This solution of the difficulty is satisfactory in so far at least as it is intelligible; but unfortunately it is opposed to the general principle, which Suarez himself admits, "that God alone

can act *immediately* and *directly* on the will or intellect of creatures." Besides Suarez requires more than is needed. It would seem to be enough to say with St. Thomas, that the angel needs only to *will* that the other should perceive his thought. It stands to reason that as the will is absolute master of the secrets of the soul, their manifestation should be no less under its control than their concealment. On the other hand, since the angelic mind can naturally know spiritual objects, nothing more seems to be necessary than that those objects be proposed to its vision. The only obstacle in the present case is the will of the angel; that will needs only to say, "Lo and behold!" and the hidden thought stands revealed. Such is the explanation offered by the angelic doctor. Bearing in mind that according to the universally received doctrine of the schools, the angelic minds were from the first filled with infused species or concepts, by means of which they always knew their connatural objects at least as to their possibility, so that for their knowledge of the reality nothing more than the presence of the object is required, the holy doctor's view seems to be entirely satisfactory. At any rate, it looks most natural. How often, when we meet with one of those walled-up, dark, blank, silent men, who move among their fellows like sphinxes, how often, when a Disraeli passes through the world, do we not say to ourselves, "Oh, if we could only read that soul!" Why, what is to prevent us? Ah, there is that unchanging exterior, that rigid face, that iron mask. What if we could tear it away? What if simultaneously we could fling away our own masks also, and without bodies, stand soul to soul? That mysterious being is as dark as before. Who can force it to give up its secrets? None but its one master, none but the Almighty God. To our questionings it is dumb. It will not speak; it will not direct its thought to our minds; if it did so we are sure we could see that thought; but it simply will not. Let it but will it, and the curtain of the sanctuary of mysteries would fall, and the spiritual object flash upon the spiritual eye. This would be spiritual speech, "the manifestation of thought specially directed to us by the will of the speaking spirit." That manifestation as well as the determination and limitation of its direction are evidently the work of the will alone, and this is the simplest and easiest way of accounting for the merely natural interchange of thought, the natural speech, of the angels.

Higher than this and by far more indescribable is that sublime language in which the holy angels describe, one to another, the mysteries they behold in the beatific vision. The flood of increated light fills their beings, each according to its capacity. The higher the angel the richer is his knowledge of the mysteries of God, and the greater also his means of enlightening the lesser spirits below

him. Hence that higher kind of speech, called *angelic illumination*, by which the higher angel makes known to the lower what new mysteries he beholds in the bosom of God. It is the communication of the light of new truths, a real intellectual illumination therefore, a positive teaching, in which the larger mind of the master must adapt itself to the limited comprehension of the disciple. It does not deal with truths that are purely natural. The subject of that supernal conversation embraces the divine mysteries in the wide domains of nature, grace, and glory. It is the "song forever old and new," that breaks from the ecstasy of the beatific vision, a speech, not so much angelic as divine, in that it is all from God, all about God, and all in God. Such is the beatific knowledge and language of the holy angels, and it is consoling to think that even in that divine intellectual greatness the little ones of Christ shall be made like unto them, that supernatural wisdom shall crown the folly of the cross.

Sweeter far, however, and more encouraging, while we are still engaged in the great battle of life, is that other thought, that to those same exalted blessed spirits God has given charge over man. It is a dogma of Catholic faith,[1] "that some of the angels are deputed to be the guardians of men *in general*." Scripture and tradition alike teach that angels are divinely commissioned to protect the nations of the earth. The Archangel Michael, who was the guardian prince of all Israel of old, is believed to be the angelic monarch of the Church also. It is, moreover, the common belief, that all smaller societies and communities are assigned to the governance of heavenly princes, and that every man has his own guardian angel from birth till death. Hence the beautiful devotion to the guardian angel is one of the strongest and most affectionate of the Catholic heart. The practical Catholic is conscious that his angel "has charge over him to keep him in all his ways," which signifies, as the Fathers interpret it, the ways he should walk according to the will of God. It were presumption and folly on his part to count on his angel's assistance when he wilfully and recklessly throws himself into the arms of the chained demons. Yet even then has that spirit-friend charge over him unto good. When he proves refractory and turns a deaf ear, not only to the voice of conscience but to the angelic warning as well, it is the angel who embitters poisonous pleasures, strikes him with physical pain, and sharpens his mental anguish beyond endurance, until he is glad to return to an humble and contrite frame of mind. Youth, which ever lives in the future, hardly adverts to this wonderful side of its life. It stands, as painters love to represent it, proudly on the

---

[1] Catechism. Roman. p. 4, c. 2, n. 4.

prow of the bark of life, stretching out its hands to the entrancing visions that deepen in splendor over the distant waves; seldom turns a kind eye to the resplendent companion who all the while holds the rudder and steers it in safety past rocks and shoals; does not think of him, perhaps, until the waters grow troubled and the light begins to die, until the shore of eternity rises dark upon its terrified vision, and then only throws itself into the arms of its life-long, its most affectionate, and may be its only true friend. In that hour the angel rises and shields the agonizing soul under his strong wing in that last stormy voyage through the narrow straits and dark passes of death. Nor does he abandon the trembling soul as it flies from the justice of God to the cleansing fires of purgatory. He can no longer act the part of a guardian, but he is all the more a friend. In the dread prisonhouse he is the soul's one great comforter, its one abiding friend, who alone, in the hour of its utter need and helplessness, goes forth in the silence to whisper to the living upon earth to have mercy, at least, on their own forgotten ones who suffer in the tormenting flame.

There is one passage in Holy Writ concerning the guardian angels which needs some explanation. An angel says to Daniel (Dan. x. 13), "But the prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days; and behold, Michael, one of the chief princes, came to help me," etc. This passage was read by Hugo Grotius, and set him thinking. Germans, as a rule, think twice before they venture to dogmatize; they are reputed the most patient thinkers in the world. But Grotius must have been in a hurry this time, for without more ado, he jumped to the conclusion, *ergo, there are dissensions and quarrels among the good angels.* A hasty glance at the mere words of the text might easily lead to so strange a conclusion; but a critical study of the context, such as one would be justified in expecting from a Grotius, would never warrant it. Long before Grotius, St. Thomas had foreseen the difficulty, and given a satisfactory explanation.[1] Imagine a universal monarch ruling all the nations of Europe through the most faithful vicegerents imaginable. Evidently these delegated rulers

[1] St. Thomas says (s. Th., q. 113, a. 8): "Ad videndum igitur qualiter unus Angelus, alteri resistere dicitur, considerandum est quod divina judicia circa diversa regna et diversos homines per angelos exercentur. In suis autem actionibus Angeli per divinam sententiam regulantur. Contingit autem quandoque quod in diversis regnis, vel in diversis hominibus contraria merita vel demerita inveniuntur, ut unus alteri subdatur aut præsit. Quid autem super hoc ordo divinae sapientiae habeat, cognoscere non possunt, nisi Deo revelante; unde necesse habent super his sapientiam Dei consulere. Sic igitur, in quantum de contrariis meritis et sibi repugnantibus divinam consulunt voluntatem, resistere sibi invicum dicuntur; non quia sint eorum contrariae voluntates (cum in hoc omnes concordent quod Dei sententia impleatur); sed quia ea de quibus consulunt sunt repugnantia."

would represent conflicting national interests, and becoming identified, as it were, with opposite causes, would consult the sovereign on their contrary merits, and, in this respect, be said to resist one another, be they never so loyal to their king, and ever so closely united among themselves in personal friendship. Thus, according to St. Thomas, in that only universal government of the King of nations, the angelic rulers stand opposed to each other only in as far as they represent the opposition of the temporal or eternal interests of different nations or individuals; their personal union among themselves cannot be surpassed in perfection save by that which binds them to God, whose will they perfectly accomplish as soon as it is made known to them. Thus, in the passage quoted, the angelic rulers were not yet acquainted with the divine ordinance as to the departure of the Jews from the midst of their oppressors; it is clear that some of them would oppose it as detrimental to their pagan wards; once the will of God was made known to them all difference of opinion ceased.

Having reviewed the spirit-world in its relationship with man, it now only remains to cast a glance at the attitude which man generally assumes towards it. An artist of the day has strikingly represented it in a masterly painting, which is called "The Game of Life." In a mortuary chapel, which, to judge from its grim architecture of guled pilasters, with heads of sphinxes and wiverns grinning from the capitals, must be in the hold of some gloomy castle of the Middle Ages, away from the light of day and the curious gaze of men, the great game is being played by the living among the dead. The chess-board is placed on the hither end of the sarcophagus of stone which stands in the middle of the ancestral vault. The pieces are allegoric figures of the virtues and vices, the colors being white and red respectively. The two players are entirely taken up with the game. On the right, as you look at him, sits a lordly man, the beau-ideal of a nobleman, and he a French nobleman, in manhood's prime. The game has evidently been going against him. A few red pawns are all that he has taken from the enemy, while the critical position of the few white-robed virtues on his side shows you that if his next move is false, the game is hopelessly lost. Bent forward over the fatal board, his head resting on his right hand, his whole soul concentrated in the motionless face, and his whole intellect fixed in the large earnest eye, he is studying that last and decisive move. He thinks of nothing else now. He is utterly unconscious of the terrible change that has come over his adversary; he does not see how those fleshless features now burn beneath the black hood as if their blood were fire; he does not even feel the fierce glare of the demon's eye, glittering as a serpent's, on its unconscious prey. He had sat down to play with Satan, in the tolerable guise of a Mephis-

topheles; but were he to look up now and see the veritable fiend, he would leap to his feet and cry to heaven for help. But he has not the faintest idea of the appalling transformation of his adversary, no, nor a thought of the dark cloud that rests on the brow of his majestic angel, who has been standing between them all the time, always whispering to him the best advice at the right moment. That angel has given the last saving counsel, and now stands, a figure of indescribable anxiety, only waiting for the fatal move before he shall turn away to weep for a lost soul.

This is not a mere painting; it is a revelation. Even as certain songs and strains of music thrill beyond the raptured ear into the depths of the soul, there to evoke a music that is not fettered by sound, so does this painting penetrate to the inner eye of faith, and unveil such scenes as are invisible to material sense. We no longer behold the picture upon the canvas. The game of life rises up before us and around us in its strong reality, the great game which every man is playing with Satan, the guardian angel standing at his side with warning hand uplifted, the virtues and vices for prizes, the game generally desperate for man, and the stake his immortal soul. There is not a practical Catholic who does not feel that he is the man at the chess-board, not one who does not instantly recognize in the two figures his own inveterate foe and his own trustiest friend. What a strange, weird painting! But stranger still, and truer still, the painter has portrayed only too faithfully man's extraordinary forgetfulness of his two inseparable companions. Thus even the moral of the painting is literally painted; man's forgetfulness and neglect of the spirits that contend for his soul are limned upon the canvas in perfect portraiture. The painting is undoubtedly a masterpiece. And yet the central figure is entirely wanting. One is not there. There is nothing to betoken his presence, though He must be there since He is everywhere. Mayhap the painter forgot Him; mayhap he thought of Him, but could not paint in any other way, save by not painting at all, man's forgotten and neglected God.

CATHOLICITY IN KENTUCKY.

GRACE NEWTON SIMPSON.

IT is a noteworthy fact that, in the entire list of canonized saints of whose early lives there remains any record, there is scarcely to be found a single one who was not indebted, primarily and under God, to his mother's instructions, influence, and example for whatever was needed to lift his mind out of the depths of earthly desires to the contemplation of the admirable things of God. The mother's influence in forming the character of her child is surpassingly great. If she be worldly-minded and frivolous, over-indulgent at times and unnecessarily harsh at others; unmethodical in the discharge of the duties of her state of life and careless in respect to the associations formed by her children; then it is reasonably certain that these latter will be subject to similar or still more extravagant faults of character and habit. Just the reverse is ordinarily the case when the mother is actuated by motives that have their origin in her sense of religious duty. Such a mother says nothing, does nothing, in the presence of her children, but after duly considering the effects of her speech and action upon those toward whom she bears the dual relation of natural and heaven-delegated guardian.

It is well for Catholicity in Kentucky that the first Catholic fathers of families who emigrated to the State were so generally provided with helpmates who had proper notions of the dignity and responsibilities of Christian motherhood. As a very general thing these were neither ignorant in respect to the tenets of their faith, nor indifferent to its practice. Where the children in after-life, or some amongst them, as was the case in very many instances, were led to devote themselves to the sacred ministry, or to cloistered contemplation and works of Christian charity and mercy, it rarely happened that they were not, under God, indebted for their vocation to the training they had received at the hands of their pious mothers. The names of many of these faithful, painstaking and Godfearing mothers are no longer remembered, not even by their descendants; but circumstances have preserved those of others to the present day. Alethea Abell Spalding, Henrietta Boone Gardiner, Ann French Reynolds, Elizabeth Spalding Elder, Winnifred Hamilton Gardiner, Clementina Elder Clarke, Mary Hamilton Hill, Ann Richards Elder, Winnifred Coomes Wathen, Ellen Hutchins Bowlin, Ann Coomes, and Ann McAtee Miles,—these are names that should be pronounced with reverence by all Kentucky Catholics.

It is not at all likely that the name of Grace Newton Simpson will appear in the least degree familiar to one in a hundred of my readers. And yet it was borne by one of the most extraordinary Catholic women of her day in all America. Her fame was local while she lived; and, happily for her, she was utterly regardless of posthumous notoriety. Her features, which were more engaging than beautiful, were indicative of a bright intellect and a sympathetic disposition. In manner, she was neither bold nor shrinking, neither presumptuous nor servile. She was not to be numbered, either, among the silent good of her sex. On the contrary, she had the gift of speech in a wonderful degree. In her praise be it said, however, she was no idle talker. Of all her Catholic sisters of the settlements, she was pre-eminently distinguished for her successful efforts at propagandism. It was through her earnest, intelligent, and prudent advocacy of Catholic teachings, that many troubled souls found rest in the bosom of the Church. How it was that she became so accomplished a controversialist may be learned from an incident that will appear in the annexed very imperfect sketch of her life.

Grace Newton was born about the year 1773, in Georgetown, then an important town in that part of the territory of Virginia which was afterwards ceded to Congress, and which now forms an integral part of the District of Columbia. Her father was a respectable tradesman of the town and an earnest Catholic in religion. Soon after the passage of the act by Congress by which a survey was ordered of the site upon which now stands the city of Washington, very many of the former citizens of both Maryland and Virginia removed to the District, with the intention of becoming residents of the future capital of the country. Among these were several families of Catholics, and notably that of Mr. Newton. This gentleman claimed kinship with the family of which the renowned Sir Isaac Newton was the most honored representative. His own marriage with an exemplary Catholic wife was blessed with a family of four children, three daughters and one son. The latter, Hugh Newton, used to say of his sisters: "One of them (Susan) is very beautiful; the second (Sarah) is very industrious; and the third (Grace) is very smart."[1]

[1] Susan Newton became the wife of Archibald Pitt; Sarah Newton, of John Lilly; and Grace Newton, of Walter Simpson. All of these removed together to Kentucky near the close of the last century. In describing his sister Grace as "smart," Hugh Newton was more witty than wise. He only meant that her gifts of intellect were too profound for his own following. Susan Pitt *was* a beautiful woman; beautiful as a maiden, equally beautiful as a matron, and scarcely less beautiful after the snows of seventy winters had whitened her hair and laid the impress of their cruel coldness on her mortal frame. She possessed, however, a more enduring characteristic of loveliness than that of form and features in her Christian modesty and quiet goodness. She survived both of her sisters, her death having taken place only ten

At the time referred to, Grace Newton was a piously inclined young woman, well educated for the times, and of good social position.[1] She had been well instructed in the principles of her faith, and there was never any question with her as to its divine character. She had not learned enough, however, to be able to displace doubt and to set up conviction in the minds of honest inquirers. A simple incident, that took place, most likely, in the year 1795, served to open her eyes to her ignorance, and to the possibility, likewise, that she might be enabled through its removal to lead, here and there, a bewildered soul into a restful haven.

While hastening one morning towards the little chapel that was the humble forerunner of the dozen stately churches that now adorn the National metropolis, the young lady was overtaken on her way by a then recently appointed judge of one of the District Courts, who was also a personal friend of her father.

"Whither so early, Miss Grace?" asked the judge.

"I am on my way to early Mass," answered the young lady.

"But what is the Mass?" demanded the official.

"It is the renewal and continuation of the Great Sacrifice of Calvary," answered the girl.

"How do you know that it is anything of the kind?" queried the judge.

"Because the Church so teaches me," returned the lady.

"But what is the basis of your confidence in the teachings of your Church?" asked the official.

"Your question," answered the girl, "is too complex to admit of a hasty answer. If you will renew it hereafter, I here promise that I will endeavor to convince you that the Church has not only the right to command my assent to her doctrinal teachings, but my obedience likewise to her disciplinary laws."

With the understanding that the subject was to come up between them at a later day, the twain here parted, and Grace hurried on to Mass. But her short colloquy with her father's friend was never forgotten by her, never once lost sight of until her knowledge of the principles of her faith was equal to its defence against all phases of opposition. Happily for herself, and happily for the many she afterwards led into the Church of God, hers was a bright

---

years ago. Her descendants are numerous in Kentucky, as are also those of her sisters. Sarah Newton Lilly was the Martha of her father's household. The service she rendered to others, however, did not prevent her from rendering true service to God. Her husband, John Lilly, represented the county of Nelson in the State legislature of Kentucky during the session of 1807.

1 She was afterwards in the habit of referring with some degree of pride to her personal acquaintance with the first President of the Republic. The exalted character of George Washington was a favorite theme with the good woman to her dying day.

intellect; a heart that was true and sympathetic, and a disposition that was more than ordinarily amiable. She sought and she found, she asked and she received, she knocked and it was opened to her. She not only read with care and profit the few books of Catholic controversy that were to be had at the time, but, under wise direction, she studied the Sacred Scriptures, and she learned from their perusal the ill uses to which human pride, not unfrequently, had put the Oracles of God.

In 1797, as is supposed by her descendants, Grace Newton intermarried with Walter Simpson, a scion of one of the old Catholic families of Maryland; and shortly afterwards she came with her husband to Kentucky and settled in Nelson County, near the site now occupied by the little town of Fairfield. From that time to the day of her death, she was regarded by her Catholic acquaintances, and these were numerous throughout Nelson and the adjoining counties, as an authority scarcely less reliable than their immediate pastors on all questions relating to dogmatic differences between the Church and the sects. Not a few were of the opinion that, in her limited sphere of action, she was even more successful than was any single member of the clerical body of the State in her efforts to spread the influence of her faith among those who had been reared outside of the pale of the Church. This was attributed, not to her superior knowledge, but to her superior prudence, and to the uniform sweetness of her disposition.

Among the anecdotes that are related of Mrs. Simpson, the following is, perhaps, oftenest referred to by the elders of the congregation of St. Michael, Fairfield, by all of whom the remembrance of her singular virtues is preserved to the present time.

Walter Simpson was somewhat of a wag. At one time he was the proprietor of a tavern-stand in the town of Fairfield, which was as much noted for its orderly conduct as it was for the excellence of its accommodations for man and beast. One day an itinerant Methodist preacher alighted from his jaded horse at the tavern door and announced to the landlord that it was his intention to stop over night, and possibly, until after the coming Sabbath. Protestant ministers of the present day are rarely distinguishable from men of other professions; but such was not the case seventy years ago. Then, sanctimoniousness not only characterized their features, but it pervaded their speech, and was to be seen in the cut of their clothes. The utterance by his guest of the single word *Sabbath* was all that Walter Simpson needed to enable him to give to the man his exact professional status.

One morning during the itinerant's stay under his roof, tempted thereto, doubtless, by the evil spirit of mischief that was his con-

stant familiar, Mr. Simpson suggested to his guest that he had a job for him in the line of his vocation. The Romanists of the town, he said, had become not a little aggressive of late. "I have reason to believe," he continued, "that they have designs upon my own wife; and from the way she receives their attentions, it would not surprise me, at any time, to learn that she had been seen waiting her turn to go to confession to the little French priest who comes here once in the month, and puts up his horse in old Clemmy Gardiner's stable.[1] It may be too late for interference in the matter, but if you would like to have a talk with Mrs. Simpson, it will please me to have you do so."

The minister plunged headlong into the pit that had been dug for him by his jocular host. He became at once deeply interested, fairly revelling in the idea, no doubt, that opportunity was to be given him to do battle against the "Man of Sin" and the "Mystery of Iniquity." The very next morning, in the presence of her graceless spouse, he approached Mrs. Simpson and begged to be allowed to interview her on a subject of grave importance. The lady was not a little surprised, but she answered promptly, that she was then and there ready to listen to what he had to say. His opening speech, pompous and inflated, after the manner of his tribe, would have opened the lady's eyes to his purpose, even though she had not been able to detect it by a glance she gave toward the face of her husband, in which immobility was vainly striving to hide the tricky spirit that ruffled the muscles beneath, and revealed itself still more plainly in the cunning flashes of his eyes. She knew at once that the partner of her life's joys and sorrows had been playing upon the gullibility of their guest, and this knowledge determined her to treat him with the utmost courtesy and consideration.

"Mrs. Simpson," began the preacher, "I have been surprised to learn that you have ventured almost into the very jaws of the Popish Beast, that has been sent all the way from Rome to ravage this land and to fill his rapacious maw with the blood of the saints of our new-found Israel. When I heard of your peril, the spirit wrestled inside of me, and I felt myself inspired to tackle with the Beast, and to pluck this brand from the burning."

"I don't know about the brand and the burning, Mr. ——," said the smiling hostess, "but if you can convince me that the Roman Catholic is not the true Church of Christ, I stand ready to become your disciple without an hour's delay."

---

1 Clement Gardiner, while living, and afterwards his widow, Henrietta Boone Gardiner, were noted among the early Catholic emigrants to the State for their benefactions to the Church. Their house was the church station of the Cox's Creek Catholic settlement, until, principally at the expense of Mr. Gardiner, the former log-church of St. Michael was built and opened for divine service.

"Then, madam," returned the gratified minister, "I have only to point out to you the texts of Scripture in which the Church of Rome is likened to the 'Abomination of Desolation,' the 'Evil woman of Babylon,' the 'Man of Sin,' the—"

"Stay, my good sir," interrupted the lady; "your quotations from the Bible, as well as many others of like character which the enemies of the Church are in the habit of referring to for proof of their untenable positions, are entirely familiar to me. I deny that any one of them is applicable to the organization known as the Roman Catholic Church, whether as she now exists, or as she has existed in the past. If you would convert me to your way of religious thinking, you must prove to me that you have authority, and all authority, to teach me what I am to believe and what I am to do in order to save my soul."

"Why, madam," returned the itinerant, "you may learn all that from the word of God."

"But the word of God," replied Mrs. Simpson, "being truth itself, cannot be otherwise than inflexible. It cannot teach opposing, or even slightly divergent doctrines. It cannot, above all things, teach me that one thing is true, and that another and very different thing is equally true. It cannot, for instance, teach that Christ was God, and that he was a mere man; that apostolic succession in the order of the Christian ministry is of absolute prescription, and that it is wholly irrelevant; that baptism into the Church may be administered by sprinkling, and that it cannot be rightfully administered otherwise than by immersion. You and Elder Nathan Hall differ widely on the subjects of Grace and Free Will. Neither of you will accept the views of Dr. Chambers, of Bardstown, on the doctrine of Apostolic Succession. And all three of you denounce as preposterous Elder Stone's declaration that there is no baptism unto Christ and His Church unless the subject of the ordinance be plunged, neck and crop, into a pool of water. And yet you and they, severally and collectively, are in the habit of appealing to the Bible for evidences to sustain your divergent notions regarding religious truth. If Christ had intended that a book which had no existence when he ascended into heaven should become the sole rule of faith for His disciples for all time, He never would have uttered the words, afterwards transcribed by His evangelist: 'And if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican.'

"Now, reverend sir," continued the lady, "it is sheer waste of time on your part to seek to draw me away from the reasonable faith in which, so to speak, I was born, to the unreasonable one which, according to all Protestant teachings, would require me to arraign the God who made me, at the bar of my own weak and

finite judgment. It is not upon God's Word, believe me, that you build your systems of faith, but upon your own earth-gathered heaps of intellectual pride."

At this point the preacher, who had kept his eyes fixed upon the face of his hostess from the beginning of her harangue to its end, happened to turn his gaze upon that of her husband, which was now all one broad grin. It is not likely that the vulgar aphorism, "sold," now so common among practical jokers, had other than the natural meaning attached to the word in the popular parlance of the times, but it is quite certain that the itinerant then and there experienced all the effects that are supposed to follow applications of the term in certain coteries of modern society.

It is said of Mrs. Simpson that she occupied at one time an anomalous position in relation to ecclesiastical affairs in Kentucky. In the year 1809, when it became generally known that a bishop was to be appointed for the then newly created See of Bardstown, the charge was brought against her that she was using her influence with Bishop Carroll to induce that prelate to recommend some other ecclesiastic than Father Badin to the occupancy of the post. Though it is not at all likely that she was guilty of any such indiscretion, it may be considered certain that she answered, honestly and truthfully, whatever interrogatories were put to her by Dr. Carroll, in regard to the estimate in which Father Badin was held by the Catholic people of the State.

It is a singular circumstance, in connection with the history of Catholicity in Kentucky, that the most extraordinary missionary priest that ever exercised his ministry on the soil of the State was regarded by very many sensible people with at least moderate disfavor when there was question of raising him to the rank of a prince of the Church. It is fair to say that the opposition of most of these was not based upon personal consideration; neither was it, in the case of any one of them, based upon anything in the character of the missionary that could be construed into a moral defect. The great majority of them were simply unable to reconcile to themselves the idea of a bishop whose personal appearance was not suggestive to them of that dignity, which, as they conceived, should characterize the episcopal office. It is not to be doubted that the notions of these had their origin in their remembrances of Dr. Carroll, of Baltimore. That eminent prelate was personally known to many of them, and a few amongst them, notably Mrs. Simpson, had been so far favored by him as to be numbered among his correspondents. The opposition of these to the nomination of Father Badin was honestly entertained, and it was in no degree factious.

Others, however, were more demonstrative in their opposition to the appointment. These were impressed with the notion that Father Badin was naturally tyrannical, and that, if invested with supreme diocesan authority, his rule would be one of exaction and arbitrariness. The greater number of these, no doubt, were persons whose irregular lives had been made the subject of the good missionary's denunciations, which, it is well known, were not always prudently rendered.[1]

Grace Newton Simpson lived a widow for many years after the death of her husband, and during all these years she kept the promise of her youth of unswerving faith and unostentatious piety and goodness. She was a great favorite with the young of her acquaintance, many of whom were in the habit of exchanging with her confidence for counsel. At the age of sixty years she was just as capable as she had ever been of holding her own in a conference upon dogma in religion, and just as earnest, too, in her efforts to open the eyes of the erring to the distinguishing marks of holiness and truth that are inherent in the one Church of Christ. Her life was no less useful than it was held in honor by those among whom many of its years were passed, and she died in the firm hope that He in whom she had believed, and whom she had served with all her strength, would incline His face to her in mercy when she appeared before His dread bar of judgment. She passed to her reward in the year 1835.

---

[1] In reviewing the lives of the early missionary priests of Kentucky, and notably those of Fathers Badin and Nerinckx, one is compelled to acknowledge that their will power over the consciences of their parishioners and penitents was at times exerted to the verge of arbitrariness. Possibly, however, it was to the very rigor of their rule that was due the solidity of Catholic faith by which the vast majority of those to whom they preached and ministered were so pre-eminently distinguished. If excuse be wanting for the severity of their spiritual sway, it is to be found in the fact that they were even more exacting in respect to themselves than they were in respect to others. Then, their education and training had been acquired in schools where rigid discipline was both enjoined and enforced. It is to be remembered, too, that they were in the exercise of a power that was at once confined to themselves and necessary to the people. They were priests, it is true, but they were also men; and as it is human to exercise power, however possessed, in the direction of one's own way of thinking, it should not be considered wonderful that they should have been led at times into arbitrariness of speech and action. Father Badin's integrity of purpose was never questioned by any one. Neither was he believed to be ambitious of episcopal distinction. Everybody thought that his nomination would follow the establishment of the See, but there were numbers of well-meaning Catholic men and women of the settlements who, for the reason above stated, deprecated his appointment.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD DEMONSTRATED.

THIRD ARTICLE.

THIS visible universe, having been put into existence and reduced to harmonious unity by an outward cause, reveals God as the absolute, self-existent, infinite being. It implies reference to Him as the circumference of a circle regards in all its points the centre, as the mighty river requires a spring from which it is derived, and as the mass of the diffused light presupposes the sun from which it is sent forth. Thus God is known from the physical order. But besides the physical there is also the metaphysical and moral order. It is our intention to show that they likewise imply as their first source and principle the absolute self-existent being, and that, the existence of the Divinity being denied, they are as impossible and unreal as an effect without a cause is contradictory and absurd. We shall, therefore, from them, as from new points of departure, arrive at the existence of God.

Let us first reason from the metaphysical order. Yet as this consists, not of existing or produced beings, but of the essences abstract from existence, we cannot in this kind of argumentation strictly proceed from the effect to the cause. Nevertheless, we argue also here not a priori, but a posteriori. For the metaphysical essences also require a sufficient reason by which they are established and a ground on which they rest. Inferring, therefore, from them the absolute Being as their foundation, we ascend from the consequence to the principle, and from the issue to the fountainhead, which is, properly speaking, argumentation a posteriori. This proof for God's existence, the sixth in our series, has not been given by S. Thomas in the same terms, though the principles on which it is based, are quite his, and frequently recur in his works. S. Augustin, however, makes frequent use of it, and in proposing it develops the loftiest ideas of his great genius.[1]

We know the things of this world not only as to their existence, but also as to their essences. We not only perceive man to exist, but we also understand his nature, the very being whereby he is what he is. The same may be said of a great many other objects of our cognizance. Even we not only conceive the natures of many things, but we also know how to decompose them into their ultimate components, and how again to compose of these by new combinations essences of objects not yet apprehended. From the

[1] De libero arbitrio, lib. ii., cp., 2-13.

notion of the essences we deduce by comparison judgments, which serve us as main principles of all our demonstrations. If on the same essences we further reflect, we discover in them attributes quite different from those of the physical order. They do not imply actual existence, but are abstract from it and mean only the aptitude to it. They are necessary, immutable, eternal, universal; necessary, because they cannot be constituted but of certain component parts, and thus composed they cannot be but something apt to exist; immutable, because, remaining the same, they have always the same constituents; eternal, because they are abstracted from time, and hence are conceived to be such as they are at any time and before all time; universal, because they are found in many things and are truly predicated of them. Just the same characters we discover in the principles drawn from them; they, too, are necessary, immutable, eternal, universal. As an important consequence we must deduce from this that the metaphysical essences are neither nothing or unreal, nor a mere fiction of the mind. In fact, the essences, though not existing, cannot be absolutely nothing; for nothing is not apt to exist; it does not constitute the being itself of things; it does not express the nature of the existent; it is not composed of certain constituent parts; it is not the foundation of necessary principles. But all this is to be said of the essences. Nor are they a fiction of the mind, a mere product of our abstraction. For we see them embodied in the beings existing outside us; we find them made actual and concrete in the physical order; we perceive the universe to be constituted and put in order according to the principles flowing from them; nor could we even judge of the existing beings in another way, or understand the contrary to be possible in them, or not conceive from them these natures with all their constituents, the necessity of thinking so being forced on us by the objective reality of the things themselves.

The metaphysical essences, therefore, being neither nothing, nor a mere fiction of the mind, are of necessity something real. But on what sufficient reason does their reality rest outside us? True, they are expressed in this visible universe so as to be drawn from it by abstraction, yet for that they are not ultimately constituted by it in their objective reality. Already before something exists, it must be possible, and there must be an essence which is realized in it. Moreover, many an essence can be conceived which was not yet put into existence and may never be put into it. Besides, the essence of contingent beings is something quite different from their existence in the physical order, something abstracted from the same; it is only the aptitude to exist, and, therefore, has also quite different attributes. Their existence is contingent, mutable,

and temporal, whilst their essence is necessary, immutable, and eternal. But the contingent cannot constitute the necessary, nor can the mutable form the immutable, or the temporal the eternal. By what then are they real, or in other terms, wherein does the sufficient reason of their reality lie? They are real either by themselves or by another being. Were they real by themselves, they would be existing; for then they would be in themselves, outside of nothingness and outside of all causes, and whatever is such must be conceived to exist, as therein consists the very nature of existence. Nay more, they would, if real by themselves, be self-existent, because they would have by themselves that which constitutes existence, being in themselves, outside nothingness and outside all causes. Such the finite metaphysical essences are not, they are not existing, and much less are they self-existent. Hence they must be real by a being distinct from them, having in it the sufficient reason of their reality. Now by what is this being real? Is it real by another one again? May it be so or not, there must be a first reason of reality just as well as there is a first cause of existence. But the first reason of reality must be real by itself and no more by another being, as the first cause of existence is existing by itself and dependent on no other one. It having been proved above that the being which is real by itself is also existing of itself, it follows that the first or ultimate sufficient reason of the metaphysical essences is the absolute self-existent being. The same conclusion we may arrive at, if we consider the attributes of the metaphysical essences. They being necessary, immutable and eternal by themselves, their ultimate sufficient reason, too, must be necessary, immutable and eternal, and it must be so by itself. But that which is necessary, immutable, and eternal by itself, is the absolute being actually existing; for, indeed, the being that stands in itself and by itself necessarily, immutably, and eternally is not merely possible, but must needs exist. Hence it is necessary that God, the absolute self-existing being, actually exists as the ultimate sufficient reason or foundation on which rests all essences are constituted in their reality, are necessary, immutable, and eternal, are the forms of all the existent, the unchangeable objects of our knowledge, the founts of all principles a priori, the firm base of all science.[1]

---

[1] It may be said that as the contingent is not the foundation of the necessary, so also the individual cannot be the foundation of universal, and that hence it is unconceivable how God, being individually one, is the first reason of the universality of the metaphysical essences. The solution of this difficulty is easy. The universality of an essence is founded on its finiteness and contingency as to existence. Hence God, being the ultimate or first sufficient reason of all finite essences, is also the ultimate foundation of universality.

This proof not only shows the existence of God as the universal source of all that is, of the possible as well as the existent, the essences as well as the existence of all things, but it also discloses us the infinity of his perfection in a new way. For as the essences of possible and existing beings are not restricted, neither to a certain number nor to a certain degree of perfection, the reason neither on which they rest, nor the source from which they spring, can be limited in its being. Were this finite and restricted itself, it could be the origin of essences only within a certain number or below a determinate degree of entity. Moreover, there is also the metaphysical essence of the infinite being. The infinite essence, though it may be conceived from the finite, cannot be founded but on a being of unlimited perfection. For although it may be conceived by the negation of the limits we find in this universe, yet it is in itself not founded on negation, but on reality; which, as the foundation and the thing founded on must be in proportion, cannot be but infinite.

The question, however, might be put how the infinite can be the foundation and last reason of the finite. It is neither by His intellect, nor by His will, nor by His power that God is the source of all essences. The divine power regards the effection of things; from the divine will proceed love or hate; but as love and hate so also effection presupposes as its object a being, which must at least be intrinsically possible, and hence already imply a metaphysical essence. The divine intellect does not effect truth, but presupposes it, and forms its conceptions not arbitrarily, but draws them from its object. It, consequently, by its ideas does not create the metaphysical essences, but conceives them from the objective order. That being, therefore, must be their ultimate sufficient reason from which the divine intellect draws them; for this knows all things from their first principle and their supreme source. But the object, from which God derives all knowledge, and in which He contemplates all truth, is His own infinite essence. It is, in reality, not difficult to understand how on the Divinity the essences of all finite beings can be founded. The perfections of the divine essence are communicable and imitable. Now that which is a communication or imitation of them is of necessity a being too, and hence is constituted by an essence; yea, the more a thing must be a perfect being, the more distinctly the divine likeness is expressed in it, and the more fully divine perfection is communicated to it. However, all that is outside God and has received being from Him cannot be but finite; wherefore it participates His being imperfectly and bears only a faint likeness of Him. There is for this reason between things divine and not divine an endless distance. Hence it is that the communicability and imita-

bility of the divine essence is not exhausted by any being outside itself, however many they may be, and that finite essences are possible beyond any definite number, and beyond any determinate degree of perfection. Thus not only the indefiniteness of the finite essences is accounted for, but also the manner is pointed out, in which they are real. Though they have their own reality, yet they have it not in themselves and outside their foundation, but within this latter. Nevertheless they are not identical with the divine essence, for they constitute beings quite different from it; nor are they contained in it formally, for nothing that is limited can be as such in God. They are implied in the infinite perfection of the divine essence eminently, and flow, as it were, from the same by its communicability, not as its parts or its attributes, but as its likenesses and faint resemblances. Yet, though they are not formally contained in the divine essence, they are so in the divine intellect, because this, contemplating the same infinite essence and fully comprehending its communicability, conceives all the particular natures of finite beings, to which its perfections may be communicated, and which, as imperfect images, may imitate and manifest them.[1]

God having thus been shown as the ultimate foundation of the metaphysical order, it still remains to infer His existence from the fact that He is the author and the end of the moral order. This we shall do by the seventh proof.

The moral order is for rational beings evidently necessary. That which is good, we all are convinced, is to be done, that which is bad is to be avoided. In each single man the lower appetite must be subordinate to the higher, and in social life justice and charity must be observed, the inferior must be subject to the superior, and the

[1] See S. Thomas, S. Theol. p. i., qu. 14, art. 6; qu. 15, art. 2. In commenting on S. Thomas, Card. Toletus says: "*Deus per essentiam suam ut multis participabilem cognovit in ipsamet omnium verum exemplaria distincte.* In hujus declarationem nota, quod essentia divina, quum sit actus infinitus ac consequenter infinitæ virtutis et poteniæ, innumeris modis extra se communicabilis est ac participabilis, et hoc quia semper imperfecte participatur, nec integre extra se communicari potest. Haec autem participabilitas, ut ita loquar, est et natura ipsius essentia udeo, quod Deus necessario particiabilisest. Per hauc autem participibilitatem, sen, ut melius dicam, per hoc quod Deus est communicativus et potens faere, et participetur, creaturæ incipiunt habere esse possibile necessarium, quod non est aliquod esse in creaturæ intrinsecum, sed sola Dei potentia et participabilitas necessaria. Unde creaturæ sunt necessario possibiles, sicut et essentia necessario est participabilis; quamvis creaturæ nondum dicantur per hoc complete possibiles, ut post dicetur. Nota secundo, quod Deus per hanc essentiam participabilem se intelligens cognoscit suam essentiam absolute et ut multis participabilem; immo infinitus modis. Et tunc distinguens in se omnes modos format exemplaria creaturarum omium possibilium, ac in se omnes illas distincte cognoscit sub ecse exemplari illo. Et tuns creaturæ dicuntur complete possibiles, quia a Deo non procedun nisi mediante intellectu." Enarratio in Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 14, art. 6.

private welfare yield to the public. All mankind perceives such an order to bind with necessity all human beings, and even all rational beings of a similar nature, unchangeably, invariably, under all circumstances, at all times, and in all places. If there are some who boast of no more being impressed by the necessity of morality, they either speak against their conviction, or they have violently stifled the interior voice of their conscience. Wheresoever rational nature is not thwarted and vitiated, there the binding necessity of the moral order is deeply felt and ever acknowledged. Of what kind is this necessity? It is not physical, for the moral order regulates our free actions, and it always lies in man's power to observe or transgress it. Much less is it metaphysical, which would make a moral fault absolutely impossible. Nor is it a mere dictate of our reason that simply reveals us some invariable truth. If one offends against the simple principles of reason, he is considered to act foolishly and to contradict oneself either in his judgments or in his doings, yet nobody thinks him therefore to have contracted a guilt. Thus we judge of a fault against a mathematical or a merely speculative truth, or against the rules of arts. But he that performs actions contrary to the principles of morality, is pronounced guilty of a crime, and subject to the loss of happiness as a well-deserved penalty, not only by those who are cognizant of his immoral act, but also by his own conscience.

If even a transgression is witnessed by nobody, and no earthly power can reach and avenge it, he who has committed it is therefore no less sure of a severe punishment to come on him.' So sharp are sometimes these interior rebukes within the heart of the sinner, and so keen the presentiment of a future vengeance, that from the moment at which the evil act was perpetrated, peace and harmony have departed from him and made room to dismay and gloom. The moral order imposed on us is, hence, the sternest of all necessities; for although it leaves us the free use of our faculties, it nevertheless so enjoins on us the performance of certain actions and the omission of others as to render disobedience to itself the greatest disgrace, and to punish it unavoidably with the heaviest of all losses. Nor can such an exigency result from a merely subjective impulse, which forces us to judge so without objective truth. For we understand the necessity of the moral order and of the reparation of its breaches to arise from the very nature of rational beings, independently of our thoughts, and even of our existence; and this we perceive so clearly and so evidently as to think it most absurd that it should be only imaginary, or should, by any philosophical theories, be proved to be unreal. Likewise the moral order cannot be established by the autonomy or absolute sovereignty of our own reason, as after Kant many philosophers

have thought. For it binds us and is, if infringed on, avenged without and even against our will and our inclinations. We are fully conscious, not of having drawn it up by our conceptions and sanctioned it by our pleasure, but of having received it and of having understood its necessity to be founded on objective reality. In sum, the moral law, all its attributes considered, is an immutable, absolute necessity, laid on us from outside by a superior power for the purpose of putting order in the free actions of rational nature, as the physical laws are impressed on matter, to reduce it to harmony and unity.

From these characters of the moral order we can and must infer God to exist as its author and its last end.[1] To prove God to be the author of the moral law, we have to search into the nature of the power that has laid it on us. Such a power must be endowed with four attributes. It must be higher than any human being, and even than any rational being of a similar nature; it must be highly intelligent and most powerful, absolutely necessary in its existence, and immutable in its determination to maintain order and right. First, he who subjects another one to an unavoidable necessity is, doubtless, higher than he that is subjected. All men, therefore, being bound by the moral law,—and not only all men, but also all rational beings of a similar nature,—its author is of necessity higher than they all. Secondly, if order in general is the effect of an intelligent cause, the moral order much more, by which the free actions of rational nature are regulated, cannot take existence but from reason and intellect. Thirdly, the ultimate author of the moral law has sovereign power over all men and all finite rational beings which are similar to man as to nature, and must moreover know all their transgressions, in order to avenge them, and all their observances, in order to reward them. His power as well as his knowledge is, therefore, most extended and perfect. Fourthly, as the moral law is necessary and cannot be conceived not to be binding us in any condition and at any time, its author also must be necessary, both as to his existence and his determination to impose it upon us and to put it into execution; and such necessity, too, must be unconditional and independent of any circumstances.

Now what cause or what principle has such attributes? There is no other being of this kind than the infinite and self-existent. Whereas this has all the qualities required, any other being, since finite and contingent, is neither necessary as to its existence, nor absolutely unchangeable in the determinations of its will, nor sovereign in its power, and not itself subjected to the moral order. By its universal necessity, therefore, the moral law, that is written

[1] See Card. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, Thes. III., p. 56.

in our hearts and promulgated by our reason, points out God, the self-existent, infinite being, as its sovereign author; He not existing, it would have no firmness and immutability, no sufficient reason, no real and solid foundation.[1]

Considering the manner in which our free actions are regulated, we conclude God to exist as the end of the moral order and as our supreme good. The object of the appetite in general is the good, the object of the will in particular the good that completely perfects rational nature. Yea, the very essence of the will consists in the tendency to happiness, or the possession of all good; and this tendency is implied in all its acts and gives energy to all its exertions. If we now bear in mind that order is put in a multitude of things by subjecting those which are lower to those which are higher, and these again to that which is the highest, in accordance, however, with each one's particular nature, it is not difficult to conceive how the free actions of our will are to be regulated. The essential conditions of order are fulfilled with regard to them, if they all so tend to the real object of happiness, that every limited good is desired as subordinate to the supreme unlimited good which fully satisfies and perfects our rational nature. But the limited good is then desired as subordinate to the supreme good, if the former is regarded as a means to attain the latter as our last end, and, consequently, if the supreme good is the motive, out of

---

[1] With his wonted eloquence, Cicero infers God as the author of the natural law from its unconditioned necessity and universality, when he says: "Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat, quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet ac vetat nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpresejus alius, nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus: ille legis hujus inventor, discepator, lator, cui qui non parebit ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso pœnas luet maximas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit." —De Republica, lib. III., c. 22.

"True law is right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one thing to-day and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from himself and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing he will endure the severest penalties, even if he avoid other evils which are usually accounted punishments."

which the limited good is loved and longed for. In such an order of actions, therefore, no limited good moves our will solely by itself; it is the supreme good which by its goodness lends motive power to any other good, concurs as the first and principal cause to all well-regulated actions, and connects them into one series.[1] On the supreme good, then, the whole moral order rests, as on the first efficient cause all other causes and all effects depend.

But in which object can this supreme good be found? What is it that can really bestow full happiness on man and perfect his rational nature? Is it something finite or something infinite, something merely possible or something existing? It must be the fulness of all goodness and all perfection; for else it could satisfy neither our intellect, which is capable of knowing all truth, nor our will, which longs after good without restriction—after all good. Hence the supreme good of man, the object of his happiness, must be infinite and is identical with the infinite being. Furthermore, this infinite good, the last end of the moral order, cannot be merely possible, but must needs exist. We grant, it is not always necessary that the final object of our desire already exists, it suffices that it is possible and is conceived as such. Yet in this case its effection is the end of our volition or operation. Now the infinite good, being essentially self-existent, cannot be produced by us; all that we can and will obtain by our actions is the real possession of it and the intimate union with it. But the unproduced being, the union with which constitutes our happiness, must be real and actually existing. The good, which neither exists, nor, if it does not exist, can ever come into existence, cannot be attained by our free tendency, nor can its possession satisfy and perfect our rational nature, nor can its attainment be considered as an object worthy of our desire, or as the motive impelling us to a whole series of actions tending towards its embrace, or as a rule of all our conduct. If, therefore, the infinite does not actually exist, there is no supreme good for man, no real object of our happiness; and, by consequence, the whole moral order has no standard, no real end, no unity, no object, which by its goodness moves us to its observance, which we may hope to attain as a reward for virtue, or may fear to lose in punishment for our transgressions. God not existing, there is nothing more absurd, nothing more contradictory than the existence of the moral order. It may at most be observed by the ignorant on account of self-deceit, but it must fall as soon as human reason begins to be enlightened. The materialist will pretend not to recoil from such a consequence, and even admit it willingly; however, it is to be denied that any one can conceive

[1] S. Thomas, S. Theol., I., II., q. 1, art. 4.

morality to be absurd; its beauty and its necessity for the well-being of society, as well as the individual, is too evident.

The whole moral order, therefore, is entirely founded on God really and actually existing; His wisdom and sanctity have sanctioned it and laid it as an immutable necessity on rational nature; His infinite goodness is its first object, its end, its centre, its unity, its motive power and final cause. Without God morality is an absurdity, as human nature itself is a monster, because it is by its faculties irresistibly inclined to the pursuit of happiness which is impossible, and to an object as its last end which neither exists nor can exist.[1]

The existence of God as the lawgiver and sovereign of mankind, absolutely to be obeyed and adored, which we just have demonstrated from the nature of the moral law, is confirmed also by the unshaken and universal conviction of all nations. This proof, the eighth and the last, proceeds in the following way: First, the fact is to be stated that among all nations, and among the greatest part of men, the firm belief in the Divinity exists, then this belief is to be traced back as to its proper cause, to rational nature itself, struck by the evidence of truth.

There were, at any time, comparatively only few atheists over the earth, and those few ones were generally considered as criminals. Everywhere the mass of the people, the learned as well as the unlearned, the rulers as well as the subjects, always believed in the Deity; they honored it by private and public worship; they

[1] Those who, with Colonel Ingersoll, denying the existence of God, profess the religion of the body, we might refer to a passage in Plutarch's famous treatise against Colotes, the Epicurean. It is as if the Grecian philosopher had known our latest atheists. "They," says he, "who contemn these things (God and justice) as if they were fables, and think that the sovereign good of man consists about the belly, and in those other avenues by which pleasure is admitted, are such as stand in need of the law, and fear, and stripes, and some king, prince, or magistrate, having in its hand the sword of justice; to the end that they may not devour their neighbors through their gluttony, rendered confident by their atheistical impiety. For this is the life of brutes, because brute beasts know nothing better nor more honest than pleasure, understand not the justice of the gods, nor revere the beauty of virtue; but if nature has bestowed on them any point of courage, subtlety, or activity, they make use of it for the satisfaction of their fleshly pleasure and the accomplishment of their lusts. And the wise Metrodorus believes that this should be so, for he says: 'All the fine, subtle, and ingenious inventions of the soul have been found out for the pleasure and the delight of the flesh, or for the hopes of attaining to it and enjoying it, and every act which tends not to this end is vain and unprofitable.' The laws being by such discourses and philosophical reasons as these taken away, there wants nothing to a beastlike life but lions' paws, wolves' teeth, oxen's paunches, and camels' necks, and these passions and doctrines do the beasts themselves, for want of speech and letters, express by their bellowings, neighings, and brayings, all their voice being for their belly and the pleasure of their flesh, which they embrace and rejoice in either present or future, unless it be perhaps some animal which naturally takes delight in chattering and garrulity." Morals: Against Colotes, the Disciple and Favorite of Epicurus, c. 30.

endeavored to appease its wrath for crimes committed, and to obtain blessings from its bounty, by sacrifices, bloody and unbloody; they dreaded punishment from it for their transgressions, and reward in the life to come for their virtuous actions. History, no less than all the monuments of antiquity that have come down to us, prove to be true what Plutarch wrote against Colotes, the Epicurean. "If you," says he, "will take the pains to travel through the world, you may find towns and cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without houses, without wealth, without money, without theatres and places of exercise; but there was never seen or shall be seen by man any city without temples and gods, or without making use of prayers, oaths, divinations, and sacrifices for the obtaining of blessings and benefits, and the averting of curses and calamities. Nay, I am of opinion that a city might sooner be built without any ground to fix it on than a commonwealth be constituted, void of any religion and opinion of the gods; or, being constituted, preserved."[1] Other writers, historians and philosophers, amply confirm his statement. This, says Cicero, "may further be brought as an irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are gods, that there was never any nation so barbarous, nor any people in the world so savage as to be without some notion of gods. Many have erroneous notions of the gods, for that is the nature and ordinary consequence of bad customs, yet all allow that there is a certain divine nature and energy. Nor does this proceed from the conversation of men or the agreement of philosophers; it is not an opinion established by institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, in every case the consent of all nations is to be looked on as a law of nature."[2] Among the Christian writers, many alleged the necessary and universal belief of mankind as a proof for the existence of the true God against the heathen atheists and idolaters. "This is," says Tertullian, "the great crime of the heathens, that they did not acknowledge Him whom they could not ignore."[3] St. Augustine, too, remarked that God cannot be unknown to man. "Such," says he, "is the power of the true Deity, that from the rational creature, which has the use of reason, it cannot be entirely hidden. Few men excepted,

---

[1] Morals: Against Colotes, c. 31.

[2] "Ut porro firmissimum hoc adferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam est immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio: multi de dis prava sentiunt—id enim vitioso more effici solet—omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur, nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus effecit, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus; omni antem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est." Tusculan. Disput., lib. I, c. 13.

[3] "Hæc est summa delicti nolentium recognoscere, quem ignorare non posserat." Apolog., c. 17.

in which the human nature is too depraved, all mankind owns God to be the maker of this universe."[1]

The very same facts we have to state of modern times, not only as far as Christian nations are concerned, among which the knowledge and the worship of God are most developed, but also with regard to the barbarians discovered in the forests of the New World. Whoever was acquainted with them, whoever had studied their languages and had for a longer time observed their customs, found them imbued with the idea of a Deity and addicted to the practice of a religion. We do not, however, say that their knowledge was well evolved, and that their worship was without gross superstition; we, on the contrary, with Cicero admit that they were plunged in grave errors; yet we also with Cicero insist on the undeniable and universal fact of their being convinced of the existence of a Supreme Lawgiver, and their adoring a Supreme Being.

That this conviction was most firm, unshaken, and forced on them with necessity is evident from the actions to which it prompted them, and from the opposite tendencies which it had to withstand. The Divinity believed in always binds man not only to worship it, but also to observe the moral law imposed on him; to reconcile it by severe penance after sin, and to gain its favor by virtue and piety. Are not such actions on the one hand most difficult and often requiring the sacrifice of our dearest interests? and are they not, on the other hand, performed by all nations for the honor of God? A belief impelling man to such feats must be deeply rooted in his soul. Besides, this conviction could not take hold of man without overcoming many and great hindrances. It was resisted by all the passions of the human heart, which were to be checked by it; by the grossest vices, which at once blunted the mind for the supersensible and rendered the existence of God, the severe avenger of sin, dreadful; by the barbarousness of so many nations, which seemed to have deadened in themselves the capacity of perceiving the spiritual and immaterial. The monstrosity of errors concerning God and religion, embraced by the various nations, and the contradictions of the learned respecting His nature and His attributes, might seem to have made the very idea of a Deity absurd and imaginary. Advanced science was ready to discover every false reasoning, and to lay open any weak point or unsound tenet which served as a basis to religious belief. Atheism did everything it could to ridicule religion, to incite man to throw

[1] "Hæc est vis veræ divinitatis, ut creaturæ rationali jam ratione utenti non omnisso ac penitus possit abscondi. Exceptis enim paucis, in quibus natura minimum est depravata, universum genus humanum Deum mundi hujus fatetur auctorem." In Joan. Tract., 106.

off the yoke of a supreme lawgiver, and to regain liberty for the human passions. Yet the conviction of a God existing was not weakened by all these hindrances and assaults; it was not rooted up by science; it, on the contrary, outlived all philosophical systems hostile to itself, and in consequence of such conflicts became but more enlightened, and was maintained with more firmness. Mankind, therefore, everywhere and at any time admitted God's existence with immutable firmness; which firmness was not blind and unreasonable, but had stood any kind of discussion, and had grown by careful examination only the stronger. We hence must infer that the conviction regarding the existence of the Deity implies a steadiness equal to necessity, and must have been irresistibly impressed on the human race.

The universality and the necessity of the belief in God being proved, it is not difficult to trace it back to its true origin. The cause of it must evidently be also universal and necessary. But there is only one such cause,—rational nature itself, struck by the evidence of objective truth. I shall first prove this by a general reflection, and then speak of the particular causes resorted to by the atheists. If the intellect embraces a false opinion, it is not led to do so by its own nature, for this tends to truth, but by the influence of the will, which, if there is no compelling evidence in the object, either does not apply the understanding to a sufficient consideration of the question to be affirmed or negatived, or determines the same to assent or dissent by the preponderance of its own inclination. Now there is no reason at all why the will should bend the intellect to an erroneous opinion of God's existence. To do so the will should have been allured by some good it hoped to attain, the existence of a Supreme Being and Lawgiver being admitted, and should have yielded to some bad propensity, it being certainly immoral to avert the intellect from truth and to plunge it into error, in a matter of so great importance. To what corrupt proneness of the human heart could this falsehood correspond, and what advantage hoped for could prompt it to so wicked an influence? As it was shown above, God is opposed to all disorderly inclinations of our will; He restrains its liberty; He commands the control over our passions, and forbids their gratification; He threatens with the severest punishments those who do not comply with the most difficult laws of the moral order; He demands the greatest sacrifices of the human heart, and promises for them only an invisible reward in the life to come. This being so, the will, following its evil propensities, cannot lead the intellect to the belief in the existence of God, but is, on the contrary, most inclined to resist and, if possible, to hinder its embracing that conviction. Experience amply confirms this. Those who

desire to indulge in their pride, lust, or avarice, struggle against the existence of a Supreme Lawgiver, whilst those whose passions are under the control of reason are never enemies of the Deity. We may lay it down as a certain rule that the more the human will is upright and honest, the firmer man's belief is in God, and that the more the will is overpowered by wicked desires, the stronger is man's opposition against God. The belief in the Divinity, therefore, is certainly not the effect of the will through some ill motive inclining us to untruth.

Should it even happen that to some the existence of a Supreme Divine Power might promise advantage, and that others were at first simply overawed by their authority, or deceived by their false reasons, no malice of the will thus having any part in their belief, there could, nevertheless, in this way, neither a universal nor a necessary conviction be produced. There would be a great many others who, for the sake of their liberty and the gratification of their passions, were interested in the denial of a Supreme Being, and who, therefore, by no false reasons and by no mere saying of their betters, could be induced to admit its existence. For doctrines which imply the heaviest duties and the greatest sacrifices are not adopted by man but after careful examination and for quite cogent reasons. On the same account also those who have once been deceived in a matter of this kind will never stick to their opinions with unchangeable firmness, but will rather always be ready to search into its grounds, and to give it up as soon as doubt is possible and reasonable.

Hence there is absolutely no influence of the will contrary to truth, which determined the intellect to the firm conviction of God's existence. Even it would be most absurd to admit that any power of whatever kind, whether intrinsic or extrinsic to us, could so prevail on the mind as to force on it a false conviction, or to move it irresistibly to a wrong assent. For such a possibility would presuppose that the human intellect equally tends to truth and to falsehood, and may embrace one and the other with the same firmness. This being granted, the veracity of reason would be destroyed, and all certainty overthrown. It is, consequently, rational nature itself from which the immutable belief in God springs. The intellect, however, its nature consisting in the tendency to truth, cannot adhere to an object with firmness and necessity, unless this be with either extrinsic or intrinsic evidence revealed to us as it is in itself; and such evidence must be the more striking, the more the propensities of our will are opposed to its admission. Hence the conviction of mankind regarding the existence of God must be traced back to rational nature, struck by the evidence of truth.

Nevertheless, the atheists resort to other causes to account for man's belief in God. They attribute it to education, to the frauds of priests and lawgivers, to fear, to ignorance. But none of these causes is universal and necessary, as the effect is which they are said to have produced.

Education is different among different nations, even in different families, and in different times; and moreover the principles imbibed by it are frequently changed in later years in consequence of studies, experience, and conversing with men of different views, particularly if they are opposed to the human passions and propensities and based on no solid foundation. The authority of the priests already presupposes the belief of the people in a Deity, and so does that of the lawgivers. Moreover how should we explain the uniformity and universality of this error spread among all nations? Should we perhaps think that all rulers and priests over the earth entered into a conspiracy, in order to at once deceive the whole human race, and that this conspiracy was never betrayed and never discovered? Was ever a similar fact known? Can it be conceived to be possible, the hostility and jealousy of the different rulers, the barbarity of so many nations, and the lack of intercourse between the different countries of the earth being taken into account? But the possibility of such a conspiracy being granted, could a few kings and priests by deceit and false reasons peacefully induce all nations, and among them the wisest and most learned men, to embrace the unalterable belief in God's existence without any doubt and suspicion, though they were in consequence of it subjected to the hardest duties and to the loss of their liberty, and though some enlightened and rightminded atheists tried by all means to undeceive them? Indeed such an admission requires more than blind faith. It is, in truth, to be astonished how our modern atheists can swallow down this monstrosity and for the sake of civilization demand the same to be done by all mankind, whilst out of mere delicacy of their intellect they find an insurmountable difficulty in thinking that the produced existences have their ultimate cause in an unproduced being.

Ignorance is not common to all men. Among many highly civilized nations there were men of great wisdom, as well as uprightness, which they proved more strikingly by the purity of their life, the greatness of their exploits, and their heroic self-sacrifices for the common welfare, than the atheists show their intrinsic worth and their learning by their boastfulness and their somewhat obscure morality. Now as these heroes believed in God and found themselves confirmed in their conviction by their deep studies and researches, so also, whilst they enlightened their age and advanced knowledge and science for many centuries, they promoted their

fellow-citizens in piety and religion. Nor can the opinion of God be with unchanging firmness maintained through ignorance; this is repugnant both to the nature of our intellect and to the inclination of our will.

The fear also of the unknown powers of nature or of threatening evils is neither as universal as the thought of a Supreme Being, nor so strong as to produce in us a belief which by no reflection could be weakened or thrown off. Not all that believe in God can be said to be timid and faint-hearted. Yea, if dreadful evils are coming down on us, those who worship God and obey His law bear them with unflinching courage and constancy, and those, on the contrary, who pretend out of mere strength of mind to despise the Divinity show most weakness and despair. The idea itself we have of God does not point to fear as its adequate cause. If terror forced us to believe in Him, we should consider Him only as a dreadful power armed with thunders and lightnings; yet we love Him as a father and revere Him as the source of all good. At last, though the fearful events in nature impress on man the idea of a great supramundane power, so as to overwhelm even atheists and to extort from them the confession or the invocation of God, it ought to be proved that thus the existence of a Supreme Being is not rightly inferred and believed in; this, however, is impossible. Such occurrences remind man too forcibly of his own weakness and dependence as to leave in him still the idea of his own sovereignty, and as not to arouse in him the thought of a superior sway and invisible Providence. It is for this reason that, as already Tertullian remarked, in such circumstances also atheists against their will acknowledge a higher power over themselves and implore its help.

It thus being impossible to find any accidental cause proportioned to the universal and firm conviction which the whole human race has of God's existence, we again have to conclude that rational nature itself, struck by the evidence of truth, must be its origin. For rational nature is common to all men, and gives necessary assent to its judgments, not in consequence of any subjective impulse, or blind instinct, or deceitful appearance, but on account of the evidence of truth which has flashed upon it.

From this it follows that on the one side God is manifested by His creation very distinctly, and that, on the other hand, the human intellect is particularly fitted to discover and to infer Him from this visible world. So in reality it is. Led by the principle of causality, which we daily apply to numberless events, man cannot observe this universe with its changes, its contingency, and its order, or experience the operation of his own mind with all its weakness and dependence, without gathering a first, independent

cause of all. He may in this way form an idea of God not in every regard perfect, he may argue not according to a scientific method, yet he will attain by common-sense reasoning at least an imperfect knowledge and an obvious certitude of His existence, firm enough as to withstand all doubts and objections. Just on this account the cognition of God's existence is said by many Christian writers of ancient times to be inborn to man, not as if innate ideas were to be admitted, as Plato taught, but because, as St. Thomas explains,[1] the principles of cognition, that is to say, the power of reason, by which we easily rise to the existence of a Supreme Being, is native with us as a constituent part of our nature. By this, however, we do not intend to deny, but rather we willingly grant, that also tradition and authority contributed a great deal to the spreading of the universal and firm belief in God. Nor are we thus inconsistent with our own tenets. From what we have said it follows at most that tradition, inasmuch as it supported this conviction of mankind, must have been endowed with extrinsic evidence. Nevertheless, according to Sacred Scripture and the teachings of the Church, that too must be maintained that from the visible creation also unaided reason *can* deduce the existence of God with certainty.[2]

But if the cognition of God's existence is necessary and forced on us with evidence, atheism seems to be impossible, and our free will has in adopting or rejecting it no part at all. This objection deserves our attention, as its solution will throw much light over the question. The contemplation of the universe and the experience of himself leads man to search into the ultimate cause of the contingent and the mutable. Whenever in this inquiry he allows reason its natural course, he cannot but arrive at the absolute and Supreme Being as the cause of all contingent existence; and to this conclusion, although drawn without scientific method, he will adhere with firmness. Yet man may by the corruption of his free will also thwart the tendency of reason by not letting it apply itself to the unprejudiced consideration of truth and by bending it nearly violently to the objections raised against the existence of a first cause. If this deflection of the intellect from seriously considering the reasons for the existence of God lasts, atheism becomes habitual, and may, though unnatural in itself, be maintained with less repugnance of the mind. Thus the firm belief in God

---

1 "Dei cognitio nobis dicitur innata esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse." In Boëth. de Trinit. Prooem., qu. 1, art. 3, ad. 6. See also Card. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, Thes. vii.; T. Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, I. Band, n. 435-444.

2 Sap. cp. 13; Acts xiv., 16; xvii., 27; Rom. i., 20. Concilium Vatic., Constit. Dogm. de Fide Cathol., cp. III.

results with necessity from rational nature, if this is permitted to follow its congenial tendency, and yet will be prevented or suppressed, if nature itself is spoiled or thwarted within us. Wherefore St. Augustine remarks that all in whom reason has dawned have the notion of God, and that the whole human race acknowledges Him to be the maker of the universe; those alone excepted who have vitiated their own nature. This fully agrees with the doctrine of St. Paul (Rom. i. 18), who assigns the ignoring of the true Deity not to the incompetence of the human intellect, but to the wickedness of the will, detaining the truth of God in injustice.[1]

To sum up the several proofs advanced for the existence of God, it is evident we can and must by many ways rise to Him from the beings of this visible universe; from their production, their contingency, their finiteness, their mutability, their order, their metaphysical essences, from the moral law written in our hearts, from the unshaken conviction of all mankind. From all these points of view we arrive at the conclusion of His existence with full certainty, from each one we derive a new perfection of His; and, gathering what from them all we have inferred, we know Him to be the first, unproduced cause, self-existent, absolutely necessary, infinite, and immutable in all His perfections, the former of the astounding order of this world, the firm foundation and the eternal author of the moral law, endowed with boundless power and wisdom and unchangeable sanctity, the source of all truth and all essences of existing and possible beings, and the eternal archetype of all that is. No being, we have thus understood, can be without Him, in whatever regard it may be considered; its essence cannot be real without His essence existing as its foundation; its existence cannot be produced without His unproduced being; its contingent nature has no sufficient reason to exist without His necessary existence; its changes cannot take place without His unchanging entity as the source of all perfections received; its order cannot have been effected but by His wisdom and power; its free action, if it is rational, cannot be regulated by a fixed rule and directed to an end answering our nature, He as the Supreme lawgiver and as the highest good not existing. God, therefore, is the first principle from which all things spring, and the last end to which they all return, the ultimate foundation of all the three orders, the physical, metaphysical, and moral, and for this reason also the ground of all science, which not being attained, nothing is thoroughly known and fully understood, and which not standing by itself, no truth can be necessary, immutable, and eternal.

[1] See Sylvester Maurus, S. J., Quaest. Theolog., de Deo Uno et Trino, qu. 15.

However, by our eight proofs we might be said to have demonstrated the existence of a Supreme Being, but not of one personal God as thought by the theists. Also the pantheists admit an absolute, unproduced being, yet conceive it to be indistinct from this universe. No less do the polytheists believe in the Divinity as the cause of this world, but they imagine it to exist, not in one, but in many divine beings, united and subordinate to one another. Can human reason not disentangle itself from these heathen views? Do the proofs set forth by Christian philosophers not furnish us with another idea of God than one that is consistent with all the errors of deism? Undoubtedly we are to deny this. But how shall we prove the Supreme Being to be one, not only as to nature but also as to number? Or how shall we evince with cogent reasons that the first cause has produced the universe, not so as to be immanent to it, but so as to be distinct from it?

Let us first treat of pantheism. All the forms of modern pantheism suppose God not to be distinct from the world. May He now be said to be identical with it as the unity or the sum of all its constituent parts, or immanent to it either as its form and its soul, or as the substance underlying its phenomena, or has the germ of all its evolutions? To evidence the distinction between God and the universe, it is above all necessary to call our attention to the essential attributes of both. God is self-existent, absolutely necessary, infinitely perfect, and so determined by this essence that any other degree of perfection than He actually possesses is in Him metaphysically impossible; whence He is also absolutely immutable. The beings, on the contrary, which are constituent parts of this universe are, as nobody can doubt, produced, contingent, mutable, and finite. They are produced because they came into existence with a beginning; contingent, because they can be conceived as not existing, and many of them even have a liability to destruction; mutable, because they, in reality, change continually, losing perfections which they had, and acquiring others which they had not before; finite, because they are limited in every regard, in their extension, their duration, their powers, their cognition. And if the particular beings are produced, contingent, mutable, and finite, the universe also constituted by them must needs be such. It cannot be self-existent, necessary, and immutable, for a whole or a collection cannot have perfections entirely and essentially excluded from its constituents, its reality being no other than that of all the component parts united. Not being self-existent, it is also not infinite, but finite. God, then, being essentially self-existent, necessary, infinite, and immutable, the universe, on the contrary, being produced, contingent, finite, and mutable, they cannot be one and the selfsame being, unless we are to predicate

at once quite contradictory attributes of the same thing, self-existence together with dependence on an efficient cause, absolute necessity together with contingency, absolute immutability together with mutability, absolute infinity in being together with finiteness. But it may for this reason be granted that God is not, as materialistic pantheism holds, identical with the universe, inasmuch as He is the whole of its constituent parts, and it may nevertheless be said that He is the substance and the world its modifications or evolutions, whether immanent to it or emanant from it, or that He is the indeterminate principle and the world its determinations, whether real or ideal, or that He is the soul and matter the body informed by it, as spinozism, evolutionism, idealism, hylozoism use to maintain. All these different forms of pantheism are no less repugnant to the divine nature than materialism. They all suppose the Divinity to be imperfect, finite, and subject to changes. According to them the divine essence is in itself unreal, and obtains concrete existence and full determination only in the different natures and evolutions of the universe, so however that each one of these natures and evolutions is finite and transient, and the whole of them is only indefinite, but never actually and strictly infinite, always changing and growing, but never perfect and complete. But an essence which is determined, developed, and realized by always changing and ever finite existences and evolutions is in itself indeterminate, undeveloped, and unreal, and in its perfections always varying, always deficient, and limited. Hence the Divinity can by no means be immanent to the universe as the substance is to its modifications, or the germ to its evolutions, or the soul to the body.

At the same conclusion we arrive, if we consider the simplicity of the divine nature. That which is infinite is also essentially and in every respect simple. In every composition each component part is finite, since it is less perfect than the whole to which it belongs, and is accomplished and perfected by the other parts with which it is united. But from the addition of finite parts an infinite being cannot arise. For every part added being limited, there remains of necessity after every addition a limit also in the whole. Moreover, could even by the union of finite parts an infinite multitude or magnitude be made up, this would still throughout its whole extension retain all the imperfections implied in each component's nature, the lack, for instance, of life, cognition or intellect. The infinite can for the same reason not be thought to enter into composition with another being. For whatever unites itself to something else is by union completed and must, consequently, be in itself imperfect, or in other words, must have the capacity of receiving a perfection, and hence be of itself in

lack of the same.[1] Now, in all pantheistic systems God is thought either to be compound or to enter into composition with other beings. For He is a body, if He is conceived to be the universe or to have secreted it from Himself, or He is joined to a body, if He is said to be the soul of the material world, or He is the substance to be united with everchanging accidents and determinations, if He is thought as the substratum of the mundane phenomena. Since, then, the infinite, self-existing being cannot be immanent to or identical with this universe, we must infer that God is not the substance in which the natural appearances inhere, that He has not produced this world as His own modifications or evolutions, but has made it out of nothing a being subsistent in itself, and that hence, though He supports it by His power and fills it with His presence, yet He is substantially and essentially distinct from it. We must from this further deduce that the first cause is a personal Deity. It is a substance, for as it exists entirely by itself and independently of anything else, it must also exist in itself and without dependence on a subject of inhesion; it is moreover a rational substance, since it is intelligent and even the source of all intellectual power, and quite a complete rational substance, which does not belong to another being and is not subordinate to another subject, but subsists in itself, because being infinite and absolute, it is completion and independence itself. But a complete rational substance subsistent in itself is a person.[2]

We think to have thus sufficiently evinced the absurdity of pantheism, and pass over to the refutation of polytheism. The first proof for the oneness of God we again take from His self-existence. God exists by Himself, or by virtue of His own essence, hence the divine essence as such must be existing, or rather identical with existence. But whatever exists is individual, not universal. The divine essence therefore must include individuality, or in other terms, be individual of itself. But again, whatever is individual can, without losing its proper being, not be communicated to many subjects. Consequently, the divine essence neither can be common to several gods. Hence by the necessity of the divine essence itself there can exist only one God. S. Thomas illustrates this reasoning by a striking example. We distinguish, says he,[3] in Socrates that whereby he is man, and that whereby he

[1] See S. Thom., S. Theol., p. I., qu. 3. [2] S. Theol., p. I., qu. 29, art. 3.

[3] S. Theol., p. I., qu. 11, art 3. "Manifestum est, quod illud unde aliquid singulare est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim, unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id, unde est hic homo non potest communicarinisi, uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates per idesset homo, perquod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem convenit Deo; nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est. qu. 3, art. 3. Secundum igitur idem est Deus et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur esse plures deos."

is this man, that is, Socrates. That whereby he is man can exist also in others, but that whereby he is this man Socrates is only in him. If now Socrates were man by the same reality or the same intrinsic principle by which he is this man, and if, consequently, manhood and that whereby he is Socrates were identical, there would be only one man as there is only one Socrates. Just so it is with regard to God; in Him the essence by which He is God is also the sufficient reason why He is this God, or in other words, His essence is also His individuality.

But is not, indeed, Socrates by the same reality by which he is man, also this man? Is not the distinction between essence and individuality a mere abstraction, not real at all in nature? It seems then that the reasoning of St. Thomas proves nothing, because it either proves too much, as it shows the impossibility of many individuals of any essence, or at least does not exclude that also among several gods each one's nature is of itself existent and individual. True, the distinction between essence and individuality results from our abstract consideration of intelligible objects; still two things must well be borne in mind. First, neither essence nor individuality are unreal, but both are found in nature, not separated, yet connected and identified. Secondly, the formal object of the conception of essence is not the same as that of the conception of individuality; for though we consider by them the same thing existing in nature, we, nevertheless, regard it under different aspects; by the one we conceive its constituent parts, as it has them in common with other similar things, by the other we conceive its manner of existing as it is peculiar to it; by the one we conceive its distinction from any other nature, by the other its numerical distinction from any other concrete being. If, therefore, according to our conceptions, the divine nature is said to imply individuality in itself, whilst the same is denied of other essences, this means nothing but that God's essence consists of such attributes as can be common neither to other natures nor to several concrete subjects, and that, on the contrary, other essences are such as exclude only identity with other natures, but not communicability to many subjects. This peculiarity the divine essence has, because it must, on account of its being identical with existence, be conceived as individual and hence incommunicable; whereas other essences do not involve individuality or can be thought without it, because their attributes do not include existence, which is always and alone individual. The oneness of God is, therefore, rightly inferred from His self-existence.

His infinite perfection is another source from which we may derive it. God is essentially the fulness of all being, the plenitude of all perfections. But if there were a plurality of gods, individ-

ually distinct from one another, none of them would be the infinite ocean of all being; for as things individually distinct exclude one another from the compass of their entity, it being the very nature of distinction that one thing is not the other, also of several gods none would possess the reality which constitutes the others in their individuality. Each one would, therefore, have not the plenitude, but a share of being. Nor will it avail to object that one god may contain all the perfection of the others, and thus, notwithstanding his individual distinction, be infinitely perfect. One thing may contain the other's perfection, either formally, or eminently, or virtually; formally, if the perfection which is found in the one exists in its very form and peculiarity also in the other; eminently, if the perfection of the one exists in the other, not in its proper form, but in a higher and more excellent manner; virtually, if one is able to produce the other's perfection. One god would undoubtedly contain the perfection of the others formally, but this would not prove him to possess the fulness of being; for the same nature or form of perfection existing in several beings renders these only similar, but does not destroy their individual distinction or confound their reality. Hence, though of two gods each one formally contained the other's perfection, still neither of them would comprise his equal's individual entity. Virtually the perfection of one god could not be contained in the other, because all divine perfections are essentially self-existent and unproduced. Nor can eminently the perfection of the one be in the other, because in this supposition one god would be superior to the others, and consequently he alone would be infinite. For this reason several gods would have quite a different reference to one another than the finite has to the infinite. The finite is also, as to its individual entity, contained in the infinite virtually and eminently; but the individual entity, as such, of one divine being would not be really contained in that of the other; and, therefore, the existence of the finite does not lessen the perfection of the infinite, but one god would of necessity void the fulness of the other.[1]

Furthermore, if one god does not contain the individual being of the other, he neither includes the finite essences founded on, and the finite existences produced by the same. Each god would then be the source and the centre of a physical, metaphysical, and moral order of his own, by no means and under no respect dependent on other divine beings. This gives further evidence that as soon as deities are multiplied in number, none of them is endowed with the fulness of all reality, each one possessing only

[1] See St. Thomas, S. Theol., p. I., qu. 11, art. 3.

a share of being, and containing, as to their essence and existence, also only a portion, and not the whole of finite beings. An obvious comparison illustrates this conclusion. The monarch who has no equals and on whom all other princes are dependent, is much more powerful than he who has equals quite independent of him. For of monarchs who are equal to and independent of one another, none has more than a limited power, while he who is unequalled and on whom all others depend, is the highest among them and has a universal and unlimited sway. So also that being to which nothing is equal and on which everything depends, must be more perfect than that which is equalled and of which others are independent. By having equals independent of itself, a being necessarily becomes limited; by being unequalled and having all things dependent on itself, it is unlimited. Hence we infer, with Tertullian,[1] that the quality of being the highest is a pure perfection, which, consequently, must be predicated of God, and that it can be realized only in one subject, wherefore God is only one; yea, we must conclude that to have no equals and to be superior to any other thing, is not only a perfection, but the constituent of infinite perfection. The plurality of gods, therefore, is evidently repugnant to the divine essence. By the very fact that this latter is thought to be multiplied in subjects individually and absolutely distinct, it can no longer be conceived to be infinite.

The first cause, then, is of necessity one single personal God, substantially distinct from the world, it being contrary to its self-existence and its infinite perfections to exist in several subjects absolutely distinct, or to consist of parts, or to be composed with another entity, or to vary in its evolutions.

Hence from this visible universe reason not only derives the existence of a first and unproduced cause, but also quite consequentially deduces the oneness and the elevation of the same over all that is finite. By the power of our intellect, which was imparted us like a spark of the eternal divine light, we rise to the purest perfections and the loftiest eminence of God; we reach Him, though imperfectly, by our reasoning as He is from all eternity, in the unlimited fulness of being, absolutely one and simple, yet comprising all and containing all, supereminent above all that is, yet the

[1] Contra Marcionem, lib. i., cp. 3: "Quantum humana conditio de Deo definire potest, id definio, quod et omnium conscientia agnoscet, Deum summum esse magnum, in æternitate constitutum, innatum, infectum, sine fine, et cetera. Quæ erit jam conditio summi magni? Nempe ut nihil illi adæquetur, id est, ut non sit aliud summum magnum; quia si fuerit, adæquabitur, et si adæquabitur, non erit jam summum magnum, eversa conditione et, ut ita dixerim, lege, quæ summo magno nihil sinit adaequari. Ergo unicum sit necesse est, quod fuerit summum magnum. Duo ergo summa magna quomodo consistent, cum hoc sit summum magnum: par non habere, par antem non habere uni competat, in duobus esse nullo modo possit."

centre and the source of all goodness and all perfection. Sound reason is, therefore, not at variance with supernatural revelation, but fully agrees with the dogma of faith concerning His divine attributes as exposed by the Vatican Council. "The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church," we read in its first Dogmatic Constitution, "believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, Creator of heaven and earth; almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in understanding and in will and in every perfection; and that since He is one single, altogether simple and unchangeable spiritual substance, He is to be declared to be really and in essence distinct from the world, most happy in Himself and of Himself, and unspeakably exalted above all things which exist and can be conceived besides Himself."[1]

---

[1] "Sancta Catholica Apostolica Romana Ecclesia credit et confitetur, unum esse Deum, verum et vivum, Creatorem ac Dominum cœli et terræ, omnipotentem, æternum, immensum, incomprehensibilem, intellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitum; qui cum sit una singularis, simplex omnino ac incommutabilis substantia spiritualis, prædicandus est re et essentia a mundo distinctus, in se et ex se beatissimus, et super omnia, quæ præter ipsum sunt et concipi possunt, ineffabiliter excelsus."—Dogmatic Constit. de Fide Cath., cp. ii.

THE REVIVAL OF MANUFACTURES IN IRELAND.

"For the husbandman, it appears, will not make his own plough, if it is to be a good one, nor his mattock, nor any of the other tools employed in agriculture. No more will the builder make the numerous tools which he also requires; and so of the weaver and the shoemaker.

"True.

"Then we shall have carpenters and smiths and many other artisans of the kind who will become members of our little state and create a population.

"Certainly.

"Still it will not be very large, supposing we add to them neatherds and shepherds and the rest of that class, in order that the husbandman may have oxen for ploughing, and the house-builders, as well as the husbandman, beasts of burden for draught, and the weavers and shoemakers wool and leather.

"It will not be a small state either if it contains all these.

"Moreover, it is scarcely possible to plant the actual city in a place where it will have no need of imports.

"No, it is impossible.

"Then it will require a new class of persons to bring from other cities all that it requires. . . . . .

"And thus passing their days in tranquillity and sound health, they will, in all probability, live to an advanced age, and, dying, bequeath to their children a life in which their own will be reproduced."—PLATO, *The Republic*, Book II.

THE Gladstone Land Bill, after mutilation by the Lords, has become the law in Ireland. The only real change which it will effect in the country is one of tenancy. It abolishes, under certain restrictions, tenancies-at-will. The landlord cannot hereafter evict on mere caprice. The tenant is entitled to keep his holding, without increase of rent, for fifteen years, provided he pays the rent. Should the famine return, and the rent be not forthcoming, the tenant may be evicted. Famines in Ireland are the act of God occasionally and the act of foreign government constantly. In either case, the consequences invariably fall upon the tenant. In moral economies and political economies, the man who tills the soil has the first right to its fruits. According to all law, divine and human, he who labors has the first right to live by his labor. But, according to foreign law in Ireland, the man who tills the soil has no right to its fruits until after another man has had all he claims from it. In Ireland, according to foreign law, the laborer is the last to be benefited by his labor; he is not entitled to any benefit from it until all other claims upon it have been satisfied. The new land law is not, therefore, a complete remedy for the ills of Ireland.

So far as it is a remedy it should not fail of just appreciation. If availing himself of its immunities, the landlord fixes a higher rent than the tenant can pay, the tenant may go before the land court and ask arbitration. To do so, the tenant must have money

enough to fee a lawyer. If he has not, and generally he has not, the landlord has the victory without a fight. If both go into court, the sharper lawyer wins; and the sharper lawyer is generally on the side of the richer litigant. Justice, when it can be obtained only through lawyers in courts in monarchical countries, is for the powerful against the weak. The rights which the Irish tenant can acquire only by going into court to get them, the majority of the Irish tenants must continue to do without.

Fixity of tenure for fifteen years, if the rent is paid, is the only substantial benefit conferred by the bill upon the tenant. All the other benefits are conditional. For instance, the tenant may sell his holding for the best price he can get; he will not, as a rule, want to sell except in seasons when he cannot make his holding pay; and at such times the general condition of the country will be so bad that he will have difficulty in obtaining a fair price. The landlord is to have the first chance to buy,—a curious way of disestablishing landlords and promoting peasant proprietary. If the landlord does not want to buy, he can object to the man who does want to buy, and then the seller must go to court for a settlement of the dispute. One of the cruel amendments to the original bill which Mr. Gladstone weakly allowed the Lords to make is that which deprives of its benefits tenants who, by reason of the distress of last year, were unable to pay their rent and are under notice of ejectment. A brave effort was made by Mr. Parnell and his associates to save them from inevitable eviction, but the commoner yielded to the hereditary legislator, and consented to a proceeding which is daily steeping hundreds of the Irish people in tears and misery. Evictions have been numerous since the passage of the bill, and the military and constabulary have been called on to effect them. The causes which prevented the delinquent tenants from paying their rent are the causes which compelled the government to pass the bill; logic, as well as humanity, would have extended its protection to the hapless poor whose poverty the bill was intended, in part at least, to repair. The chief objections to the law as it now stands are two: its provisions for peasant proprietary are impracticable, and its practicable provisions are so clumsy and so intricate that it will be of greater benefit to the lawyers of Ireland than to any one else. It does not effect the solution of the problem in the antiquated and barbarous system of land tenure in Ireland.

Disappointed in their too sanguine expectations, it is not surprising that the people should now turn their eyes in another direction in the hope of improving their material condition. A movement has been vigorously begun for a revival of manufactures in Ireland. A foreign government confiscated their lands, and re-

duced them to a nation of tenants. A foreign government destroyed their manufactures. Before we can make an intelligent estimate of the feasibility of restoring them, it is necessary to inquire into the manner and the causes of their decay.

It is a universal law of civilized society that government shall legislate for the benefit of the subject. It is the universal practice in civilized society for government to legislate for the ruin of its enemy. The record of English legislation on the subject of manufacturing industries in Ireland shows that Ireland was held as a subject but ruined as an enemy.

The principle which is invariably found in English legislation for Ireland is that industry in Ireland was to be kept in absolute subjection to industry in England.

In accordance with this principle :

1. When, in the middle of the seventeenth century, foreign war reduced rents in England, and interfered generally with trade there, the English producers, blind and distressed, raised the cry that their misery was caused by the importation of cattle from Ireland. Forthwith, in 1663, an act was passed by the English Parliament grimly entitled, "For the encouragement of trade," which forbid the exportation of cattle from Ireland to England; forbid all direct exports from Ireland to the British colonies, except through English ports, with some minor exceptions of no value to Ireland; and prohibited her from importing from the colonies except through English ports. This act accomplished for the time the destruction of the sturdy infant trade already carried on by Irish ships with the American colonies.

2. The Irish then commenced killing the cattle and exporting the cured meats to England. Thereupon, in 1665, the English Parliament passed a law perpetually prohibiting the exportation of cattle, living or dead, from Ireland. In 1666, when London was reduced to poverty after the plague and the great fire, an appeal was made to the people of Ireland by the Lord Lieutenant for aid for the English; the contribution most needed was cattle, living or cured; and a considerable quantity was promptly and cheerfully sent over. Those who were starving ate the meat; but instead of thanking the donors, the beneficiaries raised the cry that this was but a sly way the Irish had of evading the law against the exportation of cattle!

3. The manufacture of glass grew in Ireland; that was prohibited.

4. Shut out from direct trade with the American colonies the Irish ships still traversed the Mediterranean and exchanged commodities at the Asiatic ports. A law was passed to forbid this in order to protect the monopolies of the London companies.

5. The greatest blow of all was the destruction of the woollen trade, which was the principal occupation of the producing classes not engaged in agriculture. In the reign of Henry VIII. the woollen producers of England clamored for the suppression of the woollen trade in Ireland. The cruel object was approached slowly, but finally and completely accomplished. First, in 1542, an act was passed prohibiting the importation of Irish wool into England. Then the Irish manufacturers proceeded to use the raw material at home and export cloth, while at the same time they did a thriving business in clothing their own countrymen. So successful were they that they were able after some time to undersell the English clothiers; then fresh prohibitions were demanded. At last, in 1698, the English House of Lords adopted an address to the king, William III., in which the following passage appears: "We, the lords spiritual and temporal in Parliament assembled, do humbly represent unto your majesty that the growing manufacture of cloth in Ireland, both by the cheapness of all sorts of necessaries of life, and goodness of material for making all manner of cloth, doth invite your subjects of England, with their families and servants, to leave their habitations and settle there, to the increase of the woollen manufacture there, which makes your loyal subjects apprehensive that the further growth of it may greatly prejudice the said manufacture here, by which the trade of this nation and the value of the lands will very much decrease, and the numbers of your people be much lessened here; wherefore we do most humbly beseech your most sacred majesty that your majesty would be pleased in the most public and effectual way that may be to declare to all your subjects of Ireland that the growth and increase of the woollen manufacture there hath long been and ever will be looked upon with great jealousy by all your subjects of this kingdom, and if not timely remedied may occasion very strict laws totally to prohibit and suppress the same."

And they suggest that Ireland be encouraged to engage in linen manufacture as an alternative to the total destruction of her principal industry. The linen trade already existed, but as the best flaxseed had to be imported it was not so profitable, and therefore not so national an industry as the woollen manufacture. Suppose the people of Illinois should send a memorial to Congress demanding that the other States of the Union be prohibited from raising cereals, which she wishes to have an exclusive right to cultivate; and that all the other States should be encouraged to engage in some other kinds of industries, for the cultivation of which they would have to send their money abroad for raw material and plants. Would Congress be likely to receive such a memorial except with laughter? The principle that the States forming this

Union are equally entitled to enjoy all rights in common under the General Government would of course render such a memorial possible only for madmen. But Ireland equally with England was entitled to the protection of the King and Parliament in all her industries and liberties. Did the King and Parliament treat her as an equal? Did they legislate for her as a subject or as an enemy? The record is the answer.

The King replied to the Lords that "he will take care to do what their lordships have desired;" and to the Commons, addressing him on the same subject, he answered: "I shall do all that in me lies to discourage the woollen manufacture in Ireland and to encourage the linen manufacture there, *and to promote the trade of England.*"

That pledge was faithfully carried out. He did all that in him lay to promote the trade of England at the cost of industrial ruin to Ireland. Accordingly a fatal prohibitive duty was laid on woollen exports from Ireland. This prosperous branch of industry was practically extinguished. When the fatal stroke entered the vitals of Irish thrift, she was a trader with almost every part of the world to which her ships had not been forbidden access by English law. The woollen fabrics were consumed in part at home, and in part were "sent to the northern nations, from which," wrote Dean Swift, "we had in exchange timber, iron, hemp, pitch, tar, and hard dollars. At the time the current money of Ireland was foreign silver; a man could hardly receive £100 without finding the coin of all the northern powers and every prince of the empire among it."

Thus, step by step, a foreign legislature advanced upon the ruins of Irish industries. Thus, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Ireland, by the deliberate acts of her own government, was cut off from the markets of the world, deprived of her natural and acquired means of effecting commercial exchanges, and reduced to indolence and poverty. Was England governing her then as a subject or as an enemy? Did she assume the attitude of an enemy, or did England place her in that attitude and compel her to remain in it?

"The right of exchange," affirms one of the first authorities in political economy, "is just as much of a right as the right of breathing. It stands on the same unassailable ground. Every man has a natural, self-evident, and inalienable right to put forth efforts for his own well-being; . . . and it is a high-handed infringement of natural rights, a blow aimed at the life and source of property, when any authority whatever interferes to restrict or prohibit the freedom of exchange, except that act be justified by a solid proof that other private or public rights, which are equally well based as the

right of exchange, are infringed thereby." It will scarcely be contended that the rights of one portion of the subjects of a government to a monopoly of manufactures justifies a government in robbing another portion of their fellow-subjects of a right as natural and inalienable as the right of breathing. Governments are accustomed to rob only their enemies of the right of breathing. As an enemy, not as a subject, England legislated for Irish manufactures, even "to the verge of insanity," as has been said by an eminent French student of British affairs; for the law suppressing the Irish woollen trade drove twenty thousand of the skilled operatives out of the country, most of them to France; and in a short time the French undersold the English in that trade.

One of the favorite methods to which the English agents in Ireland resorted from time to time to keep the people from a thorough understanding of their commercial situation, was the suppression of books and pamphlets powerfully illustrating it. Molyneux enjoyed the honor of having his "*Case of Ireland*" burned by the common executioner; copies enough survived to embarrass the government. The large reward offered for the discovery of the author of Swift's "Drapier's" letters proved futile; and one of the volumes which was most effectual in hastening the day of parliamentary independence and industrial freedom, *The Commercial Restraints of Ireland Considered*, was not publicly proscribed, but the government did its utmost to buy the edition up. It is now an exceedingly rare work, and is as valuable as it is rare. Appearing in 1779, when the debates in the Irish Parliament displayed a thoroughly awakened sense of national duty, it must have created a profound impression by its keenness, its moderation, its dignity, its professed and doubtless sincere loyalty to the crown; and most of all by the accuracy and minuteness of the information it conveys, and the pathetic picture it presents of the condition to which Ireland had been reduced by the laws destroying her commerce and manufactures.

The title-page is anonymous; but the author was known to be Hely Hutchinson, then provost of Dublin University and a member of the Irish Parliament. "The book," says Sir John Jonah Barrington, in *The Rise and Fall of the Irish Nation*, "acquired so much character and spoke so many plain truths, that for many years it was quoted as an authority in the Irish Parliament." It was printed in Dublin, in 1779, by William Hallhead. The form adopted is that of *Letters to a Noble Lord*. Hutchinson, it need not be added, was a member of the Established Church; no other Irishmen were eligible to sit in Parliament in Ireland, or at that time even to vote for members; the Parliament represented an insignificant minority of the Irish people, and was in no sense national

in its composition, nor, up to 1782, had it the power to propose any legislation for Ireland, or to pass any except such as had been approved by the King's Council in England. It was, in fact, merely a recording body to formulate in Ireland the orders issued in England for the advancement of English interests in Ireland. The distress caused by the destruction of the Irish trade gradually created a patriotic faction in the Parliament, and this faction became the Opposition. The faction grew into a powerful political party, which, in 1782, aided by the volunteers,—of whom this is not the place to say anything,—wrested from a reluctant crown and frightened ministers the right of the Irish Parliament to make laws for Ireland. What the Irish Parliament did in the eighteen years England suffered it to exist will be hereafter considered.

Hutchinson, in a judicious preface, confesses that it is difficult for any one to write upon the state of Ireland in that year. "The attempt," he says, "is full of difficulty;" "it will require more than ordinary caution to write with such moderation as not to offend the prejudices of one country, and with such freedom as not to wound the feelings of the other." Then he gives this appalling picture of universal misery which the suppression of the manufactures had precipitated: "The present state of Ireland teems with every circumstance of national poverty. Whatever the land produces is greatly reduced in value; wool is fallen one-half in its usual price; wheat one-third; black cattle of all kinds in the same proportion, and hides in a much greater; buyers are not had without difficulty at those low rates, and from the principal fairs men commonly return with the commodities they brought there; rents are everywhere reduced, and in many places it is impossible to collect them; the farmers are all distressed, and many of them have failed; when leases expire, tenants are not easily found; the landlord is often obliged to take his lands into his own hands for want of bidders at reasonable rents, and finds his estate fallen one-fourth of its value. The merchant justly complains that all business is at a stand, that he cannot discount his bills, and that neither money nor paper circulates. In this and the last year above twenty thousand manufacturers in this metropolis were reduced to beggary for want of employment; they were for a considerable length of time supported by alms; a part of the contribution came from England, and this assistance was much wanting from the general distress of all ranks of the people in this country. Public and private credit is annihilated. . . . . This kingdom has long been declining. The annual deficiency of its revenues for the payment of the public expenses has been for many years supplied by borrowing; the American Rebellion, which considerably diminished the demand for our linen, an embargo on provisions for

three years and highly injurious to our victualling trade, the increasing drain of remittances to England for rents, salaries, profits of offices, and the payment of forces abroad, have made the decline more rapid."

Ireland—starving and impoverished; her thousands of manufacturers receiving alms—had to pay millions in taxes to support abroad, in wars she abhorred, the troops of the crown that had impoverished her!

Going back into the period preceding the enactment of the prohibitory laws, the commercial condition of the country is found full of thrift and promise. "After the Restoration . . . . to the year 1688, Ireland made great advances, and continued for several years in a most prosperous condition. Lands were everywhere improved; rents were doubled; the kingdom abounded with money; trade flourished to the envy of our neighbors; . . . manufactures were set on foot in divers parts, . . . and this kingdom is then represented to be the most improved and improving spot of ground in Europe." Passing over the miseries of the reign of James, Ireland recovered from them, and again went on prosperously. "Our exports increased in 1696, '97, and '98, and our imports did not rise in proportion, which occasioned a great balance in our favor; and this increase was principally owing to the woollen manufacture. In the last of those years the balance in favor of Ireland in the account of exports and imports was £419,444."

Then came the fatal law prohibiting the exports of woollens, and practically annihilating the principal industry of the country.

For five years after the passage of the act no Parliament met in Ireland. The Protestant tradesmen had been made the victims of the commercial laws; it was reasonable to expect that they would convey to the crown through their representatives a confession of their wretched state. The complaints sent to the crown were wholly in their behalf; their condition was described as desperate by "the almost total loss of trade and decay of their manufactures," and immediate assistance was asked "to preserve the country from utter ruin." When it is remembered that the land of the country had long before been confiscated from the Catholics and given to the Protestants of England and Ireland, the condition of the former may be imagined. If the Protestants had no longer any trade, at least they had the land. The Catholics, who were five-sixths of the population, had neither trade nor land.

Up to the death of Queen Anne no improvement ensued; and well may Hutchinson write, "that a country will sooner recover from the miseries and devastation occasioned by war, invasion, rebellion, massacre, than from the laws restraining the commerce, discouraging the manufactures, fettering the industry, and, above

all, breaking the spirits of the people." To this day Ireland is without manufactures. "The industrial employment which despotism so easily destroys," says De Beaumont, "does not so easily revive with liberty." But liberty has not come to Ireland. The land system, which for centuries has drained the people of the money produced by the sole means of occupation, has left the country without capital. The government has been coerced at last into a slight modification of the system; but until it is reformed altogether, capital in Ireland must continue small in proportion to her natural facilities for industrial production.

As the laws destroying Irish trade had been passed by the English Parliament, the Irish Parliament, however well disposed, could not repeal or alter them. It did, indeed, appeal to the crown, but without effect. For twenty years only one remedy was proposed, and that a novel one: to establish a bank by subscription which was to circulate paper without money! It was in this emergency that the crown of England proposed to sell to one William Wood the privilege of making halfpence for Ireland, on condition that the Duchess of Kendall, whose relations to his majesty need not be mentioned, should share the profits. What became of the halfpence we shall see hereafter. The distress of the country grew deeper and deeper, and in 1728 and 1729 thousands of families were exposed to the direst necessities; "many artificers and housekeepers," says Hutchinson, "being compelled to beg for bread in the streets of Dublin." The manufacturing classes had no longer the money, formerly derived from commerce, to buy food from the farmers; there was no scarcity of food in the country, but there was no money to buy it. The famine was an artificial one, like that of 1880. Rackrents accomplished last year what the destruction of the woollen trade accomplished in 1729. Again, in 1740 and 1741, famine prevailed for want of money to buy food. Then the Lord Lieutenant proposed the employment of the poor and the encouragement of tillage, but no provision was made for either. Thousands perished from hunger and diseases arising from want. For forty years after the passage of the restrictive laws, Ireland, says Hutchinson, was always poor and often in great want, distress, and misery. The linen manufacture had grown feebly, but it was not sufficiently profitable to affect the condition of the masses. It had been offered to the people of Ireland as an equivalent for the woollen trade, but, for obvious reasons, it did not, and could not, recompense them for the loss of that; for the latter, they had everything necessary; for the former, they had to import the best seed at great expense, and the efforts to extend the trade in various parts of the country proved unavailing. The misery of the towns became so abject that it was necessary to offer a bounty

to the farmers for bringing corn and flour by land to Dublin, which, according to Hutchinson, "saved this country from utter destruction." The principle of the law, he adds, "is to bring the market of Dublin to the door of the farmer;" and the cost of the experiment was over sixty thousand pounds a year! Surely a high price to pay even in those days for the privilege of being governed from abroad.

Ireland never was too poor to be taxed for the support of English wars, from which she derived no benefit; on the contrary, she derived only injury. When the rupture with Spain occurred she was required to raise, equip, and maintain five battalions and to pay at the same time sixty thousand pounds a year in pensions to favorites of the English king, not a shilling of which returned in any form to Ireland. The linen trade, which gave some employment, suffered a decline during the American war and intensified the poverty of Ireland, yet she was required to furnish troops to aid in putting down a rebellion over which the majority of her people rejoiced. No measure was taken to relieve the wretchedness of a country made wretched by legislation. Generations died in poverty who might have lived in comfort and blessed the world with their industry; but England, which had robbed them of the means of doing so, remained utterly indifferent to their necessities which she had created. "If you discourage the people," says Hutchinson, "from working up the principal materials of their country, the bulk of that people must ever continue miserable, the growth of the nation will be checked, and the sinews of the state enfeebled." How vast the commerce of Ireland might have become, had its growth been unchecked, can be imagined when we recollect that of her thirty-two counties nineteen are maritime, and the rest are washed by copious rivers that empty themselves into the sea.

Had the woollen trade not been destroyed in 1699, its remarkable development and the favoring natural conditions of the country must speedily have laid the solid foundations for many other industries in addition to those which existed with it. The Irish then had ships, and the harbors of the island were crowded with masts; the Irish flag was met on the highways of the oceans until forbid to be seen there; the natural capital of the country was being utilized at home, and must have expanded its activity into new fields of occupation had it been left free. Had the woollen trade not been annihilated, it is entirely reasonable to say that Ireland would to-day fill a place in history very different from that to which her long series of industrial and political misfortunes have consigned her. Instead of being a country without manufactures, tall chimneys would smoke in her cities, the incalculable water-

power that courses through her valleys would be turning myriad wheels, her cabins would be cheerful with thrift, and her children's cheeks red with plenty; her farmers would have innumerable exchanges at home for which they would sell the fruits of the earth. There would be no famines, for money enough would circulate in the country to buy food for all in a land that can feed many times its own population. Instead of "profound indigence and chronic anarchy," we should behold there peace, prosperity, and all the blessings, domestic and political, which only peace and prosperity can insure.

It is not enough to say that if England destroyed the woollen trade she encouraged the linen trade. For reasons too obvious for assertion it was the woollen and not the linen trade that would have developed parallel industries in Ireland and built the edifice of diversified productiveness. Venice and the other Italian states carried on the manufacture of wool until the countries producing the raw material manufactured it; then the Italian manufacture dwindled into insignificance. The Flemings undersold the Italians, being nearer the wool-growing countries; then England undersold the Flemings for the same reason. The linen trade has never expired, but it has been of comparatively little significance in promoting other industries. So long as money has to be sent out of the country for the best flaxseed, it is impossible that it should be effectual in national development.

When Ireland was robbed of her manufactures, her trade, in the words of Swift, was "glorious and flourishing." She has never recovered from the shock, nor has it ever been possible that she should. The only source of profit left was the land; that was not owned by the people. The owners have done nothing to promote the establishment of manufactures. The landlord class are exclusively a consuming class, and with the money drawn from the soil of Ireland they have enriched the producers of every country but their own. The capital of Ireland is daily drawn out of it, and never returns in any form. It is a country literally without exchanges.

The political economist cries, "How, now, does it happen that society is one vast hive of buyers and sellers, every man bringing something to the market and carrying something off? We speak of the commercial classes, but all classes are commercial. Everybody exchanges. You do something for me, and I will do something for you, is the fundamental law of society. From this results the division of employments, and all the various professions. Every man brings his own product and exchanges with society as best he can. The farmer brings his produce, and exchanges. The mechanic brings the product of his skilled labor, and exchanges.

The laborer brings his strength, and the teacher his knowledge, and they are ready to do service for a consideration. The merchant, the physician, the lawyer, the clergyman, the editor, the lecturer, the singer, the actor, and so on to the end of the list, are all in position to render services to society, and justly expect to receive an equivalent service in return. Indeed, when we look out upon society, the most striking thing we observe about it is that these exchanges are going on in a thousand directions at once, determining all employments and professions, reaching everywhere and permeating everything, and all this the more rapidly and perfectly as knowledge and civilization advance. Since, therefore, as a matter of fact, men do constantly put forth onerous efforts to satisfy other men's desires, in order to receive back from them the results of corresponding efforts in return; since this mutual exchange of services is everywhere present in society, not in the market-places only, but in every department of life, there must be in this exchange some great gain. We now inquire particularly what this gain is? What is the motive that leads men universally to exchange?

"The answer to these questions will bring us to the gratifying conclusion that the laws of exchange are based on nothing less solid than the will of God. The desires of men are not only various in kind and indefinite in degree, but also tend to increase in variety and extent by the progress of knowledge and freedom. To the gratification of almost all these desires, however, there are obstacles interposed, some of which are physical and some moral; and these obstacles are so great in all directions that the powers of the individual man are utterly incompetent to surmount them. They mock at his weakness, and throw him back upon his destitution.

"Without association with his fellow-men, there is no creature so helpless, so unable to reach his true end, as is man; and therefore it is that the impulse to association is one of the strongest of our natural impulses. Men come together, as it were by instinct, into society; and, associating themselves together in a society, it is very soon discovered, not only that there are various desires in the different members of the community which are now readily met by co-operation and mutual exchange, but also that there are very different powers in the different individuals in relation to those obstacles which are to be surmounted. There is a vast diversity in natural gifts. One man has physical strength, with no mechanical ingenuity; another combines with a feeble body a wonderful knack for contrivance; a third has a philosophical turn, liking to examine into the laws of nature; and a fourth has a bent and genius for traffic. Now, then, nature speaks in this diversity of gifts in as loud a voice as she can utter, in favor of such a de-

gree of association and exchange as shall allow a free development of these varying capacities, while they work upon the obstacles to the gratification of men's wants which are appropriately opposite to them." All of which is abstractly indisputable; all of which is actually true in every country on the globe except Ireland.

The essentials of exchange have not been hers. "Freedom, association, and invention are the three things which make exchanges as profitable as they can become, and which will carry society, so far as exchanges can do it, to the highest pitch of prosperity. Of these, by far the most important is freedom, because, where freedom is conceded, association and invention follow in time by laws of natural sequence."

When the cable reported recently that a convention had been held in Dublin for the purpose of arranging for an industrial exposition there, the conclusion was irresistible to an American that there was going to be an Irish exhibition of English manufactures. It was indeed proposed that it should on the contrary be an exhibition of Irish manufactures; but what Irish manufactures there are to exhibit it is difficult to imagine. There are cobblers in the kingdom doubtless; but when a government advertisement appeared for bids to furnish a large quantity of boots and shoes a few months ago no bid was received from an Irish manufacturer; there are no large manufacturers of boots and shoes in the country. A gentleman who recently returned from a romantic locality in Ireland, vaunted to his American friends that he had on an Irish hat,—he had bought it a few weeks before at Killarney. A hasty glance revealed a well-known English trademark in the crown; it had been made, of course, in London.

From the official returns for 1875 there are only 67,744 persons out of a population of 5,500,000 employed in textile industries in Ireland, and of these 60,000 are in 149 flax factories. There are 8 cotton factories, 60 woollen factories, 1 worsted factory, 4 hemp factories, 11 jute factories, 2 silk factories,—in all 235 factories for textile products. Even in the linen trade Ireland has not kept her lead of late years. In 1868 the number of flax factories in England and Wales was 128; in Scotland, 134; and in Ireland, 143. In 1875 the number in England and Wales was 141; in Scotland, 159, against 149 in Ireland. In 1868 there were 13 cotton factories in Ireland; in 1875 only 8. The poplin trade has not declined, but it has not grown. There has been an inconsiderable increase in silk. There has been an increase in the jute manufacture; 11 factories are reported in 1875 against 2 in 1868; and the persons employed have risen from 20 to 2000. There is also a slight increase in hemp. And what of all the other manufactured articles that enter into the daily life of even the common

people? Ireland has to buy them all from England,—millinery, silk, gloves, hats, cloths, cottons, muslins, ribbons, soap, candles, iron, hardware, glass. The total manufactured goods and minerals of Ireland was valued a few years ago at £16,000,000,—only two-fifths the value of the property destroyed in the young American city of Chicago ten years ago, and more than restored in a single decade.

The outlook for a resuscitation of manufactures in Ireland can scarcely be considered bright. Yet her natural advantages for manufacturing are not surpassed by those of many other countries. The fertility of her soil, her immense water-power, her mild climate, her proximity to the coal-fields,—for English coals can be set down in Dublin cheaper than in Birmingham or London,—the abundance of cheap labor,—these are substantial advantages. She has minerals and clays from which she has as yet derived little profit, but the ownership of which is carefully guarded for the landlords by Mr. Gladstone's new liberal land law. But she has no capital to speak of; she has no skilled labor, no plant for any industry except linen and a few minor productions. From 1699, when the fatal blow was delivered upon her trade and commerce, until 1782, when Grattan and the volunteers compelled England to repeal the restrictive statutes, the hum of industry was not heard in the country. Three generations were born and died. Can it be wondered at that there is no skilled labor now there? As for capital, how can there be capital in Ireland? The land alone is the money-maker; but the land of Ireland is not the property of Ireland. It is owned abroad, and the money it makes is spent or invested abroad. This has been true for centuries,—since the wholesale confiscations; and while the present landlord system exists there can be no capital in Ireland for manufacturing purposes. The interest of the English manufacturer is identical with the pleasure of the Irish landlord. The English manufacturer can prevent the Irish landlord from employing his money in Irish manufactures. Ireland is considered the private market of the English manufacturer. Any interference with that market he would promptly resent, and he is in a position to make the Irish landlord feel his resentment. He can say to the landlord: "So long as there are no manufactures in Ireland, our Parliament shall protect you; if you use a pound of your rents to establish in Ireland industries that will affect us there, we will pull the landlord system down. We maintain you, you must not interfere with us."

The destruction of the landlord system is apparently necessary to a permanent revival of Irish industry. If the Irish farmer were a proprietor, the money his land and labor earned would remain in the country, and would seek domestic activity; he would find it

cheaper to buy at home than abroad, and that generous system of domestic exchanges, which best insures the peace and prosperity of a community, would soon come into healthy life. But so long as a country of farmers is also only a country of tenants, so long as the capital produced in the country is owned out of the country and spent abroad, how can there be a general increase in home manufactures?

Yet it is wise, practical, and patriotic to make at least an effort to revive industrial production. Economic laws govern supply and demand, but economic laws are themselves sensitive to moral influences. Capital has no prejudices. It is sordid. Political economy has been defined as the science of enlightened selfishness. If the Irish people stand together, and resolve that they will wear no hats not made in Ireland, capital will go to Ireland and make hats. It may be English capital; but the labor, the plant, and the product will be Irish, and the wages earned will be spent there. The danger is that the resolution will not be taken, or, if taken in a moment of ardor, will not be kept. Swift advised the people to burn everything that came from England except the coals. They did not act upon the advice. Hutchinson tells of an effort initiated in his time to wear only Irish manufactures. It failed. If the persistence of the Irish people were equal to their fervor they would soon be free, and would need no foreign capital to build factories for them. Their impulses in the right direction are sublime; their firmness in carrying them out verges on the ridiculous.

In 1781, when freedom for Irish trade was wrested from the English Parliament at the cannon's mouth, there was a revival of production, and an immediate improvement in the general condition of the whole country. The story of that revival belongs more properly to the next number of the REVIEW; for the centenary of that auspicious event,—the independence of the Irish Parliament,—brilliant, if it was brief, will be the 16th of April, 1882.

THE LESSON OF PRESIDENT GARFIELD'S ASSASSINATION.

ALMOST the entire period since our last issue has been one of anxious interest to the whole country. The life of a newly inaugurated President has hung quivering in the balance, till hope, buoyed up by flattering appearances, at last died away, and President Garfield, on the very threshold of his administration, lay stark and cold beside the deep-voiced murmuring ocean on which his dying eyes had gazed.

Succeeding one whose title to the Presidency which he held was never recognized by the conscience of thousands of his fellow-citizens, James A. Garfield was, as our elections go, fairly elected. No voice was raised to challenge his title. His election looked at first by no means probable, as the more moderate views of which he was the exponent were not shared by a section of the party which had manifested in the convention great unanimity and a set and dogged purpose. Even after his nomination this branch of the Republicans held sullenly aloof from all active participation in the canvass. Their tardy action made his election sure, but his principles were fixed and his policy settled. The Cabinet he selected was mainly from those who sympathized heartily with his views, and he manifested no disposition to admit the others to his counsels.

Almost at the outset of his administration an issue was raised between the President and the leaders of this school of Republican politicians. It foreboded some petty difficulty, but the voice of the country evidently sustained President Garfield, and the expression of its will was sufficiently clear to encourage him in pursuing the course which he honestly deemed most compatible with the true interest of the republic.

The presidential policy for the next four years was apparently settled. The financial plans were accepted in the great money marts; a return to greater economy in the various branches gave general encouragement. All this was changed in an instant, and by an unexpected event.

The murderous hand of an assassin has effected a revolution like that which raised the first Alexander to the throne of Russia, or deprived Ecuador of the great Christian statesman Garcia Moreno. A ball sped from the pistol of a disappointed politician of the lowest moral grade deprived an eminent citizen of his life, the United States of a President, changes the whole policy of the administration for the next four years, and elevates to the presidency

one whose political school had been condemned by the party which elected him. In the very act the assassin proclaimed that this was his purpose.

President Garfield had long been a public man; not eminently great either as a statesman or as a soldier, he was a representative of the better type of our political men, and from his personal struggles through life, from the more studious habit of mind, and apparent resolve to wield for the general good the power confided to him, had inspired confidence in all parts of the country. When he was so suddenly and so cruelly struck down, the sympathy of the people was manifested so unanimously and so spontaneously that Europe watched almost as anxiously as America the daily announcements of his struggle for life. Monarchs sent to sympathize with the family of the wounded man and with the citizens of the Republic, and the Pope, occupant of the oldest throne in Europe, was by no means tardy in the expression of his concern. When the fatal moment came, all felt for the wife who, just recovered from a dangerous illness, had so faithfully kept vigil beside her husband. Words of comfort came from throne and cottage, and the nation adopted her and her children with prompt and characteristic generosity.

Amid universal sorrow the twentieth President of the United States, James A. Garfield, with his work unfinished, has been borne to the tomb on the hillside by Lake Erie.

The terrible event reveals a new danger in our complicated system of electing the chief magistrate. Party spirit runs high, and each party has in its own bosom discordant elements. The nominating conventions develop the strength of these factions; that which by tact or combination wins the selection of its favorite as candidate for the presidency, propitiates the defeated faction by accepting its nominee for the vice-presidency. Both are elected on the same ticket, each representing the choice of a portion of the party only. For most purposes the office of Vice-President is merely complimentary. By an inherent absurdity this high officer is elected as a member of the executive department of the government, the possible successor or temporary substitute of the President, but the active duties imposed upon him belong not to the executive but to the legislative department. An executive officer, he has no executive duties; he is not a member of the Cabinet or taken into the council of the President. Had he been made by the Constitution the Secretary of State there would be an apparent fitness, while now there is a glaring incongruity in electing a man for one department, and thrusting him into another and a distinct department of the government.

During the brief administration of Mr. Garfield, Mr. Arthur, as

President of the Senate, entered warmly into the political strife that convulsed that body, taking a decided stand against the policy of the President, and making himself the virtual leader of the section of the Republican party arrayed to defeat the action of Mr. Garfield. He even left the capital of the United States for the capital of his own State to lend his personal influence, exertions, and skill to insure the return of two Senators whose election was to be a rebuke to the President.

The temptations to such a course should not be left for any future Vice-President. A change of the Constitution is imperatively demanded, which will remove that officer from the legislature, where his presence is an anomaly, and place him where he should be, as the adviser and cordial aid of the President, not his antagonist, whom the misguided hand or heart of a spontaneous or hired assassin may make his successor. So long as this system remains in the Constitution, political parties will seek to unite discordant elements by giving both a place on the presidential ticket, really giving the chief magistrate a secret enemy in his very household, and raising a perpetual temptation.

What in this case is the act of a nature so imbued with vice as to be apparently incapable of honest thought or purpose, may be hereafter in this country, which swarms with secret organizations, the act of a stolid butcher who carries out the decree of some organization like the Nihilists in Russia.

Incalculable as are the results of a murder of a President, no majesty under our law environs his person. There is one and the same law to punish the killing of a President and of a tramp. The criminal may be punished, like any other murderer, for depriving a fellow-man of life; but the crime of depriving that man of his high office, and of depriving the country of a chief magistrate, has not been defined, and cannot be punished.

All admit that political life has become in this country thoroughly and intensely base; that elections are carried by bribery, corruption, perjury, and fraud. Neither party is free from the charge; and if on one side it is alleged that Rutherford B. Hayes was raised to the presidency by iniquitous means, it is retorted that the opposite party cannot show that they acted with greater honesty. This universal disregard of truth and fairness in politics is one of the most terrible features of our system. Everything conspires to encourage it and fasten it upon us, a cancer that is eating out the vitality of our institutions. The very courts of justice wink at it, and it becomes impossible to punish offences even where evidence is at last extorted.

The army of office-holders is appalling. There are nearly eighty thousand offices in the gift of the President, and every State, county,

and city has its hundreds or thousands laboring to obtain or retain some office. Every one of these men has his tools; the primary elections are packed and so handled that decent members of the party shrink from taking part in them, and delegates to nominating conventions are but representatives of the worst and most worthless, instead of being delegates of the solid citizens who really have the interests of the country at heart. These party hacks, office-holders, or would-be office-holders, are men who have seldom followed any legitimate business. Industry, thrift, steady work, are ideas foreign to them. They are actually the very men least fitted to be trusted with any office. They are men whom no one would select as executors, guardians, or trustees. Yet these men really control our elections, and determine the choice of our rulers, and even of our judges. Elections are carried on by party taxation, levied on these men before and after they secure offices; the notification from party headquarters of the tax imposed is imperative. It is pay or renounce the office. Men dare not refuse to pay the amounts amerced, but reluctantly disburse the money, and then take an oath that they have done nothing of the kind. The moneys thus raised are frequently used to buy the votes of unprincipled men, and move them to polls where their ballots will be decisive, and where they are frequently deposited after glaring perjury. Frauds lead to contested elections, and occasionally men are removed from positions they have grasped unduly. But so widespread is political depravity in the public mind, that when a man is thus convicted of having stolen an office to which he is not entitled, he is not only not punished, but generally receives from the public treasury money to pay his expenses in attempting to retain an office to which he had no valid claim. In fact, an inducement is held out to evildoers to undertake this species of robbery.

Illegal acquisition of office is a new crime in history; it is almost peculiar to this country, for in no other are there such hosts of offices put up constantly to be decided by elections. Were the standard of public morality and honesty high, this mode of selecting officers would insure good results. Unfortunately it is very low, and what must fill thinking men with gloomy forebodings is the fact that it is gradually sinking.

The secularization of education, and the stubborn and defiant intention of its advocates to eliminate from the training of the young all religious and moral instruction beyond a Protestant smattering, to satisfy those who still call themselves Protestants, is already bearing its fruits. Men are prompt to disavow religious influence; public men especially seem to think that it will prejudice them with the public to admit that they recognize any church.

In the case of the late President, in whose sufferings we all

sympathized so sincerely, it was sad to see him linger day by day without a single religious exercise, a single uttered prayer or act of devotion; sad to see him expire without any religious rite. And when his spirit had passed away the clergyman whose church he attended, it has been stated, was prompt in denying that Mr. Garfield was a member of his flock. No sooner had the papers of the day began to discuss his successor than care was taken to state that, though his family were members of the Episcopal Church and Mr. Arthur accompanied them, he was not himself a member. A profession of Christianity has come to be something to be deprecated.

In every way religion is thus thrust aside. In the olden time the ten commandments, at least after a fashion, were taught in schools, and children were impressed at home and in school with the doctrine that it was a sin to steal, a sin to kill, a sin to take another's good name. Now there is none of this, and our newspaper writers trained in this system laugh at the moral law, and their influence is steadily sapping whatever of religious and moral restraint is left among the people. This practical ignoring of God lies at the root of most of the evils that threaten the future of America.

Our neighbor's life, property, and good name are held very lightly. The generally prevalent wasteful and extravagant modes of life and dress are a constant temptation. Young men and old in any office under the State, corporations or individuals, forgetting the injunction not to make haste to be rich, forget also to be honest. Credit mobilier schemes, star routes, freedmen's banks, railroad appropriations mark the dishonesty in the higher circles, while those beneath them furnish the army of defaulters, peculators, forgers, thieves, and swindlers, whose deeds are recorded day by day until at last they excite no surprise. A man put in a position to rob is almost expected to rob. "In his position you could not hire me to be honest," was a politician's declaration to the writer, and that politician now occupies a judgeship.

Where men think nothing of taking money or property dishonestly, they have even less scruple about usurping any office into which they can intrude themselves, although conscious that they were not legally elected. Election frauds, buying up of votes, intimidation before the poll closes; then falsification of records, tampering with ballot-boxes, perjured returns, are all practiced, and that not in rare or solitary cases. Sometimes a pharisaical zeal for purity of elections is manifested, as in New York in regard to illegal naturalization papers; but it is merely a pretext to terrorize and intimidate timid men holding perfectly valid papers, and thus keep enough away from the polls to turn the scale. Then, like the woman in Proverbs, they wipe their mouth and prate of virtue and honesty.

A man's good name is his dearest possession, but who regards it? Reputation is assailed without any regard to truth or decency. Letters are forged or pretended letters cited to compromise public men. Punishment rarely follows. It is considered smart. Public opinion may be roused from its torpidity and legal investigation demanded, but this soon dies away; after an indictment is found by a grand jury, the whole matter is allowed to drop out of sight and mind. All this shows an unhealthy state of the public sense. Where men do not respect in their neighbor his right to his good name, his reputation and credit, they are not likely to respect his right to his property or his life. And where is this respect to come from in later years, if it is not impressed on the mind in the days of childhood, in the parental home, and in the school where the teacher takes the place of the parent?

The recklessness and disregard of human life is increasing to an appalling degree. No greater proof exists of the fallacy of the delusion so many hug to their breasts that education, by which they mean "public schooling," is the great moral safeguard of the nation. True education, the education of the moral as well as the intellectual faculties, will do much to form good citizens; but to develop the mental powers, without any moral counterpoise, is to make men approach devils rather than angels, the one pure intelligences under moral restraint, the other intelligences without it. The public school canker that is eating at the vitals of American society ignores the moral restraint.

There have always been crimes, murderous assaults, but except in rare cases they were the work of coarser natures, committed in passion or to escape detection, or under the influence of liquor; but now new forms appear. There is an appalling list of murders committed by mere boys and girls within the last ten years, all traceable to the utter want of moral training, and not unfrequently to the ridicule they hear cast on moral restraint by the lips of parents and teachers, for these child-criminals are generally not of the degraded but of a better class. Insuring men's lives, with the object of murdering them to secure the money, is a crime of our later times, and of course one requiring some education. Infanticide before and after birth is desolating the country, and the terrors of the law seem to inspire no dread. Highway robbery is increasing, and the great mass of criminals is from the ranks of those to whom education, without moral restraint, has only fanned the passions and made the hope of escape seem too great to cause any hesitation. The details of crime are spread in fascinating guise by the hirelings of the press, and are gloated over by the youngest, in whom a depraved nature without moral check has created an abnormal craving for such hideous reading.

Conscience cannot be altogether deadened, and to silence it men invent religions to justify criminal deeds. The Oneida Community, the Mormon leprosy, finds hundreds of adherents, and passion is indulged under the mask of religion. One class of crime leads to another. Lust to murder. The terrible Mountain Meadow massacre, a murder of a whole party of emigrants, was the work of the lustful Mormon Church, and only one man ever paid the penalty of murder.

With this class of depraved minds gradually increasing, young men and young women reaching maturity without any religious or moral training to implant principles to dictate self-restraint, we can scarcely wonder at any crime that is announced. In this vast population of unbalanced minds, habituated to thoughts of vice, with consciences stupefied or lulled by false and specious theories, lies a terrible danger. Excitable, inflammable, buoyed up with pride, considering all they aspire to as their own, and every hindrance a wrong, we have a class who are like some powerful destructive element, that the wild words of a violent religious or political declaimer can in a moment explode to deal death around.

Petty party divisions lead men high in office or influence to indulge in the most violent denunciations. The moves on the chessboard of politics are accompanied by a rancor and violence that to cooler minds seem absurd and meaningless, but if the leaders merely put on the show of violent excitement, many beneath them take it all seriously, and brood and plot to effect a remedy by murder.

The man who deliberately shot down President Garfield, in a railroad station in Washington, committed a deliberate murder, that he had planned and sought day after day his opportunity to commit. Personal wrong existed only in his imagination, if, indeed, it really existed there. But he is a type of the utterly depraved element, familiar with all vice, without moral principle or restraint, ready for any act of meanness, duplicity, or violence to obtain money or gratify passion, heartless, yet endeavoring to make religion a cloak and a tool, full of pride and vanity.

On such a nature the violent party struggle begun in the Senate hall at Washington, and continued in the Legislature at Albany, acted, and turned his diabolical instincts on the harassed President. His victim's days of anguish and suffering almost equalled the short and vexatious period during which he held the presidency. It elicited the sympathy of the world, but the personal hatred of the wretched criminal shows how little the public at large feel the real danger that the crime reveals. The assassin may pay the penalty like any other man who takes the life of his fellowman, but if society goes on as we are going the punishment will

not deter others. Education must be made moral; the press must seek to impress rather than weaken the influence of morality and religion; there must be in the training of the young more moral teaching, a horror of vice inspired, and a sense of our terrible accountability to God; unless this is done crimes against life, property, and reputation will increase, and the wild ravings of the political ranter will find men of utter unprinciple to put in bloody act the violent thought of men who use the gift of eloquence and influence without moral restraint.

Prayers were offered throughout the land that God might in his mercy spare the life of President Garfield. When temporal blessings are sought we ask them conditionally, if they are in accordance with God's will and his supreme direction over all for the salvation of men. The prayers will be answered, if they awaken a sense of responsibility; a sense of the necessity of religious and moral training; a sense of the care we should have of our neighbor's life, property, and good name; and thus infuse into daily life, and especially into our political life, a higher sense of our responsibility as a Christian people.

AN AMERICAN CATHOLIC DRAMATIST.

THE most prominent Catholic poets of Great Britain did not reflect much honor upon their religion. Dryden too often wasted his splendid talents in unworthy compositions; Pope's chosen companions were a freethinking philosopher and a free-acting parson; Moore, while singing the pathetic story of his country's wrongs, too often forgot the religion that made his country blest. Very different from these was the subject of the present article. George H. Miles has told in language, beautiful from its simplicity, how, as a youth, he knelt before the chapel altar of Mount St. Mary's College, while the waters of regeneration were poured upon his head, and he rose, a Catholic—a member of that holy Church which Walter Scott was too timid and Goethe too proud to embrace. He became thoroughly imbued with the spirit and beauty of the Catholic religion. It pervaded his thought, appeared in his writings, and lent a charm to his dramatic pieces.

George H. Miles commenced his dramatic career with remarkable brilliancy; in 1849 Edwin Forrest offered $1000 for the best original tragedy by an American author. Mr. Miles was at that time a young Baltimore lawyer, not yet twenty-five years old. He was waiting for clients, which were slow to come. He did not, however, like so many young lawyers nowadays, practice in the neighboring bar-room while waiting to practice in the court-room. He was, it is true, more devoted to Shakespeare and Addison than to Chitty and Blackstone. Law was his profession, but literature was his love. So, when he heard of Mr. Forrest's offer, he determined to compete for the tempting prize, and succeeded in carrying it off against a hundred competitors. His play was "Mohammed, the Arabian Prophet," a blank verse tragedy in five acts. True to his Catholic education, he shows in this drama that it is utterly impossible for any man, however gifted or great, "to counterfeit a mission from God without becoming the slave of hell." Mohammed, while claiming to be the Prophet and Messenger of Allah, prepares mankind by deliberate falsehood for the reception of what he calls the Eternal Truth. There is a rich, Oriental warmth in this drama which recalls the glowing imagery of the *Arabian Nights*. As a specimen of the style of the poem, we quote the passage in which Mohammed describes to his wife the vision of the Angel, and the announcement of his mission:

> "I was alone,
> Expecting thee, when suddenly, I heard
> My name pronounced, with voice more musical
> Than Peri warbling in the dreamy air.

Ravished, I turned, and saw upon the rock,
Resplendent hovering there, an angel form:
I knew 'twas Gabriel, Allah's messenger.
Celestial glories compassed him around;
Arched o'er his splendid head, his glistening wings
Shed light, music, and melody. No more
I saw,—no more my mortal eye could bear.
Prone on my face I fell, and, from the dust,
Besought him quench his superhuman radiance.
'Look up!' he said: I stole a trembling glance;
And there, a beauteous youth, he stood and smiled.
Then as his ruby lips unclosed, I heard:
'*Go and teach all the mortals,* . . . THERE IS
NO GOD BUT ONE—MOHAMMED IS HIS PROPHET!' "

Mohammed is asked by his followers, what will be their reward, in hazarding for him life and its present pleasures. He exclaims:

"PARADISE!
In Eden, in silk and gemmed brocade,
Resplendent, shall we glide o'er pearls, that glance
On streams surcharged with honey, milk, and wine;
Embowered in cool and perpetual shade,
Sweet youths with immortal bloom,
Shall proffer water fresh from Salsabil,
Lambent as camphor, and around you clash
Their golden goblets. But my words are weak;
I might exhaust the sea, were ocean ink,
And fail to number half the joys of Eden."

Later, when urging his followers to fight regardless of death, Mohammed, holding in his hand the white banner of Islam, says:

"To all who die beneath the sacred standard,
I promise Eden's loftiest couches, lined
With greenest silk, glittering with gold and gems,
Around them flowering branches shall mature,
Embracing fruits, and twining roses shade
Their perfumed limbs," etc.

The drama closes with the death of Mohammed, which event is preceded by a dream, in which the Prophet sees again his first wife. He tells his dream to two of his faithful friends:

"O, I have had a sweet, refreshing sleep!
On downy dreams my youth came smiling back:
Methought a band of angels fluttered o'er me:
And some were like my boyhood's playmates,—
Some
Repeated songs unheard since infancy—
So soft, so sad; and darting from their midst
Cadijah, fairer even than ever, approached
In dazzling light and loveliness: she breathed
Upon my brow, and with a glance of love
Immortal, pointed to the opening heavens,
Then, dove-like, vanished in the golden air."

Encouraged by the success of his first dramatic effort, Mr. Miles, in less than two years, produced another play. He chose for his hero De Soto, the discoverer of the Mississippi. The subject was fresh, romantic, and interesting; and it enabled him to contrast the civilization, religion, and cupidity of the Spaniards with the ignorance, barbarism, and simplicity of the Indians. The character of De Soto is highly idealized; the cruel and stern companion of Pizarro in Peru becomes the gentle, humane, and pious conqueror of Florida, with religion for his watchword and the cross for his banner. His lofty soul resists temptation the most alluring, and he seeks not to destroy the bodies of the Indians for their supposed wealth, but to save their souls for heaven. All the poetry, romance, and chivalry of De Soto's character are painted in the most attractive colors, while his less amiable qualities are carefully concealed.

The singleness and consistency of the plot form one of the chief beauties of the play, was the opinion of a contemporary critic, who said further that the interest never flagged, and the action was never retarded by long speeches; and although some of the language is highly poetical, there is no dramatic vigor sacrificed to mere rhetorical flourish. The story is full of knightly adventure, and "grim-visaged war" never "smooths his wrinkled front" throughout the narrative, but a sweet love-story runs through it, with a heroine as lovely and innocent as a Miranda, to soften down the sterner features of the drama. As an American play upon an American subject, *De Soto* is one of the most brilliant contributions to our literature. It has never been printed, and the following extract, from the author's manuscript, will be read with interest.

Anasco, a Spanish soldier and astrologer in De Soto's army, while gazing at the starry heavens, exclaims:

> "Who dares affirm that those unchanging orbs
> Are meaningless, superfluous, strewn at random
> Along the skies, like mild forget-me-nots,
> Mere spangles in the diadem of nature?
> Who shall say the toad,
> Spotted fantastically, the queer frog,
> The lizard, moth, chameleon, beetle, locust,
> The strange variety of birds and insects,
> Each plumed and streaked with superhuman care;
> The butterfly, whose powdered wings reflect
> Infinite beauty; that the pard-like monkey—
> That marvellous diminutive of man—
> Have not their separate uses, and appeal
> To powers that compass us, invisible,
> Till summoned by the symbols they obey?"

We scarcely think the following description of woman will please our fair readers:

"Honest, yet fallible, yielding and pert,
Governed by fancy and a foe to reason,
With tears and smiles at will—a contradiction—
Man's mystic supplement—a curious dovetail,
Weak where we are strong, and strong where we are weak."

Mr. Miles puts into the mouth of De Soto a sentiment which will find an echo in most American hearts:

"The smallest hair that idly strays
Across the brow of woman, be she fair
As Aragon, or olive as the Moor,
Is sacred to a Christian knight."

To Ulah, the gentle heroine of the play, De Soto tells the story of his studious youth and ambitious manhood:

"I was a gentle boy, averse to sports,
Guided by curates, fond of manuscripts;
I loved the hills, for on their silent heads
I stood alone, with naught 'twixt me and heaven.
But once a high-born damsel crossed my path—
O, she was fair, just ripening to the flower!
She gazed—I sprang to manhood in that glance.
Back to their shelves
I sent the books, then valueless and dead.
Her image danced upon my father's sword,
Her image shone upon my father's shield,—
I snatched the weapons from their resting-place,—
And learned to use them! I followed her to court.
My sword and buckler my only fortune.
Riches and fame were asked. I soon gave both.
Columbus had revealed another world,
Pizarro's flag was floating on the Tagus:
I sprang aboard—we landed at Peru—
A nation and a nation's wealth were ours—
My name returned the synonym of conquest—
From court to cot it went, a household word;
And songs were written to De Soto."

The fourth act opens with De Soto meditating in his tent at midnight. Gloomy thoughts weigh down the heart of the once gay and gallant hero; his faithful friends are few; his followers are dissatisfied and long for the vine-clad hills of sunny Spain; hostile Indians are dogging his march to the Great River, which is the dream of his hope. His meditation is interrupted by the entrance of Alvardo, his most trusted companion, to whom he imparts his intention of penetrating the Indian camp, to rescue Ulah, who has been carried off by Tuscaluza, the chief of the Floridas. Alvardo endeavors to dissuade him from the attempt, to whom he says:

"There is a spectre haunts the gates of manhood,
In all the mist and glory of a vision,
Exacting tribute for the charmèd torch

It waves before us,—till the sacred oils,
The myrrh and frankincense of youth exhausted,
Blacken the wick they fed: you know its name—
AMBITION!—I am less than Tuscaluza:
He is a patriot—I, a conqueror.
Had I his cause—slumber and I were strangers,
Till this continent were up in arms,
With spear and arrow, knife and tomahawk
Edged on the altar stone of Liberty!"

In the fifth act the dream of De Soto is at last realized; the *Mississippi is discovered.* He arrives on the banks of the Great River just before sunset, erects a cross, and advancing with drawn sword, takes possession in the name of God.

At the first sight of the Mississippi De Soto exclaims:

"Stand back, and let me gaze my fill. At last
De Soto and the Mississippi meet,
And meet to part no more. How beautiful!
The waterfowl is nestling in the sedge,
From shore to shore the lengthening sunbeam sleeps,
And all is silent save the river's breath."

Then, with prophetic vision, he cries:

"The commerce of the world is riding there,—
These shores are gardens, and those thickets cities;
There lies more wealth within those golden waves
Than doomed the Inca to his rosy bed,
Or forged the chain of prostrate Montezuma.
This is the legacy I leave to Europe!
Hernando Soto claims for God and Spain
All the broad continent and sunny isles
Washed by the waters of the Mississippi:
And here 'gainst infidel and Christian, I,
A Spanish knight and soldier of the Cross,
Offer my body to make good the claim!"

In the meantime Tuscaluza has carried Ulah to her mother's grave, where he tells her how she was snatched by him from the arms of her Spanish mother, whom he had slain, and brought up by him as his own daughter; that he loved her, and would make her the Queen of the Floridas. She indignantly rejects his love, and tells him she had saved the Spaniards by betraying his plot to surprise their camp. Maddened by love and revenge, he stabs her to the heart. De Soto now vows neither to eat, drink, nor sleep until he has revenged Ulah's death. The Indians are pursued, their town captured, and Tuscaluza slain by De Soto, who, at the same time, receives a mortal wound. When dying, news is brought to him that the Spanish fleet has reached the Mississippi,—that his wife and child are dead. Calling his followers around him, he bids them kneel, then pointing to Alvardo, he says:

"Men of Spain,
In him behold your leader; by the Cross,
I charge ye swear to follow without question
Where'er he leads."

"*Omnes.* We swear.
"*De Soto* (*to Alvardo*). Lead them to Spain.
"*Alvardo.* And thou?

"*De Soto.* *I stay here!*
My children, cluster round me,—I am dying.
Bright be your lot amid the groves of Spain,
New honors, and true loves. For me, but this:
Deep in that mighty river be my grave,
Its foam my shroud, its ceaseless voice my dirge,
Its everlasting wave my monument!"

De Soto was written for James E. Murdock, and originally played by him with great success in 1851–52. In 1856 the author revised it for E. L. Davenport, by whom it was played at the Broadway Theatre, New York, in the spring of 1857, receiving high praise from the dramatic critics of the day.

From this time, Mr. Miles devoted himself almost exclusively to dramatic composition and dramatic criticism. The next fruit of his fertile brain was "Mary's Birthday." Like all of his literary work, the style is highly finished, and the dialogue bright and pointed, but we think it is the least pleasing of Mr. Miles's dramatic pieces. The chief characters are two brothers, George and Vernon Lordley, the one a disappointed cynical man of the world, whose life has been blighted by his wife—the pretty daughter of his father's gardener, whom he married in a moment of infatuation—running off with his dearest friend. Being disinherited for making a *mesalliance*, Mr. Stillworth, a bank president, makes him his confidential clerk. The president lived beyond his means, gambled in the vain hope of retrieving his fortunes, and, finally, in despair, defrauded the bank. George Lordley stepped between the culprit and his doom, sacrificed his own honor to save his friend's, and was branded as a defaulter. On his deathbed, Mr. Stillworth sent for George's father, and told him of his son's innocence. Mr. Lordley restores George to his inheritance of his princely estate, and he becomes the guardian of Mr. Stillworth's daughter, Mary, a lovely child of eight years. At the opening of the play, George Lordley has succeeded to the paternal estate; his brother, Vernon, a young fellow, whose occupation is shooting, and amusement, billiards, is betrothed to Mary Stillworth, but is in love with Alice Hawthorne; and Mary, who knows nothing about George's history, is in love with the latter. On Mary's twentieth birthday, she receives a packet, left by her father, to be opened on that day, which informs her of her father's crime, and of the noble, unselfish conduct of George

Lordley. At his request, Mary consents to marry Vernon on the evening of her birthday. On that very day, George's runaway wife returns to her father's house to die; Vernon discovering that Mary loves his brother, tells him of it; Helen (George's wife) dies, and—all's well that ends well!

We shall not quote anything from "Mary's Birthday," which was successfully put on the stage in the spring of 1857, but proceed at once to the consideration of Mr. Miles's sparkling comedy, called "Señor Valiente."

It is related that Zoilus once handed Apollo a very severe criticism upon a certain work, whereupon the god of the silver bow asked him for the beauties of the book. The critic replied that he only noticed the *errors*. The story runs that Apollo handed him a sack of unwinnowed wheat, and told him to pick out *all the chaff* for his pains. Apollo would never have an opportunity to condemn us for dwelling only on the *defects* of "Señor Valiente." We have read the play repeatedly, and unhesitatingly pronounce it the most delightful piece in American dramatic literature. Were we a professor of rhetoric, we should recommend the study of "Señor Valiente" for the grace and beauty of the style. Bulwer very happily calls Macaulay the "Titian of English prose." With equal justice, George H. Miles might be called the Van Dyck of the American drama. His touches are refined and delicate, but at the same time firm and masculine. He always writes like a gentleman, and avoids, with the fastidious care of Chesterfield, everything coarse and vulgar.

Let us go over "Señor Valiente," and enjoy some of its bright wit and clever hits at the follies of the day. The scenes are laid chiefly in New York, and the characters are from Fifth Avenue and Wall Street, with a sprinkling of literary men from no particular locality. Lille Clinton, a young girl of eighteen, is in love with Manfred Caverley, a poet and man of fashion, aged twenty-five. The play opens with their engagement, and Lille has sent for her stepfather, Richard Flintleigh, to announce it to him.

"*Lille.* How shall I ever tell him? I know I am blushing dreadfully. It is strange I should, too, in my *second* winter; few girls do in their first.

Enter FLINTLEIGH, *with his hat on.*

"*Flintleigh.* Well, Lille, what is it? Speak quick. It's noon now; there's a meeting of the Salt River Railroad at two and of the Cannibal Conversion Society at three. You know I'm president of the one, and treasurer of the other—so speak quick. Besides, the devil's to pay in Wall Street, and between gambling and the gospel, I have a tough time of it.

"*Lille.* Well, pa, I have promised Mr. Caverley an answer to-day. He has been dangling after me these two years, and he'll bore me to death if I don't have him.

"*Flintleigh.* Which, of course, he would, if you do.

"*Lille.* Is he worth having?

"*Flintleigh.* He drives his two trotters, hunts his two Spanish pointers, keeps his

two yachts, sports a mustache *a l'empereur*, sonnetizes in the *Home Journal*, wears yellow kids, and owns from Grace Church to Castle Garden. That's a woman's idea of a man worth having, isn't it?

"*Lille* (*rubbing her hands*). Yes—delightful—and then his family. A 1, you know—General Caverley.

"*Flintleigh*. American families are very much like American firms,—A 1 to-day, B flat to-morrow. Now, I've only one objection to make to your Manny,—he's a poet.

"*Lille*. Yes, that's *dreadful*, I admit. I've done my best to cure him.

"*Flintleigh*. I'm a self-made man. I never read a page of poetry in my life, and never expect to; and more than that, I despise anybody who *is* poetical. Poet has got to mean pauper, and I've no notion of introducing pauper into my family. However, if his father will meet *me* half way—and you *must escape his attention*—why, then, you shall have as pretty a start in life as ever a pair of Fifth Avenoodles had."

Mr. Flintleigh retires, and young Caverley is announced. Lille says this saying "yes" to a man is a humiliating business, and determines to plague his life out before she does. So, when her lover enters, anxious for her answer, she assumes an air of indifference towards him.

"*Lille*. Who is this Señor Valiente, the rich Mexican, that's making such a sensation? I am dying to know.

"*Manny*. He's about fifty thousand a year and forty-four front. Quite fascinating. Lille, may I venture to hope.

"*Lille*. Why does he look so sad at the opera? Why is he always alone? Why does he cut all the men, and dodge all the women? Why did he leave Mexico? What is he doing in New York? How did he happen to take a fancy to you? Wasn't he a soldier or a pirate? Isn't he married and divorced? Hasn't he a history? Can he speak English?

"*Manny*. Yes, he speaks the American language perfectly. That's all I know about him.

"*Lille*. Why, you're his bosom friend.

"*Manny*. There's one little difference between bosom friend masculine and bosom friend feminine; we *hear* secrets, you *tell* them."

After teasing him for some time, Lille tells him of the interview with Mr. Flintleigh, and Manfred asks her to name the happy day. Lille says: "Certainly not for a year or two." Whereupon the young poet was eloquent, and draws an inviting picture of a summer in Europe, the song of the shrill cicala in Florence, the lowing of the white oxen along the gray Campagna, the clouds of Naples, etc.

Act second opens in Señor Valiente's library. Manfred and Valiente are lunching together. The latter cautions his friend against rushing into print.

"*Valiente*. If you have a MISSION, wait! as Dante, Milton, Cromwell, Mohammed, and my own Calderon waited. If you be laden with songs or deeds celestial, bury them deep in your warm bosom; brood with folded wing, till the crumbling shell bursts with its inner life. The world is weary of larks and nightingales; they build in every bush. We want the sunward scream of the full-fledged eagle, hawking at heaven through the strong whirlwind and the red heart of the thunder-cloud. You smile.

"*Manny.* Only at your very poetical way of putting down a poet. Now, honor bright, haven't you done a little of this? [*Counting his fingers on his thumb.*]

"*Valiente.* When you were spinning your first top, I was spinning my first couplets to a face—well, Manny, to the face, the unforgotten face that first teaches us to love. You are so like her now, I seem to live those golden moments over. I thought myself a poet then; the world and *she* thought otherwise. So ends my sermon. Cæsar must have his Brutus, Charles the First his Cromwell, and poets their publishers."

In the meantime, Flintleigh becomes involved in financial difficulties, after getting General Caverley in a tight place. He is in love with the general's daughter, Nell, and cannot say to her: "Marry me, or I'll smash your father." Miss Caverley gives a domino, at which she meets Señor Valiente, who tells her the story of his early love, how he was jilted, forsaken, and despised by the woman he had fondly trusted. The Mexican war began; he enlisted as a private in the ranks, whose sole ambition was a soldier's grave. He planted the American flag upon the heights of Chapultepec and the next moment was struck down, desperately wounded. Left for dead on the field, he was carried off and cured by a Mexican padre. Recovering about the time the California fever broke out, he went there, dug out the teeming gold, speculated in lands and herds, had fortune thrust upon him, and Harry Clinton became SEÑOR VALIENTE. Nell Caverley recognizes herself as the heroine of this story, and, of course, faints at the discovery of her long-lost lover in the person of the mysterious Mexican, but recovers at the proper time, and Clinton asks her, as a last favor, *not to marry Richard Flintleigh.* As Clinton retires, Flintleigh enters, and tells Nell by marrying him she can save her father from ruin, otherwise there will be an execution on the Caverley mansion, and the family turned into the street. Then follows an admirable scene between father and daughter, in which General Caverley confesses to Nell that he has lost his money, and hers, too, every cent of it hopelessly squandered.

"*Nell.* You spent it splendidly. What matter? A daughter's white hands can work for a father's white head.

"*Caverley.* Work! *You* work! Stitch for tailors at starvation wages, over dipped candles in a rat-riddled garret! I know a trick worth two of that. *Ad plures*, Nell, over to the majority, coffins for two, the old Roman remedy. When life's your enemy, death's your friend. I'm of the old school, born to my own wine, and my own coach, and I'm too old a bird to hop without my feathers. With some men dishonor means death. Cleopatra had her asp, Hannibal his ring, Mark Antony his sword, and I am not without an equal refuge. So, *ad plures*, over to the majority.

"*Nell* (*aside*). This is terrible. I must save him.

"*Caverley.* Plain pauperism I don't object to, but decayed gentility! There's something ghastly in it. You actually smell the corpse of the gentleman. Why, think of it. General Caverley, in a back attic, Brooklyn, or a third story Jersey front. Dying's a small matter, but I can't go that Jersey front.

"*Nell.* You shall still live on with wine and horses, with song and supper, as a grand old gentleman should, superbly rolling to his end, like a measured symphony.

"*Caverley.* What do you mean, Nell?

"*Nell.* I mean that you need apprehend nothing from your friend, Richard Flintleigh.

"*Caverley.* Ah, you rogue, I see what you're after. Don't do it. I never made any sacrifice for anybody in my life, and I never expect anybody to make sacrifices for me. If you're mad enough to think of marrying a self-made man like Flintleigh, why hang it, you do it on your own responsibility."

The general retires, and Nell exclaims: "I will save him. It is my duty and my fate. My father gave me life; I will pay back the gift with mine."

The next day she sends for a lawyer, and gets him to write a release of judgment from Richard Flintleigh to General Caverley, which Flintleigh signs upon her agreeing to marry him. Lille and Manfred Caverley have in the meanwhile ran away and got married, and been received by Lille's brother, Harry Clinton, otherwise Señor Valiente.

Nell's wedding is appointed for eight o'clock in the evening at General Caverley's. On the day before, Wall Street was in a commotion, stocks tumbled, brokers broke, speculators were ruined, and Richard Flintleigh, to save himself, issued forged certificates of stock, upon which he obtained a loan from Harry Clinton.

Nell and Flintleigh are married, and drive immediately to Madonna, a place on the Hudson, which belonged to Flintleigh's first wife, whose picture hangs on the wall of the library. Here the couple are seated. Nell is startled by hearing her name uttered, and, looking up, sees the picture smile. Recoiling, she is caught by Flintleigh, who supports her, and, in loosening her dress, discovers the release to her father. He is about to tear it when Nell revives, and grasps it, exclaiming: "Man, would you rob me of the price of my bondage? For this, I have resigned a hope that changed earth to heaven, have dared a fate I most abhorred." He demands the paper, and gives her two minutes to decide between persuasion and compulsion. As Flintleigh is about to snatch the paper from Nell, Clinton enters and seizes his arm. He then tells how Flintleigh had once struck his wife (Harry's mother), because she refused to take a long and dangerous journey, and thus expose the life of her unborn child. Flintleigh denies the charge, and says: "Could the dead rise and speak, she would answer that the tale is false." At that moment, a figure in black advances from the picture-frame. Flintleigh recognizes his wife, and, resigning all pretension to Miss Caverley's hand, claims "her who has been so unexpectedly returned by Providence, and with her the house." Here, enter Chiselby, the lawyer, with officer.

"*Chiselby.* Devil a bit. The living have no heirs. Officer, that's your man.

"*Flintleigh.* Unhand me, fellow. What means this insolence.

"*Clinton.* It means that certain forged certificates were yesterday lodged by you

with Señor Valiente; that Señor Valiente stands before you as Harry Clinton; that you are arrested as a felon by the company. You have resigned as president.

"*Flintleigh.* Abandon this absurd accusation, or surrender your mother. I know my rights.

"*Clinton.* Your *rights!* Villain! coward! My mother's brain still reels at the remembrance of your tyranny. *Your rights* against my wrongs."

He seizes him by the throat, and drags him down. [Enter Manfred, Lille, etc.] Clinton releases Flintleigh, who is carried off by the officer.

Then follows a very effective tableau, with Harry and Nell in the centre. She silently gives him her hand, and he places a cameo ring on her finger.

This is a very meagre outline of an exquisite comedy, of which a fastidious Boston critic said: "'Señor Valiente' is an American play, presenting a picture of the life and character of the times, interspersed with romantic and somewhat mysterious incidents. The underplot is excellent and well sustained, while the various characters are distinctly marked. Most of the situations are telling, and some are highly wrought and effective; that at the end of the fourth act is graphically so, and has rarely been surpassed in dramatic writing and action. The dialogue of the play is piquant, keen, finished, and the hits at the follies, rascalities, and characters of the day are capital."

After writing several minor pieces, including a musical extravaganza, called "Abou Hassan," Mr. Miles commenced the supreme effort of his literary life, "Cromwell, a tragedy." This drama has never been played nor printed, and we have been kindly permitted to use it for the purposes of the present article.

The subject possesses so great an historic interest, that it is astonishing none of the old dramatists selected it for a theme. A commoner by birth, a farmer by occupation, Oliver Cromwell became the leader of one of the greatest political revolutions in the annals of England. Becoming a soldier at the age of forty, he displayed a military genius that has placed his name among the great commanders of the world. Becoming the head of the government when past fifty, he ruled with more than kingly power, and did more for the fame of England than any legitimate king had ever done.

This is the man chosen by Mr. Miles as the hero of his drama. The play opens with the defeat of Essex, and ends with the death of Charles the First. The principal characters are the King, Prince Rupert, Cromwell, and Elizabeth, his favorite daughter. Cromwell is made too attractive. Like a courtly painter, Mr. Miles has toned down the harshness, smoothed the wrinkles, and idealized the character of the great commoner, of whom a contemporary said: "He is so perfect a hater of images, that he hath defaced God in his own countenance."

At the beginning of the play, Prince Rupert gives the King a stirring description of the recent battle in which the Roundheads were beaten. Charles, wishing to put "a bloodless end to the unnatural war," resolves to send a messenger to Cromwell, who is advancing at the head of his Ironsides. Leslie, who, although a Cavalier, is in love with Elizabeth, is chosen for this mission. In the next scene, Cromwell is sitting abstracted at a table. His daughter enters, unnoticed by her father, whom she chides for no longer loving her. He answers:

"Love's but a fall of manna in the desert,
Once seen, once tasted, and then gone forever.
Once, too, I dreamed of rest and household peace,
Reposing in the pleasant shades of Ely.
But, I have done, alas! with old St. Ives,
With those still grazing lands; my dearest wish
To walk the Market Green with godly neighbors,
Or stray at evening by the black Ouse River,
Reading my Bible, till the pious stars
Lit their pale tapers round the dying sun,—
All this is gone, and Cromwell henceforth walks,
In self-annihilation, the meek slave
Of the Most High."

The meeting between Cromwell and the King is barren of results, but affords an opportunity for the dramatist to write some fine passages. In the course of the interview, Cromwell uses such lofty language that the King demands whether he dare mate with him.

"No, not thy *mate;*
But here, beneath these deluge-watered oaks,
Here, in the haunts of thy dead ancestors,
Here, in the presence of the living God,
Here, in thy teeth, Charles Stuart, no mate of thine,
I am thy MASTER!"

"*Charles.* Madman, I defy thee!
"*Cromwell.* Collect thy strength—let Rupert lead the van,
With bold Will Legge—give bloody Goring rein—
Marshal the White coats of daft Newcastle—
Add thy most royal person to the fray—
Yet shall I scatter ye!
"*Charles.* And ruin England?
Around me rank the noblest of the realm;
All that is best in Britain clings to Charles,
Prince, artist, poet."
"*Crom.* (*enthusiastically*). If thou hast one trait
Compelling reference, by thy purity,
Name not thy poets; I have one whose song
Outtrills thy Waller's, as the nightingale
Excels the listening thrush,—the Bard who sang
Of chastity in Comus!

My poet, Milton!
Upon his brow an ever-present heaven
Teems with immortal thought; his pallid face,
Tender as woman's, mirrors all the sky,
And wisdom clothes his lips. When thou and I
Are tales but seldom read, half understood,
His everlasting genius will outlive
Our deeds, and minister to future ages
That need us not!
King Charles, men paint me rough,
Ungainly, gloomy—an ill-omened bird,
Whose harsh croak hushes mirth:
All true—I am.
My body is plebeian, tho' my mother
Sprang from thy royal house, and flushed my veins
With something of the Stuart.
"*Charles.* Ay, so 'tis said.
"*Crom.* Man of the times, begotten of the people,
Rocked by the storm, baptized in civil war,
I lack all gentle show; but pierce the crust,
The forced ice of my spirit,—there's a stream
As warm and pure as the white tide that fed
The Roman father. Speak your pleasure with me.
"*Charles.* Kneel to thy lofty monarch and receive
His pardon. Sirrah, dost thou hesitate?
"*Crom.* I kneel to none but God—to Him alone
I bend the knee that never trembled yet!
Charles Stuart, this abject mummery must cease;
Humanity outgrows her swaddling-clothes:
The name of MAN eclipses that of king.
"*Charles.* I yield nothing; whilst I live, I reign
King, irresponsible and absolute.
"*Crom.* Then, hear me, hoary ages, past and future!
Hear me, ye heavens, from whom my mission comes!
In England's name, I throw the gauntlet down,
Lifting my voice against all kings and crowns,
And swear to humble this Goliath.
"*Charles.* How?
"*Crom.* With this (*drawing his sword*) last argument of *right*
against *wrong!*
The people with this iron flail shall thresh
All chaffiners and bearded forms away,
Leaving the naked king to take his chance.
"*Charles.* To live a monarch, or to die a martyr.
"*Crom.* King, thou hast said it! Oh, beware! Farewell!"

Then follows a long scene between Elizabeth Cromwell and her Cavalier lover, Leslie, in which he urges her to fly with him.

"Let us fly England, Bess, and Europe, too!
There is a land where, 'neath the tropic Moors,
The palm tree trembles o'er the sacred Nile;
Where lotos, wreathing with the damask rose,
Embowers the sleeping isles; where Nubian girls,
Trailing their braided locks enwreathed with gold,
Flash their quick dances round the tombs of kings;

Where the still dead from their tall monuments,
Serenely smiling, laugh ambition down,
And Memnon warbles love.
Wilt follow me
Across the sea, where that unclouded sky
Shall lend perpetual beauty to our home,
And grant the sanctuary to our love
That England now refuses?"

Cromwell enters, and Elizabeth, instead of flying with her lover, flies to her father, who orders Leslie to leave them, which he does, exclaiming, "Farewell, forever!" The scene next changes from love to war, and we have this graphic description of civil strife:

"Once more
Must fathers combat with apostate sons,
Brother with brother, friend with friend; once more
The young wife risk her husband 'gainst her sire,
The daughter pray her mother's prayer may fail!
Then shall the cannon cool his lip and hush
To Sabbath silence, while from hill to hill,
O'er hedge and wood and daisy-dimpled vale,
The church bells scatter peace."

The battle of Naseby follows, in which victory is plucked from the King by the desperate courage of Cromwell and his Ironsides. A hand-to-hand fight takes place between Cromwell and Prince Rupert:

"*Rupert.* We meet at last.
"*Cromwell.* Bold, bad, and bloody robber, thou art welcome;
Better meet late, than never. I have thirsted
For this encounter with the demon Prince,
Whose whispered name affrights our babes asleep,
Whose sword is havoc, and whose wizard steed
Feasts high on Roundhead blood.
"*Rupert.* Then, pray thy last,
Great Puritan. I have no words to waste;
Learn from my sword how much I hate thy name. [*They fight.*]
"*Cromwell.*—This for my son, and this for Hampden; this
For all thy butcheries, and this for God! [*Disarming him.*]
Now Rupert, to thy last award!"

As Cromwell is about to give Rupert the finishing stroke, Leslie appears, and rescues him. Then enter Fairfax, Harrison, and other Roundheads, shouting "Victory!" Fairfax says:

"Cromwell, the glory of this day is thine.
"*Cromwell. Not mine.* Serenely throned above that sun,
Liveth the Spirit that brooded o'er the waters,
Whose word shot light upon the restless world,
Waking from chaos, whose transcendent power
Roared in the deluge, thundered from Mount Sinai,
Or blazed on Horeb; in whose name, the sling
Of David felled Goliath: unto Him,
JEHOVAH! be the glory of this day."

We are in the next act taken to Windsor Castle, where the King is held a prisoner by Cromwell. An interview takes place between them, in which Cromwell promises to restore the throne, provided Charles will crush the bishops. The King agrees, and says: "And thou shalt have the garter." Bidding him "keep faith with Cromwell," the latter departs, and the faithless monarch mutters: "Fulfil thy word and thou shalt have the garter,—but *round thy neck!*" Just at that moment Prince Rupert, Leslie, and Will Legge enter through a secret passage in the castle:

> "*Rupert.* Fly!
> Relays of horses expect us from the back,
> A boat will waft us to a gallant bark,
> Freighted for France.
> "*Charles.* No fugitive am I,
> But King, the King of England!
> "*Rupert.* What mean you?
> "*Charles.* I mean that now—this instant—Cromwell left us
> To quell the army, to rebuild the throne.
> "*Rupert.*—Beware. Tho' he may mean and promise well,
> Yet fate will govern him, and vanquish thee.
> At best, thou canst but play the puppet—dance
> As Cromwell pipes—postpone thy destiny,
> The scaffold.
> "*Charles.* Better that than coward flight;
> Better to die a KING than live an exile!"

He then bids them go away, after intrusting to Will Legge a letter to Queen Henrietta Maria. Rupert and Legge leave the apartment; Leslie remains with the King. A shot is heard, followed by a rattling volley. Leslie starts to go to the assistance of his companions, but is forced back by Cromwell, followed by Harrison and Pearson. Charles demands an explanation of this sudden entrance to his chamber:

> "*Cromwell.* Man, 'tis *I* want explanation!
> Rupert and Legge had business here; what was it?
> "*Charles.*—Escape to France: I steadfastly refused."

Leslie corroborates the King's statement, and Cromwell is satisfied. The soldiers, hearing that their general has pledged himself to protect the captive monarch, grow mutinous. The ringleaders are seized, and about to be shot, when Elizabeth rushes in, holding in her hand the letter of the King. She gives it to her father, who reads: "My soul's Marie, the Brewer is our tool—his pay the garter, but *around his neck.*"

Cromwell demands of his daughter how she came by the letter, and she tells him it "was found on the man Legge, who, before his death, in the delirium of the dying hour, had plucked the paper from his bosom, kissed it, called me his queen, then gave it me, and died." Cromwell bitterly cries:

"'His pay the garter, but around his neck,'
Sneer down mankind—humanity's a lie!
Sweet truth has fled to heaven!"

He then orders Harrison to post with his regiment to Windsor Castle, and take the King to London, but warns him to harm him not:

"Not one white hair!
It must be done—but legally—by trial."

The last act of this splendid drama opens in London, on the night before the execution of King Charles the First. The hour is midnight; Cromwell is sitting at a table, remorsefully meditating over the terrible event of the morrow. His daughter enters, and he starts up, like a "guilty thing." He bids her return to her chamber, and to bed.

"*Bess.* 'Twere vain, I cannot sleep. Not far from us
Men are at work: I hear the steady clang
Of hammers on the nail. Are they repairing
Whitehall?
"*Cromwell.* To bed, girl: if you cannot sleep, let me.
"*Bess.* Let you! Not all the poppies of far India
Could give you sleep to-night: sleep never visits
Eyes so dilated, lips so stern, so white.
Father, you tremble.
"*Cromwell.* It is very cold.
A stoup of wine will warm me; fill it fast.
"*Bess.* You cannot thus deceive me, sir,—you suffer.
"*Cromwell.* Suffer is not the word; I'm on the rack!
Approach the casement. Dost thou see the moon
Pointing at something—something newly raised—
Something she never saw before, that draws
Her concentrated beams upon itself!
I've stood all night here, and the wondering moon
Is staring at one object.
"*Bess.* What?
"*Cromwell.* Dost see
The towers of Whitehall?
"*Bess.* Like Roman senators
Silvered by age.
"*Cromwell.* Dost see a thing beneath them?
Beams that run crosswise—on the top a platform?
Yon frozen orb stares at it fixedly,
And all the conscious stars aim their long fingers
Thitherward.
"*Bess.* I see some scaffolding.
"*Cromwell.* A *scaffold*, child, the scaffold of a KING,
The block on which Charles Stuart dies to-morrow!
"*Bess.* May Heaven forbid it!
"*Cromwell.* I am tempted
To creep to him, to save him!
"*Bess.* Do it!

"*Cromwell.* Do it!
I would die deaths to do it honorably,
A million deaths to do it honorably.
Liar and hypocrite while hope remained,
Yet deluged with despair this man emerges
A sudden saint, a brave, unblemished martyr.
Heaven, if his doom were mine, I should not ask
Thy grace to mend his bearing in one point!
He was all dignity and gentleness,
All faith and courage—every inch a martyr.
"*Bess.* You consecrate his cause, then, by his death.
"*Cromwell.* I know it, there's the staggering point. Child, child,
I am half mad! I do not kill the King!
Placed on that scaffold he becomes my master;
Memories of him will whip me to my grave,
Scare me from sleep and blear the blessed sun.
Living, I fear him not;
But dead, he triumphs. What can drive me thus
To regicide?
"*Bess.* Thou art not one!
"*Cromwell.* I am,
Nor more, nor less—a regicide. Behold him!
"*Bess.* You said you did not seek his death.
"*Cromwell.* I lied,
Lied like a craven! I did seek his death—
Brought him to trial—had the sentence passed—
Furnished the nerve that else were wanting—planned
To-morrow's execution.

* * * * *

I date a new idea! In aftertimes
The noblest title that a man can bear,
Eclipsing all the attributes of kings,
Shall be the people's *servant*, not their *master*.
I am their first great slave!
"*Bess.* Their first great victim.
I know your heart; remorse will drink it dry.
"*Cromwell.* 'Tis true that I have said farewell to sleep,
To all the sweet affections of the hearth,
Consented to a life of ceaseless danger,
Parted from all those mellow joys that bloom
Like second springtide, softening life's declinė.
True that regret may vex my soul with doubts
Of this great deed, this stern necessity;
But, Bess, remorse, God's last and direst curse,
Is not for me! Could I discover here
Aught of ambition, hatred, fear, revenge—
"*Bess.* Say not too much.
"*Cromwell.* I say too little, child;
My soul is up in arms to save this man;
I challenge earth and heaven to gainsay this.
Oh God, desert not the poor regicide!"

The fatal morning of January 30th, 1649, has dawned. The King, after calmly sleeping all through his last night on earth, awakes to prepare for his execution. To his faithful friend Leslie,

who has clung to his fallen fortunes, and has just rendered him his last services, he says:

"Am I well attired?
I have put on an under robe, lest cold
Should make me shiver and men call it fear.
Thou shalt not blush for thy lost monarch, Leslie!
I feel the high hereditary blood,
The spirit of my murdered ancestors
Stir at my heart. Mark, when the axe is o'er me
Not an eyelid shall quiver. Weep not, Leslie."

Pearson at the moment enters with a file of men, and announces that the hour is come:

"*Charles* (*to Pearson*). Kind sir, I ask a favor—'tis the last,
And easily granted: send this open packet
Safe to my Queen and children: it contains
Matters that cannot hurt your Parliament:
Mere toys of love, and frail memorials.
And pray you, let me have a velvet pall,
A leaden coffin, with a leaden scroll,—
And guard my body, as you would a soldier's:
Thou understandest? Shrink not, sir,—'tis all.
Charles Stuart is ready, gentlemen, move on.
Now witness, England, how a king should die!"

The next scene represents Cromwell viewing the execution of the King. The sight arouses in the breast of the regicide conflicting emotions. He admires the noble and dignified bearing of Charles, and exclaims:

"Charles Stuart, thou art a King upon the scaffold,
Thy crown and throne gave no such majesty.
Calmly he sinks his head upon the block.
God, can they smite him there so meekly bending!
Hold off thine axe, thou damnèd headsman, hold!
Heed not his signal!—Christ, the deed is done!"

The drama ends by Cromwell seizing the crown of England, dashing it upon the floor, and placing his foot upon the golden symbol of iron power:

"Crash, damnèd symbol, rot and crumble there.
Leap, ye high hills, ye skipping mountains, leap;
At last the freeman's foot is on the crown!"

Thus we have traced the career of our American Catholic dramatist, and endeavored to show that, in the literary field in which Shakespeare won immortality, and Sheridan carried off his brightest laurels, George H. Miles has earned a high, if not the highest place in the dramatic literature of America.

THE IMPOSSIBILITIES OF UNBELIEF.

The Nineteenth Century. London: 1881.
The Grammar of Assent. John Henry Newman, D.D. London.
Brownson's Review. New York.
Contemporary Review. London: 1881.

THE world of intellect has its fashion, like the world of society, and it seems that tawdry rhetoric about religion and its disappearance, and the appearance of Atheism in its place, forms, in a very marked manner, the "*enfant gaté*" of modern literature. Hardly a single number of one of the better reviews and magazines issued in the English language does appear without containing a paper bearing either directly or indirectly on this much-vexed subject. And, strange to observe, though proceeding not unfrequently from quarters holding entirely opposite views, an analogous strain runs mostly through all. If it is a lamentation over the encroachments of unbelief upon the territory of faith, launched forth by some clerical pessimist, the hopeless view of the future which is held up therein before the reader appears to find its verification in the confident assertions which another article, written, perhaps, at the headquarters of exact science, sets forth to the effect that the old moorings are being gradually but surely swept away, and replaced by the positive truths of science. Other writers, who pretend to the office of impartial critics, discuss with much ability the decay of religion in general, and make believe, or try at least to make believe, that the proud boastings of Atheism have not been uttered in vain. From the concurrent testimony presented to the intelligent reading public for inspection, it would seem, therefore, as if the era did not lie in a far-off future when religion will belong to the facts of the past, and only as such offer a matter of not uninteresting research to the human mind.

This, it may be claimed, is the aspect of the situation which is forced, more or less, upon any one who is in the habit of forming his opinions upon the mass of evidence on the subject which is encountered in the vast majority of publications. And this aspect, moreover, seems to be borne out by facts. For it must be admitted that the falling-off in numbers of those who openly profess one creed or another is not merely considerable, but so enormous as to indicate, with a goodly amount of probability in its favor, that the days of the reign of the orthodox faith of mediæval times are drawing to a close. And this opinion, let it be remarked, is not

the opinion of a few isolated individuals, but is an opinion which has been and still is gaining ground among a large class of society. It is held to be true to such an extent that even reflective minds, on turning their vision towards the social condition of the "to-morrow," draw deep sighs of suspense and anxious fear, and surrender almost to despair when contemplating what the issues of the growth of unbelief will be.

All this is true enough as far as it goes. Nor do we attempt to gainsay this sad state of affairs. But what we contend is this, that the reason for this sad state of affairs is not to be sought in the fact that belief has become impossible—which, we regret to say, is, however, generally presumed to be the case—but in the phenomenon that the proud sons of the nineteenth century content themselves, in a large measure, with superficial aspects. Lassitude of thought, mental inertia, a slovenly habit of accepting the thoughts and conclusions of others as true without much questioning, a disinclination to inquire into the soundness of the foundations of new theories—in short, the work of reason half done, and left in that unfinished stage—this, and nothing else, we hold is a just cause for uneasiness. It is very certain that doing things by halves has never yet accomplished any good. And especially in a region so all-important as religion, the light and off-hand, not to say frivolous manner of dealing with a grave object is bound to produce sad results. It is deeply to be deplored that our age has fallen a prey to this habit, and it is all the more to be deplored because the very leaders in the realm of thought appear to have lost the true bearings of thought, and have nowhere thrown the lead until it struck bottom. Therefore, until men learn again the great lesson of life, namely, to think correctly, a general veering round to the true pole can hardly be expected. But, all this notwithstanding, unbelief in these our days, we assert, has not become less impossible than it has ever been before in the history of the human race. Nay, it seems to us safe to state, that unbelief has become more impossible than it has ever been before. And the reasons for this position are quite obvious. Life and the complex facts of life surround us in precisely the same way in which these problems hovered round our ancestors in ages past. The light of reason, by means of which all generations endeavored to solve those ponderous enigmas, has remained the same. If it has undergone a change at all, it has undergone a change in favor of the attitude we assume. For in all departments of human knowledge a really wonderful advance stands on record. What but a short half century ago were virgin forests to the human mind, realms on which no bold adventurer had as yet laid his eyes, that, to us, are well-known pleasure-grounds, in which we move with comparative ease and familiarity. The means of verifying

the judgments rendered by our intellect have not been decreased by the march of time, but have, on the contrary, been multiplied and amplified. Faith, therefore, as largely dependent upon the verdict of human reason, must needs stand on firmer ground to-day than it did before. If religion and reason were not inseparable allies, bound to stand and to fall together, *then*, and *only then*, would it be true that faith is on the death-list, and that the span of time still to be allotted to that hallowed relic of old covers, at best, a few short solstitia. And until reason and its proper and legitimate use are totally and irrevocably forfeited by mankind, faith will, therefore, remain until then the one reliable companion, the one true friend of man through life.

The possibilities of unbelief, that is to say, the positive, the aggressive side of Atheism, is being put endlessly before the public; not so the negative side, which, in our estimate, is much the stronger, and outweighs in force all that ever can be said against it. What is unbelief, and why is unbelief impossible? These, then, are the questions we propose to deal with in this paper. They are portentous subjects, and can, of course, not be discussed in an exhaustive way within the limits of an essay; nor is it the object of this paper to do so. We aim merely at directing the chaos of contending opinions towards the investigation of a field whose cultivation, we believe, cannot fail to compensate richly for the labor bestowed upon it.

The structure of modern Atheism has frightened the world by presenting the appearance of an unassailable fortress. Outworks, quite formidable in number, are seen all around it; they are seemingly faultless in construction; they are laid out with unquestioned skill. This strong fortress, moreover, we know has fallen into the hands of the clever genius "*man*," and knowing this, we are apt to consider it impregnable, and stop without going further. We, generally speaking, do not inquire into what really determines the value of a stronghold, namely, the amount of armament and provisions, which alone render even a most heroic garrison capable of rendering any amount of resistance. Now a loose way of reconnoitring does not disclose the discrepancy between appearance and reality. But if we borrow for the occasion a little French *élan*, and a little of British dogged perseverance, and climb the breastworks and inspect minutely the stores, we will perceive that the provisions are scanty in the extreme, and that the magazines are filled solely with blank cartridges—cartridges, it is true, which, on exploding, will make a great deal of thunder and smoke, but perfectly harmless as far as their destructive value is concerned. We learn, hence, that the clever genius "man" has been gifted with a great deal of ingenuity not in vain. Sham detonations and sham

manœuvres are protecting the weakness of the stronghold, and they have to stave off any real assault. In reality, the place is absolutely untenable and hopelessly defenceless. Thus the terror-inspiring attitude of unbelief dissolves itself into an idle phantom. Atheism, we repeat, has had but one success, and that success is, it made people believe that it would replace religion, because it did not divulge the secret that a kind Providence had confiscated every real weapon, and that, boldly confronted by reason and common sense, it cannot hold the ground. In other words, unbelief hid its poverty under the garb of wealth, and the counterfeit coins it passes from hand to hand have acquired a current value because the assayers failed to stamp upon them the mark of counterfeits.

Now, what is unbelief? What constitutes its essence? Unbelief, if it means anything at all, means necessarily the absolute negation of God as a personal, self-conscious, absolute, and infinite Being. Men of superior intellects promulgate to the world that there is no personal God such as Christianity tries to impose upon human credulity. The question is now, what is the proper office of reason before assenting to the proposition offered by science? The office is less onerous than many perhaps are inclined to think. All that is required is to take the trouble, not to wade ankle or knee-deep, or, say up to the shoulders, into the waters of the atheistic creeds, for that only confuses the mind, but to go a little further and submerge ourselves, and dive down with a will until the ground is reached; and then, if that is done, we need but fearlessly open our eyes. The result of the venture yields up one or two "unknowables," or an "indefinite and undefinable first cause,"—in short, the agnostic formula "something is," under variations. The discovery amounts practically to this. The very men who deny the existence of a personal Deity, who deny the existence of a Supreme self-conscious Being as the cause of life and of all that is, these very men, in the last instance, are bound to proclaim an emphatic denial of the truth of their own assertion. This being the case, reason and common sense do not hesitate very long to apply the terse and drastic Bible saying to the men of science, "Only the fool says in his heart, there is no God." Modern unbelief, looked squarely in the face, does not proclaim the non-existence of the Supreme Being, heretofore called God, but proclaims in reality simply, that it has no name for this last link of the chain, that it can give no information as regards its character, nature, physiognomy, etc., and hence, modern unbelief virtually affirms what it pretends to deny. True, until the unknowable quantity is reached, the mind has to wander through a vast multitude of negations; of these a great many are quite correct, while nearly all of them contain a germ of truth, and the whole fabric does not collapse until it is

seen that the whole basis rests on treacherous quicksand. Modern enlightenment leads thought back into darkness, heaps cloud on cloud, and when all is shrouded in impenetrable mists, then it turns round and bids those who followed, with perhaps a feeble and untrained light of reason, whithersoever they were led, in a most obliging manner, "Grope your own way." And there exactly the mischief lies. Having led others so far, the leaders there retire from the leadership. Not that they themselves disbelieve what they enunciate to others. Far from it. They cling to it with a tenacity which is all the greater because on reaching the final conclusion a conviction in their inner selves contracts, as it were, their very breath, and invites them to abandon a result which, no matter how much their heads may bow in assent, their hearts neither can nor do accept. They announce to the world, with honest simplicity, what science, when asked to tell us about the Master of all science, always will tell us, namely, that He is above all science, and *master* but never *matter* of science. They tell us that they do not see God, that they do not feel God, that they cannot hear, or smell, or taste God, and because of this unsatisfactory testimony of man's sensiferous organs, they proclaim what their whole life denies. The theoretical negation by the lips has no practical hold upon them. Their every activity in life embodies the paramount weight they attach to those relations which depend solely upon and, in fact, presuppose the existence of a personal Deity. And not a few affirm, in a most exemplary manner, the practical belief in God, since without it their lives would be the climax of inconsistency. It is well to remember, that the doings of a man—that is to say, thought operating on the will and manifesting itself in action—that these doings furnish the true criterion by which a man's belief must be judged, and from which the innermost, though, may be, suppressed convictions of the heart must be inferred. If this unerring gauge is applied to the professors of unbelief, it is soon apparent that, however much they appear to swerve from the true basis in theory, practical belief permeates their lives in spite of all. Consequently, to the man of real thought, schools of unbelief have no existence; he turns them into corroborative evidences, and for him they are powerful confirmations of God's existence.

Further than this, a correct mode of thinking extracts even more from sounding the true depths of the various schools of modern advanced thought. We learn how utterly hollow the notion is that either Agnosticism, or evolution, or infinite differentiation, or the unknowable, or the Universum, as Strauss calls it, or the infinite, as some metaphysicians say, or the all, or the good furnish any basis on which religion can be placed. As Frederic Harrison well puts it, we learn, "that we need something that we

conceive able to reach our human sympathies, to be of nature akin to our own, something that we can really commune with in a moral union, something living, not dead." And all systems evolved by modern thought fail to furnish this one central point.

Again, the one quantity beyond the grasp of science, beyond the demonstration of our senses, appears invariably as immaterial, superhuman, supra-telluric, that is in the language of common sense as divine. These inferences, it must be observed, are necessary logical inferences drawn from science's sanctuary; they appeal directly to reason as self-evident, and hence on them belief rests on a firm basis.

Unbelief rests, however, also on a secondary basis. This is the difficulty of reconciling God such as we must conceive Him, if we conceive Him at all, namely, God as Allwise and as Allgood, with the misery and wretchedness of human life, and with the whole mass of evil which surrounds man on all sides in this world. It is hard, to say the least, to believe in a being which is the plenitude of perfection and goodness, and to believe that selfsame being the author of that interminable chain of cruel suffering, of which our own times, like the past ages, are so full. It seems impossible to reconcile the foremost and noblest prerogatives of divinity with the agonizing tortures which have befallen and still continue to befall human individuals. Here facts clamor for solution, facts whose reality nobody can gainsay, facts from which every one suffers more or less. Here there are perplexing contradictions, greater perhaps than the problem of life itself. Here, in the moral and sociological sphere, there are ins and outs which seem to lead inevitably to the rejection of the idea of God with much greater force than the abstruse investigations of science. Here life and its daily cares and sorrows, its troubles and anxieties, and petty annoyances and afflictions, great and small, and disease and crime, and illness, and vice, and passion and its wild outbursts—all has to be dealt with, all ask for a place and ask for an explanation. And, on the other hand, love and virtue, and charity and humility, and forbearance and heroism, even unto the sacrifice of life, and obedience and friendship, and affection, and a host of other relations petition likewise for solution. Here, there is enough, indeed, to bewilder any intellect which mistrusts the power of the light of reason to carve its way through this amazing mass, and to disentangle the thread of harmony which runs through all. And yet this thread of harmony not only runs through all, but leads on to belief in God, and moreover to belief in His revelations and His church. Reason and common-sense, as has been said already, reject with scorn the negation of a personal God; they reject with

greater emphasis the conclusions to which a superficial glance at the secondary basis of unbelief appears to lead.

To philosophical minds wont to wander in the realms of speculation, Dr. Brownson's "refutation of atheism" offers a network of irrefragable logic, acute analysis, logical deductions, "in forma," reanalysis, so admirably conclusive, that there is no door of escape left from the force of deep and sound reasoning which America's great philosophical mind develops therein step by step. For another class of minds, Dr. Newman's "Grammar of Assent" treats the subject "why we ought to believe" in an exposition so clear and so strong, that this work for many may serve as a guide from darkness to light. But proofs of this character are only accessible to a select few, because they are comprehensible, intelligible only to a select few. The large mass of human society is perfectly content with a catena of facts much more loosely chained together, and follows as a rule the dictates of "common sense," which term denotes, as we take it, reasoning of such character as to adapt itself readily to the majority of intellects. And hence, the question before us now is this: Can and does popular reason suggest or offer a solution which contains a strong probability of its intrinsic soundness, one that does bear a convincing momentum with itself, one that commends itself to the acceptance of the average mind? And to this question we venture to answer, without hesitation, "yes."

The first step towards reducing the chaotic mass to a state of order is to clear up the position, in other words, to ascertain exactly the premises on which the line of reasoning has to move along. Popular reason, as has been stated already, derides the negation of a personal Deity; it not only accepts, but it believes in God, as a superhuman, self-conscious being. Our own conscience tells us, next, that right and wrong, good and evil are realities, which cannot be explained away. Whatever efforts science may make to convince mankind that the inner voice, which can be stifled for a time, but never can be entirely suppressed or plucked out altogether, is merely the offshoot of education and civilization, in short, nothing but a product of evolution, it will never be accepted at large. Every one bears, thus, within himself an internal evidence of the existence of evil. To this must be added the external evidence, which is not lacking. The world is, as a matter of fact, so full of it, that it requires much greater hardihood to deny the existence of evil than possibly can be attributed to common sense. Therefore the premises which popular reason presses into our service are: God, man, and evil.

Now, even the limited spark of human intelligence shrinks from coupling with the conception of God the idea that He is the cruel,

wantonly cruel, and moreover, perpetual tormentor of the human race. It is repugnant to reason to suppose so, it is a thought which cannot be entertained because of its utter intrinsic absurdity. If we think God, we have to think Him as a Creator, who creates of necessity good and perfect what He does create. He can no more create for suffering, than He can create evil, and yet suffering as well as evil do unquestionably exist. In pre-Christian days this dilemma defied human sagacity, yet Plato went so far as to utter in a prophetic spirit, that until the word (λόγος) became man, this mystery would remain a mystery. And this is the utmost limit to which reason could go in those days of gloomy darkness. But now that Christianity has chased away the mists of old, the position is changed. Reason has no longer to perform guesswork altogether; it has merely to single out among the solutions offered the one which is in full accord with it, which harmonizes those facts which, without the adopted solution, would not merely contradict but totally exclude each other. And, on examination, the tenets of Catholicity will be found to offer a complete and full, and also a thoroughly acceptable and satisfactory solution, first, in the doctrine of a hereafter, that is, the immortality of the soul; secondly, in the doctrine of the fall of man, that is, of having forfeited in some way or other the primordial state of perfection. That these two assumptions fill the bill completely, does not require much sagacity to perceive. For the moment we look upon this life as upon a transient state, a stepping-stone to real life; the moment we look upon the telluric existence as simply a forerunner of a state which does not approach us with each sunrise so much nearer to dissolution, but which is neither subject to change, nor subject to time or to space—then, it follows clearly, that not this short term of planetary life but the hereafter becomes the reality upon which reason must base its verdict as to whether God is just and good or not. No sane-minded person ever enters a concert hall and forms a judgment about the exquisite melodious harmonies of a sonata of Mozart or Beethoven, by listening simply to the jarring sounds which strike the ear while the orchestra is engaged in tuning the various instruments. And what else is this life but a brief time allowance in which each individual is given an opportunity to catch the keynote struck by the leader, and tune every chord accordingly? What else is this life? If we desire to join in the harmony of neverdying sounds, we must set the instruments in proper order now, or we shall be excluded from participating in the grand concert of eternity, should we fail to have possessed ourselves of the right note, for the strains bursting forth there suffer no imperfection. This, then, is the rational aspect of life. And as partakers of real life in a world beyond our globe, as heirs to an im-

material and imperishable existence, much of the significance we are in the habit of attaching to things below disappears. The dignity of our nature is raised, we crawl no longer along the glebe of the soil. From fortuitous accumulations of chemical atoms, from that degrading lot which science desires to assign to us, we soar into a nobler and higher sphere, in which neither intellect nor heart loses its sacred rights. The least, therefore, we are compelled to do is to suspend our judgments until we know the full meaning of the hereafter. This by itself clarifies our minds and frees them from the bias of narrowness.

As regards the second assumption, to which reason cannot refuse its assent, it will be seen that the fall of man accounts to us for evil, as well as for the wailing cry of distress which mankind is sending up from age to age. It makes it clear to us why our craving for happiness meets with such ungenerous returns here on earth, and teaches us to look upon human nature with sympathy and regret rather than with pride and haughtiness. These two points once fully admitted, all further doctrines of genuine Christianity unfold themselves without any difficulty of comprehension. Reason confirms them all and weakens none. On a little reflection it is quite apparent that the twofold natures being welded into one in every individual, any disorder which disturbs the one must necessarily react upon the other. And hence, it is not well possible to presume that, no matter what the cause of man's fall may have been, no traces of the same should be discoverable in his present condition. It is perfectly legitimate, on the contrary, to suppose that whatever cause led to the forfeiture of the primordial state, should have left visible imprints, so to speak, in the temporal and in the spiritual order. And to examine whether this is the case or not, appears therefore a rational undertaking. Now looking at the world and its present condition, the foundation of peace and the principle of universal harmony consist in the principle of authority. In all constellations of life its necessity is encountered, in the small nucleus of the family, in communities, in cities, in states, everywhere alike. In fact, it confronts us with such overwhelming force that the concession is very readily made, "human society without authority ceases to be possible." Now why is this so? Why does the social order proclaim with but one voice its dependence upon the principle of authority? Why has it to rely upon it as an indispensable condition of existence? The answer is very plain and is full of instruction. In every human breast there dwells a tendency to make the "ego" the centre of rotation, that is to say, to set up the "self" as the authority par excellence. The liberty of choosing between right and wrong, added to the propensity of obeying rather our own inclinations than restraints

imposed upon us from without, this creates the necessity of checking in a wholesome way for the preservation of society at large these dangerous human proclivities. Nobody, we think, can gainsay the strong leaning of our nature to disobey rather than to obey, and it is this leaning which has to be overcome. Obedience must be enforced, when disobedience is offered. This is the object of all laws, which practically only limit and regulate obedience and provide penalties for violations of their injunctions. A refusal to obey a government's authority is, we all know, called revolution. Thus we have here in the temporal order established a disorder of vast import. And we ask, whence does this disorder come from? Can it have for its progenitor a similar disorder in the spiritual order? To deny this possibility is unreasonable, and therefore we extend the investigation. If we calmly deliberate what the greatest disorder is which we can conceive between creature and Creator, we are bound to admit that it is the desire of the creature to equal the Creator, to take his place. For any other transgression except this does not attack the Deity in its most vital part. A declaration of self-sufficiency appears, therefore, as the greatest offence man can commit, and it remains now to be seen whether we can fasten upon man the fatal ambition to be God himself.

When we consider the weakness of man, the darkness of his reason, the fickleness of his will, and all the sufferings with which he is assailed on all sides, it appears at first strange, that in such a creature no less an ambition than to rival God himself should lie at the bottom of all his misery. But if an analysis of disobedience is made, pride looms up as its germ, and pride, so Christianity tells us, has been the cause of man's fall. For, what *but* pride gives the impetus of wishing to replace God by man, and this impetus of putting the cultus of human intelligence above the cultus of the omnipotent Deity is only too apparent in these our own days. These reflections put therefore the case in the following light. What we find very forcibly expressed in the state of society and of life around us, namely, the necessity of restraining man's inclinations to set himself up as supreme authority, a demand made upon us by society with inexorable severity, a demand which keeps us from using our free-will in any direction fatal to the welfare of the race, in short, the principle of authority and its imperative necessity, this self-same disorder followed up in and applied to the spiritual order is traceable there. And hence the conclusion that the disturbed equilibrium in the temporal order is the remnant and sequence of the disorder in the realm of spirituals, forces itself upon our minds. Nor is this all. The nature and essence of pride explain to us "error," they explain to us "sin." We recognize in "error" the thought of a fallible mind which refuses to acknowl-

edge any higher authority than himself above himself, and we perceive in "sin" the act of a corrupted will, which disregards any authority but the own volition.

Common sense goes even further. For in accepting God, his indwelling authority is not denied. If He is the only Creator, then He must be also the only monarch, so to speak. Consequently all authority on earth must be a participation in and delegated by the divine authority in order to be legitimate. Man in his own name has no power over man; when he commands in his own name, his power is brute force. It is a usurpation of a power which does not belong to him. Every authority on earth must be under a certain aspect an offspring of the divine to lose the odium of illegitimacy. The social order is, however, permeated by a divine rule of authority, and in obeying a father, a mother, the child for instance obeys simply the appointed representative. And so the claim of a government, whatever its form, whether republic, or kingdom, or empire, upon the obedience of the nation, is sacred on this ground only. How drastically do not the several "isms" of our day illustrate the correctness of this view! Abolition of religion means abolition of authority, means, hence, rejection of the powers in authority, and that, in turn, means dissolution of society. On this point the world has fully agreed, and that verdict indorses in full what reason, working quietly and untrammelled, with open eyes, its own way, tells us, namely, that the necessity of authority in the temporal order serves as an evidence, and virtually is but the consequence of a disorder in the spiritual sphere owing to the reaction of the latter on the former by reason of their close interdependence.

The road now ascends less steep, and all that is required for a full understanding is a careful following up of what is implied in the accepted admissions. The fact, for instance, that every human being possesses free will now, leads necessarily to the belief that free will was likewise a possession of man before the fall, from whence it follows that an act of man's own free will did inspire him to assert his own self-sufficiency, to aim at equality with God. Again, the idea we have to form of divine justice makes it incumbent to believe that no transgression can remain unpunished, as it further compels us to recognize that the atonement dare not be less than the offence, and since the latter, being directed against the Infinite, acquires thereby this character, an infinite merit alone can expiate the crime. It being evident that the primordial state of perfection became forfeited as soon as the fall was accomplished, man in his fallen state has been of course unable to offer an act of equal intrinsic value to those which he could perform in his state of perfection, that is, it becomes clear that, though able to offer an

infinite insult, he thereby incapacitated himself from offering an infinite satisfaction in order to re-establish the original relations. Thus the necessity that proper reparation should and had to proceed from one man and yet more than man at the same time, is established. A rational conception of God makes us willingly concede that Omniscience had to foresee the fatal calamity which overtook the human race on its journey, and that hence a provision for a full appeasing of divine justice is a necessary exigency of the case. For, if not made, then the lot of mankind would be endless suffering, which is an idea altogether incompatible, as already stated, with our conception of God. The very attributes, without which God becomes unthinkable, necessitate therefore the belief that proper provisions for the redemption of the human race were made from all eternity. Now while these reasons urge upon us very powerfully the necessity of a Redeemer, the fact that, as a man caused the race to fall, so a man also must cause it to rise up again, brings us face to face with the mystery of incarnation in the God man. He alone could rescue the human family from perdition, since He alone could offer a sacrifice of sufficient magnitude.

From what has been said, it is evident that the rejection of the Incarnation resolves itself into a repetition of the first fall, and as such confirms only the same. For to acknowledge God as Creator with all prerogatives of Deity, to acknowledge ourselves as creatures, to acknowledge evil and our imperfections, and to deny what follows from these premises, amounts to this. Human beings admit that they are finite and created intelligences, and somehow not in the original state in which they were created; they admit that all that leaves the Creator's hands must be perfect; they admit that they are impotent to free themselves by their own might from the imperfections to which they are heirs; they admit even that God could not be God, had He not devised an atonement for the race; they admit all this—but they dispute nevertheless the sovereign right of the infinite Intelligence to have provided by the Incarnation for the redemption of mankind. Now if this is not an emphatic and flat refusal to accept God's authority, if this is not prescribing limits with a perverted will and a darkened reason to the mercy of God, and a finding fault with Him that He condescended to take the form of man, and as Godman atoned by a sacrifice of infinite obedience for an offence of infinite disobedience; if this is not setting up human wisdom, teaching divine wisdom, and in the last link of the chain, another effort of man to pull God's majesty down from the throne and mount it himself—then, we must give up reasoning altogether. Men, certainly do in these days rebel, and that quite openly against the acceptance of the divine sacrifice on Calvary, and this revolt, it appears to us at least,

confirms in a conspicuous and singular way the doctrine of Christianity regarding original sin, in offering evidence beyond question to the effect that the inheritance of our forefathers has been faithfully transmitted even to our generations. No more convincing proof could be put before us than this very effort to shake off the tenets of Christianity in order to show us that the doctrine of original sin, etc., is no idle invention of priestcraft.

If it is once clearly understood that pride is the root of all evil, that it is the one fault which attacks the very sovereignty of God, then Christianity in its necessity, in its unity, and in its infallibility offers no obstacles to a full comprehension. The questions, not unfrequently asked, what need is there for a Saviour, what need is there for a church, appear then in their true absurdity. For, mindful that our faculties have been impaired by the fall, and there is but *one* will which has the essential and the absolute right of being obeyed, the will of the One, who created all and who preserves all, we see at once how it is quite indispensable that the ordinances of this one will should have been made known to us, and that there should be ministers to remind us of these ordinances, and to maintain their observances in family, church, and state. The thirst for knowledge, which once proved so fatal, proves no less so even now, if not kept in proper bounds. Knowledge, if not under the protective tutelage of grace, nourishes the old arch-enemy pride, and inspires a secret preference of our own will to the Higher will. It is very apt to make us forget that even the most extended knowledge is but ignorance before God, and that humility alone raises us up. What is it, after all, that human reason does understand at best? Nothing, literally nothing; faith, on the contrary, embraces even the infinite. He who believes stands therefore above him who only reasons, and simplicity of heart becomes preferable to knowledge. True perfection consists in proper interior dispositions. It is also quite natural that the One who speaks to us through His Church, has not wished to satisfy our vain curiosity, but rather to enlighten us as to our duties, to exercise our faith, and to purify and nourish our souls by the love of what is truly good and true and beautiful. Nor is it less so, that in endeavoring to penetrate with reason the impenetrable mysteries of God, human thoughts wander astray and find only error at the very moment when they think they are drawing from the Almighty his secrets. On the hand of faith, science can reach out into wondrous depths; without it, it is a ship, waterlogged, and without compass and needle. Religion, on the other hand, explains fully to us our misery, and points out at the same time the remedy for it. For while teaching us that we can do nothing of ourselves, it also teaches us that we can do all things through Him, who is all

strength. It makes us feel our own weakness, nay, almost enjoy our nothingness; it bids us to throw aside vain aspirations and the littleness of our opinions, and thus digging out, as it were, a deep pit in our hearts, it infuses into them through humility that peace which proceeds from implicit trust.

The tendency to deride this belief in the supernatural is apparently widening in this world. The brilliant utterance of our times that man, at last, was obtaining a complete victory over nature, led to a belief and to a trust in materialism, which caused people to be regarded as enthusiasts who asserted that the invisible was more certain and more palpable than matter. The belief in a something that is above and beyond us, which has the promise in it of satisfying the infinite longing within us, has been stunned for a time, but it has not been extirpated. Nor can it ever be. As Max Müller says in very simple language, "The faculty of recognizing the infinite, which neither reason nor science has been able to overcome, has always been able to overcome reason and science." The influence of religion of faith on the character and spirit of man remains unchanged. Only through the supernatural can that chivalry be engendered which knows no personal danger; only through it can man rise to the desire to become worthy to associate with the Deity itself. And the farther we reach out in true knowledge the lesser need we part with our reason.

The *Creed of Layman*, a paper by Frederick Harrison, published in the *Nineteenth Century*, will in the following quotations illustrate that the soundness of the position we have taken in this article begins to be clearly perceived. He describes the situation as follows: "The capacity for religious unity is checked in the present day by the prevailing theories. What has happened is that knowledge and belief do not range with devotion. Practice is out of joint with profession, and reverence itself bears the standard of revolt." He holds with us that religion must reduce life as a whole to harmony by a central principle of life and by a systematic discipline of life; he notices distinctly that all non-theological schools repudiate this idea; start back from worship, from any formal appeal to feeling, from the very idea of devotion of spirit to a great power—in a word, turn with disgust and mockery from religion. He says: "Mention to them *worship*, *devotion*, *religion*, the discipline of heart and practice in the continuous service of the object of devotion, and they smile in a superior and satisfied way." He adds, later on: "All the teaching of history, the entire logic of philosophy, the perennial yearnings of the human heart, the intense hopes of the best men and the best women are against them." In another place he says: "It is the delirium of revolt which screams out to us to cast out the habit and faculty of faith. Besides, it is cant; mere delu-

sion to suppose it is done, or can be done. Neither enthusiasm, nor discipline, nor faith, nor reverence, nor devotion to a cause, nor love for a power greater than ourselves, are at all dying out in the world. They are not growing weaker. They are, even in the midst of change, growing wider, deeper, more universal." Wherein he errs is this, that he supposes positivism in the abstract idea of humanity furnishes subject and object of faith. And we offer in the following quotations his own words as evidence that apart from the doctrines held by the Catholic Church nothing can or will fill the void. It will be also seen how clearly and how fully he perceives the true requirements of genuine religion:

"Man has a mind and an enormous accumulation of knowledge. We have to satisfy that mind and give order to that knowledge. Man has energies; we must give them a full scope and yet keep them in due bounds. Man has a soul fitted for great devotion; we must fill that soul with a worthy object of devotion, strengthen it, purify it by constant exercise. If we leave out one of these sides, human nature is cramped, harmony is destroyed. And what is more, not only must all three sides be appealed to alike, but they must be appealed to by some great principle that can inspire them in one work. If this can be done it is plain how enormous must be its power over life. If there be such a principle, all else in human nature is of little moment till we have it. If harmony in the whole nature be possible, it must be the supreme good dreamed of by the philosophers of old. It must be happiness, duty, wisdom, peace, and life all in one. And why are we to assume so confidently that there is no such harmony, that human nature shall drag on in the oscillations of external conflict, in misunderstanding and crossed purpose forever, till this planet chills into its last phase of silent ice?"

He remarks: "The rude men who sweat and swelter in mines, in furnaces and factories, the hedger and the ditcher, and the cottager with his pinched home, the women who stitch and serve, the children wandering forlorn and unkempt into rough life, how are these to be sustained and comforted by science and enlightenment? How will free-thought teach discipline to the young and self-restraint to the wild? What sustenance will the imaginative and devotional nature receive from the principle of free inquiry?" The dilemma presents itself to this able writer in full force. On the one hand he sees "free inquiry, interminable free inquiry, skepticism, indifferentism, research, and then more research, waiting for something to turn up, while vice, ignorance, strife, moral helplessness and mental indecision do not wait, but grow and enlarge;" and on the other hand he sees the necessity "of the devotion of brain and heart and energy to the service of that mighty Power

which stands beside us day and night, of which every act and thought of ours is but the reflection, the aggregate force of the lives of true men in the past, present, and future, in which civilization is incarnate and lives a continuous and visible life?" He holds with us that "it is a farce to pretend to love or to serve the infinite, the unknowable or evolution or the idea of good." He declares therefore that an abstract idea without a reality corresponding to it never can be the object of worship and devotion, and hence of religion and faith. *Humanity* consequently, which is the ideal he conceives as the revivifying element of the creed of the future, is debarred from filling that office, but not so the God-man, whom the true form of Christianity holds up for adoration. Even there his candor does not stop, for he admits freely that the creed of humanity which he is advocating, is incapable of offering an equivalent to the superhuman joys and hopes and seraphic raptures which Catholicity has produced and still does produce. He does not believe that his creed can work these miracles of subduing sense and galvanizing certain chords of emotion. He recognizes, on the contrary, in the eternal recompense of earthly pain, the everlasting communing of congenial souls, the heavenly contemplation of infinite goodness, a force which belongs exclusively to Christianity. Yet, after writing the following words, "How often has the overburdened spirit felt peace amid agony and bereavement; how often has the dying lips smiled in peace; what trust and calm have beamed in the eyes of the weakest, the most afflicted, the most forsaken! We know it all. We too have felt all these things. We are not cynics, swinishly deaf to the spiritual voices." After writing these words, he bursts out again in doubts and says, "But the question again is, are they real, are they true, or are they artificial!" To us the inconsistency of affirming as a fact, a reality, for such experience is, first, and denying in the same breath this fact, this reality, this experience, seems incomprehensible. But without commenting upon the contradictions contained in that able paper, the author goes therein as far as human reason can take us; he sees the absolute necessity of a personal God, sees that this personal God must be God and man in one person, whose life we may imitate, whose footsteps follow with reverence, a power human, and hence ours to commune with and embrace, and divine also, to infuse strength and grace for the onward struggle, stir up the sluggishness of our nature, enliven all that is noble within us, and make us feel that He is the real and living and loving power. Christ as believed in and taught by Catholicity is confounded by him with the Christ of Protestantism, those mock forms of Christianity which can no longer preserve the semblance of being true before the world. Superficial

acquaintance with the tenets of Catholicity leads him to mix up its essence with the glittering but worthless quartz of that loose Christianity which has been the most fruitful source for opening up avenues on which unbelief could make its ingress. Aware that "thought and feeling are not enough," but that we need "practice —action;" aware that the elements of genuine religion are not only *belief*, that is, an intellectual scheme, and *worship*, that is, an appeal to the highest feeling, but also *discipline*, that is, a scheme of life, the place which education occupies in life is thoroughly understood by him, and likewise that an organized body of competent and trained teachers is an indispensable requisite. In fact, the Church and its hierarchy, and all that Catholicity implies, he sees clearly by the light of reason, as *that* without which true religion can not live, and what impedes his sight is the absence of that light which reason is powerless to supply, namely, "grace," the gift of humility and prayer. The essential ingredients of true religion we find in another paper of his well given in these words: "To have true religion resting on the belief in God, we must have a deep sense of the reality of His being, an inward consciousness that we can understand His will, and that we can rest in peace and love on his breast." How impossible, even according to his own words, that that abstract idea of humanity can serve as a central focus for these requirements. The clearness of vision of this highly gifted writer, a clearness which at times is almost transluminous, is beset by difficulties, which do not beset common sense.

For, that this world is not man's All, that the world beyond forms the true home of the human race, is satisfactorily proven to popular reason by the craving for a happiness which all the world offers is impotent to satisfy. The reaching out for what lies beyond has ever been characteristic of man at all times. And on that evidence the supernatural is accepted. And if but this is done, then the complete synthesis of life, and of every relation of life which Catholicity offers, explaining to us what science and mundane wisdom ever will fail to explain, comes forward and asserts its true place. Catholicity never stepped from the position which has been assigned to it by its intrinsic character, but the insinuations of modern enlightenment effected this, that outsiders looked upon it as a structure with no firmer foundations than those whose collapse they witnessed every day.

The sum of contemporary knowledge of good or evil is, it must be borne in mind, in a large measure the handiwork of those who write. And over the far larger field of literature the health or disease of the writer's mind and momentary humor are spread; they form, at bottom, the leading feature of the work, and are, in reality,

the only thing an author communicates to us. The subject is often but a trifling part of many pieces of literature, and the view of the writer a fact of far more importance, because less disputable. An author who has begged the question, or reposes in some narrow faith, cannot, if he would, express the whole or even many sides of experience; for his whole life being maim, some of them are not admitted in his theory, or if admitted, are only dimly and unwillingly recognized in his experience. The writings from which we have quoted serve as an illustration. Yet, though it is a maxim of the morality of letters that it is best to be wholly silent on a subject-matter unless it is wholly understood, it appears to us, papers like those we have referred to, are welcome contributions and valuable as a study in the lessons they teach. Unable to speak from own experience on what Catholicity offers, he advises strongly not to disturb the faith of those who can believe, and hints in more than one passage that genuine faith is probably sought in vain outside of the Church of Rome. Such words are guides rather than obstructions, and every argument in favor of that hollow phantom Humanity contains life-giving strength as an argument to bow before the God-Man of genuine Christianity. The vantage-ground of unbelief is narrowed down by the position Frederick Harrison takes; for if nothing else is learnt from him than this, that those who believe stand above those who, accepting solely scientifically demonstrated theories, waver through the length of their terrestrial career in unhappy doubt, an essential step forward is already made.

In all temporal affairs we are mostly willing and ready to listen to counsel and advice, and yet temporal affairs, after all, are within our mastery. Why then should it be irrational to pursue a like course in affairs which are acknowledged not within our reach altogether? If it is difficult to be our own infallible guides in the matters of this world, if we lend our ears to friend and foe, weigh both sides, and frame our actions in accordance with the decision we arrived at, it is surely not less difficult to steer clear of rocks in the realm of spiritual affairs. And it is a common-sense view at all hazards to consider it highly proper not to reject those means, through which alone we can acquire full control over ourselves, channels instituted by the Creator himself, because of His knowledge that without them we would be drifting to and fro in a helpless condition. But these channels have one *sine qua non* attached to them in order to become available, and that proviso even appears only just and proper, namely, the grace of faith must be earned by an act of our own, by a decision of our own free will. *That* which broke the link of intimate relationship in the beginning, *that* also must co-operate in its re-establishment. The rights with

which we have been created are too highly respected by the Creator to force upon us any gift of His against our will. Yet God speaks to man's heart; and what we have to do is to listen. For there is a voice which in the depths of our souls accosts us; there is a desire which bids us to follow the promptings of the heart; there is a longing in the human breast to call Him, with all the soul's ardor, near unto us. If in humility we pray for that voice, that desire, that ardor, then faith, the divine gift of grace, is not withheld, but pours in and diffuses its blessing.

Reason, therefore, and common sense can and may do much; they can show us the necessity of and the road even towards faith, but there their office ends. And it ends there, because the seat of faith is pre-eminently the heart of man. The intellect verifies and indorses, but another power vivifies the feelings of the heart. This line of thought, it seems to us, ought to be taken up in our days in preference to stale discussions about the progress of unbelief. Faith neither can nor will die out. Its acquisition, however, is not furthered, we take it, by endlessly repeating how impossible it is to believe, whereas a determined throwing off of all prejudices, and following up of what reason and common sense demonstrate so clearly, namely, that it is impossible *not* to believe, may at least have the effect to shake the bias of unbelievers, and bring them gradually once more into the possession of a treasure, which of all goods is the only real good, since it is the one that we carry with us beyond time into eternity itself, where the reward of faithfulness awaits Belief.

RIGHT AND WRONG:

THEIR RELATION TO MAN'S ULTIMATE END. IS THE NORMA OF MORALITY ABSOLUTE OR RELATIVE?

WHETHER we consider man singly and apart from his relation to other beings, or whether we view him in connection with the whole order of beings,—of which he is a unit,—it is equally evident that he exists on account of a certain end, which directs and gives a character to all his actions. If our knowledge of man as tending to a final end is to be anything more than generic, it is plain that our consideration of him cannot stop with those properties which he possesses in common with the mineral, vegetable, or animal nature. Although man has action in common with these three grades of being, yet it is not on this account, but by reason of his specific nature as a human being, that he tends to an end differently from irrational creatures. The brute animal can tend to a sensible and material end, but it cannot know its nature as an end; and it cannot accordingly deliberate upon and devise means for its accomplishment. The case is different with man; he can tend to an end rationally known to be such, deliberate upon the best means to accomplish it, and finally, he can choose freely the measure he deems best fitted to secure his purpose. As a still further exercise of his power of freedom, he can pass by the best means, and knowingly select those ill adapted to attain the object in view; or lastly, he may reject the means altogether, and not choose at all.

Here it may be asked, with what class of actions is morality concerned? And, first, let us see what is the meaning of this word. Morality, the abstract term derived from moral, denotes nothing else than an aspect under which we view certain actions, founding our view, however, on an objectively real and unchangeable basis. When we consider the human body in its structural arrangement, and as a physical organism subject to waste and repair, we are within the domain of physiology; but when we view the human organism as the medium through which a spiritual substance communicates with the external world, and as the inseparable companion even of the soul's most abstract thought, or, in other words, when we consider the body in its relation to the soul, we are no longer taking a physiological view of the inferior part of our nature, but we have entered into the province of psychological science, whose grade of abstraction is higher, and whose nature consequently is superior to the concrete and physiological aspect.

Similarly when we view the actions of man merely as physical effects proceeding from him as their principle, or when we regard man even as the most perfect natural agent, as the one in whom proportionately the greatest mechanical efficiency is secured with the least expenditure of power, we then have matter competent for physics or natural science; but when we are engaged with ethical science, we lay aside the physical character of man's action and pass to a different sphere, wherein indeed the action still proceeds from man as its principle, but with this peculiarity, that his character as principle is then understood, and along with this understanding is the capability of becoming or of not becoming thus related to any given act. The subject of such action then understands its nature, *i. e.*, its relation to him as his effect, and he is free to elicit it or not. Being aware of the character of his action, the principle that elicits it must know more or less determinately its proper effect; and action has a moral value not so much as action precisely, but as productive of an effect which is the end of the action.[1] In other words, the action must be directed by the agent to a certain term which specifies it, or gives it its moral denomination; and the characteristic of rational action is that the agent is self-motive in respect to the end, whereas creatures that have not reason tend to an end as extrinsically moved to it,—not intrinsically,—since they do not know its nature as end.[2]

[1] "Actio aliquando dicta effectus, quatenus est ab agente, tamen magis proprie est via ad effectum." "Action is sometimes termed an effect, inasmuch as it is from an agent, yet, more properly, it is the way to the effect."

[2] "Tamen considerandum est, quod aliquid sua actione vel motre tendit ad finem dupliciter. Uno modo sicut seipsum ad finem movens ut homo. Alio modo sicut ab alio motum ad finem: sicut sagitta tendit ad determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante qui suam actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo quæ rationem habent seipsa movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quæ ratione carent, tendunt in finem propter naturalem inclinationem quasi ab alio motu, non autem a seipsis cum non cognoscant rationem finis: et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem ab alio ordinantur: nam tolu irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum sicut instrumentum ad agens principale; et ideo proprium est naturæ rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se agens vel ducens in finem. Naturæ vero irrationalis quasi ab alio acta vel ducta, sive in finem apprehensum sicut bruta animalia: sive in finem non apprehensum sicut ea quæ omnino cognitione carent." St. Thom., 1, 2, Q. I., Art. 2, conclus. "Yet it must be remembered that anything by its action or motion tends to an end in two ways: in one, as moving itself to an end, as man. In the other way as moved to an end by another: as the arrow tends to a determinate end, because it is set in motion by the archer who directs its action to an end. Those beings, therefore, that have reason move themselves to an end because they have dominion over their acts in virtue of free judgment, which is a faculty of the will and of the reason. But those beings that have not reason, tend to an end on account of natural inclination as moved by another, not by themselves, since they do not apprehend its nature as an end. Hence they are unable to direct another to an end, but are themselves directed thereto; for the whole of irrational nature is referred to God as instrument to principal agent. It is, then, the peculiarity of rational nature to tend to an end as

The plant, by the physical law of its nature, tends to perfect vegetable life by means of growth from intussusception of food; and its action, though immanent and vital, is invariable and uniform. The animal, although moved to its end by extrinsic agency, —similarly to the plant,—yet enjoys a specifically higher life, whereby it tends to an end that is in some manner known; differently from the plant, it can apprehend and sensibly know this or that concrete object as materially such; *v. g.*, the dog can sensibly discriminate between his master and other men. But the faculty of the dog to know stops with the singular and sensible thing; it can indeed apprehend concrete and material relations, but not as such; it apprehends them as sensible things.[1] To know an end formally as such, that is, not merely to know this or that object, but to perceive in it the quality of desirability, or the character which presents it as an object fit and good for appetition, simply transcends the sphere of sensible and organic cognition, and is peculiar to immaterial and intellectual knowledge. Man, as endowed with reason, can know an end not only in its physical nature and properties, but he can also perceive it as an object having a relation to his rational appetite, or to his will. He can then judge and determine for himself freely whether or not he will choose or reject the object; and it is only when this judgment and self-determination in respect to an end are the principles of the action that man can be styled a moral being. The action is then properly called a human action, for as the term "human" expresses the specific note by which man is different from other beings, so, a human action is one which is elicited by man in virtue of his specific perfection; and it consequently differs from other action, whether of man himself or of irrational animals, in this, that it is exercised obediently to rational command. This is the perfection peculiar to a human act; for not all action even of man's intellect and will can most properly be called human, since much action of these faculties is necessitated, and only those acts are human which are done *obediently* to reason, or over which man has *rational dominion.*

Having considered the nature of a human or moral action somewhat analytically, it will be conducive to clearness to view the subject, with Herbert Spencer, as a whole, and this whole is called conduct. Returning mentally upon the matter under consideration we may ask, of what is this whole which we call conduct composed,

---

moving or directing itself to it; and the characteristic of irrational nature is to be moved or directed by another to an end which is apprehended, as is the case with the brute animal, or to an end that is not apprehended, which is the condition of those beings that are without knowledge entirely."

[1] "Finem apprehendunt sed non rationem finis."

and what is its extent? Reflection upon the meaning of this word will make plain (1) that conduct is with most propriety and by the best English writers applied to that which has a moral character; it is a term which most properly belongs to man when acting completely and specifically as a human being. By analogy to its primary meaning, it may be used to express actions of a different kind when considered in their entirety; for instance, it might be said that a ship's conduct in a storm was admirable, her behavior was all that could be desired. It is evident, however, that these expressions are figurative, and do not manifest the primary signification of the words conduct and behavior. Herbert Spencer[1] thus answers the question, how shall we define conduct: "It is not coextensive with the aggregate of actions, though it is nearly so. Such actions as those of an epileptic fit are not included in our conception of conduct; the conception excludes purposeless actions." And in recognizing this exclusion "we simultaneously recognize all that is included. The definition of conduct that emerges is either acts adjusted to ends, or else the adjustment of acts to ends, according as we contemplate the formed body of acts or think of the form alone. And conduct, in its full acceptation, must be taken as comprehending all adjustments of acts to ends, from the simplest to the most complex, whatever their special natures, and whether considered separately or in their totality."

The conception (of conduct) undoubtedly excludes purposeless actions; for conduct can be made up of those actions only which are done for an end or purpose. But by whom is the purpose intended? Is it intended by the agent who then and there acts? If so, our conception of conduct is true. If the purpose is not intended by the agent that then and there acts, its operations cannot be called its conduct; it is the exertion of merely physical forces in their own degree and kind. There is a final purpose or an ultimate end manifested in the action of every being, even in that of minerals, *v. g.*, the stone which becomes loosened from the side of the cliff falls to the earth obediently to the law of gravitation, and the law of gravitation itself but subserves an ulterior purpose in the economy of the universe. There is design exhibited in the complicated functions of vegetable life, and equally perceptible is the unifying influence of a final purpose in the varied phenomena of animal existence. To apply the word conduct, however, to the operations of merely physical causes—how visible soever in all of which is a purpose—would surely be an inapt use of the term; there is an essential constituent of conduct yet wanting, and this is, that the purpose on account of which such action is done is un-

[1] Data of Ethics, chapter i.

known to them as the directive principle of their action, and must be referred to a being who is extrinsic and superior to them, viz., to the author of their natures. The Duke of Argyle,[1] with much clearness of language, thus draws the line between the actions of animals and their knowledge of such action: "But this adjustment (between bodily organs and corresponding instincts) would be useless unless it were part of another adjustment between the instincts and perceptions of animals and those facts and forces of surrounding nature which are related to them and to the whole cycle of things of which they form a part. In those instinctive actions of the lower animals which involve the most distant and the most complicated anticipations, it is clear that the prevision which is involved is a prevision which is not in the animals themselves. They appear to be guided by some simple appetite, by an odor or a taste, and they have obviously no more consciousness of the ends to be subserved, or of the mechanism by which they are secured, than the suckling has of the processes of nutrition. The path along which they walk is a path which they did not engineer. It is a path made for them, and they simply follow it. But the propensities and tastes and feelings which make them follow it, and the rightness of its direction towards the ends to be obtained, do constitute a unity of adjustment which binds together the whole world of life, and the whole inorganic world on which living things depend." The purpose, then, which is visible in animal action, is not in the animals themselves, but in the being who framed their nature; their action, therefore, cannot properly be called conduct. Conduct essentially is applicable to those actions only which are performed by an agent on account of an end which is known as such, and intended by himself; it is there the behavior of a *person*. Such action is peculiarly the agent's own work; his dominion or ownership is complete, and it is, therefore, imputable to him, or he is accountable for it. To sum the matter up, conduct in strictness is applied to the action of that being only who is intelligent and free. A distinction becomes necessary, therefore, in the following proposition of Mr. Spencer: "Complete comprehension of conduct is not to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human beings only; we have to regard this as a proof of universal conduct—conduct as exhibited by all living creatures."[2]

Now there is a true respect under which we may speak of universal conduct, of which that of human beings is a portion only. When we contemplate the action of all creatures as giving evidence of a purpose which exists in the mind of an intelligent being, then

[1] The Unity of Nature, published in the Contemporary Review for October, 1880.
[2] Data of Ethics, chapter i.

the actions of all creatures as his effect are in a true sense imputable to him as principal agent, and as manifestations of his power and intelligence they become, in some manner, the conduct of this intelligent being. Since conduct is necessarily a predicate only of an agent that is intelligent and free, and since man is the only being of such a kind in the visible world, human language recognizes this truth, and refuses to employ the word as a predicate proper to any nature lower than man's. The inference, then, is, that to define conduct as "the adjustment of acts to ends," is to leave unsettled the relation which the adjustment bears to the being whose action is in question. Does the being adjust its own actions to an end known as such, or are its acts adjusted to an end for it by an extrinsic and superior being? Conduct requires a *self-adjustment* of acts to an end whose character as end is known; the adjustment cannot be performed by proxy, or else the action sinks to the merely physical, which is the case with the actions of all natures lower than the human.

It will be in place here to consider more specially what is the end of conduct or of human actions; for it admits of no rational doubt that there is an ultimate end which terminates either expressly or implicitly the action of all creatures. Let us now examine what definitely this end is. It may be stated at once that the object to which every being tends, or which is aimed at in the action of every being, is good.[1] Good is essentially the object of appetition; it is that which is simply and for its own sake desirable. Since good is the object to which every being tends, and since beings are of different natures, it is plain that the good, as the object of appetite, will vary according to the nature of the being whose term it is. In other words, the good which is the term of every being's action must be such as befits the specific nature of the being, and ultimately perfects it; for example, the musician, as such, does not aim at producing a beautiful painting, nor does the portrait painter, as such, endeavor to compose exquisite music; and accordingly the ultimate perfection of the one is not that of the other, though a good object is that to which both in their respective characters tend. In brief, the essential end of every being must be duly proportioned to the specific nature of the being. And as a human or moral action differs in its essence from one that is merely physical or natural, it follows that the essential object of the one is different from that of the other, although both objects agree generically in this, that they are good. The final end, then, which is the ultimate perfection of a being, is proportioned to the being's nature, and it is reached in a manner proper to the being itself.

[1] Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.

This is the distinction made by the schoolmen, and it is clear and precise. They admitted that the ultimate end of all actions is good, and hence the same *objectively;* but the obtaining of the end constituting final perfection was proportioned to the nature of the being; in other words, the possession of that ultimately perfecting good was according to the being's own essence.[1]

The means by which rational natures come into possession of their essential end constitute the matter about which morality is concerned; and this as reduced to formulæ directive of the conduct of these beings, *i. e.*, as prescribing the use of some and forbidding the use of other means, takes the shape of law; hence law is "an ordinance of reason," "a rule of conduct," etc.

The good to which man tends, as to the final perfection of his nature, is called the chief or supreme good, and the possession of it is styled beatitude or perfect happiness, which, to use the words of Mr. Spencer, is the "end underived from any other end." It is that which alone is adequate to meet the requirements of our nature; not even virtue, which possesses a participated perfection, can be the chief end of human aim, for virtue in the last analysis is only a means to an end, and if this were withdrawn, although the intrinsic distinction between right and wrong would yet remain, independent of consequences,—the proper course to be observed by a rational nature,—still there would not always, in such supposition, be an efficient incentive for virtuous action; for man, as now constituted, is not gifted with perfect insight into the true nature of things, and the human will is not always impervious to the seductive influence of pleasure inconsistent with reason.

---

[1] St. Thomas, I. 2, Q. 1, Art. 8, concl.: "Respondeo dicendum quod sicut Philosophus dicit in 5, Met., finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cujus et quo, id est ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius rei: sicut si dicamus quod motus corporis gravis finis est vel locus inferior ut res; vel hoc quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut usus: et finis avari est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniæ ut usus. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quæ est finis: sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia conveniunt; quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum rerum. Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad consecutionem finis sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant creaturæ irrationales, nam homo et aliæ rationales creaturæ consequintur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non competit aliis creaturis quæ adipiscuntur ultimum finem in quantum participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt." "An end, as Aristotle says, may be viewed under two respects, viz., merely as an object or thing wherein the character of good is found, and also as an object to be reached or possessed: just as the end to which a heavy body in its motion tends, is a lower place, as an object, and as an object to be reached or possessed it is *being in* a lower place; or, as the end of a miser is money as an object, and as an object to be attained it is the possession of money. Hence, if we speak of man's ultimate end merely as an object, there it is the same for him and all other creatures; but if we speak of it as to its possession, irrational creatures do not share in it, since rational creatures attain their ultimate by knowing and loving God."

It was just said that even were the true end of human aim withdrawn, were there no essential end for man's nature,—as there is,—even then the distinction between a right and wrong would not be obliterated; for we must conceive the inherent rectitude of certain actions and the intrinsic evil of others to be so seated in the very nature of things, that if we put the impossible case in which no reward would ultimately crown virtue, and no punishment visit the wrongdoer, even then the moral character of human actions as right or wrong would not be effaced, and the right would still be worthy and the wrong unworthy of our rational nature's observance.[1] Morality as belonging to the speculative and absolute order we rightly conceive to be founded in the intrinsic essences of things in such a manner as to be simply independent of reward or punishment, happiness or unhappiness; these are necessary consequences of good and bad actions, but being effects, and hence secondary, our consideration cannot rest in them for the ultimate and absolute reason of things. They are indeed causes in one sense, since in the present order of providence, they are the last *practical* motive for the performance of virtue and for the avoidance of vice; but for philosophical analysis we must proceed to the causes of these effects, happiness and unhappiness, reward and punishment, and this brings us to the *a priori* order of the essences of things, to which there is nothing ulterior; here we are within the sphere of metaphysical truth, on which ultimately rests the difference between right and wrong, and from which results the simply final and immutable norma of morality. And just as we cannot say that the final reason of mathematical truths is to be found in the advantages resulting from their practical application, so neither can we say that the essential truths of the moral order are such *ultimately* because of the benefits accruing from their observance. But when we leave the order of speculative truth, and enter the sphere of the practical, then we must take into account the results of good and evil actions, their character of producing happiness or unhappiness, and in this sphere the end, the *summum bonum*, is supreme. Our moral actions having, of necessity, good as the term of their tendency, are performed on account of an ultimate end, whose possession renders us perfectly happy, and perfect happiness, therefore, becomes practically the final rule of our actions.

[1] Cicero (lib. 2, de Finib.) has this expressive sentence: "Quod tale est ut detracta omni utilitate sine ullis præmiis fructibusque perscipsum possit jure laudari." "What is intrinsically right (honestum) is such that were all utility removed it could of right be praised for itself alone, even without reward."

And Aristotle has the following: "That then is honorable which, while it is an object of choice on its own account, is commendable also, or which, being good, is pleasant simply because it is good. But if the honorable be this, virtue must necessarily be honorable, for being good it is commendable." 1 Rhet. chap. ix.

In this connection let us view a theory current with some writers on the last motives of moral actions. The following is from Mr. Spencer: "And yet cross-examination quickly compels every one to confess the true ultimate end. Just as the miser asked to justify himself is obliged to allege the power of money to purchase desirable things as his reason for prizing it, so the moralist, who thinks this conduct intrinsically good and that intrinsically bad, if pushed home, has no choice but to fall back on their pleasure-giving and pain-giving effects. To prove this, it needs but to observe how impossible it would be to think of them as we do if their effects were reversed."[1]

To follow out this reasoning, we should say that the chemist who thinks gold intrinsically different from silver, if pushed home, has no choice but to allege the different specific gravity of the two metals, their difference of malleability and color, and other properties peculiar to each respectively. Now, the different effects of these metals, or the properties peculiar to each, are certainly a reason why the two metals are different: furthermore, they are the only means by which we arrive at a knowledge of their difference at all: yet the difference of specific gravity, of malleability, color, etc., are not the *final* reason why gold and silver are intrinsically distinct. This is presupposed to such properties, and is to be found *ultimately* in the difference of essential nature which exists between the two metals. The inherent essence of gold is different from the inherent essence of silver, and consequent upon this are the distinct essential properties which belong to each. Similarly, to make the final reason why this conduct is intrinsically good and that intrinsically bad consist in their different effects as producing happiness or unhappiness, is without doubt to state *a* reason, nay, the *last practical* reason, why the two sets of actions are different, but we have not then arrived at the absolutely ultimate reason for such distinction. This is to be obtained only from a consideration of right and wrong as composed of those essential relations whose terms are the intrinsic essences of things. This view prescinds from the merely practical, and places the question in the order of speculative and necessary truth, which is absolutely immutable.

The reasoning, then, employed in the passage quoted above while true under a respect, yet is not without difficulty from a philosophical standpoint. Objection must be raised also to the assumption that man's present life is his final and only state. If this were true, if man's moral actions had no bearing on any other condition of things than the present, no practical reason could be assigned for the performance of many actions which are now called

[1] Data of Ethics, chapter iii.

virtuous; pleasure-giving and pain-giving effects would then be an important element in shaping the conduct of many. Although virtue is the means by which we arrive at perfect happiness,—which is our last end,—yet it does not always meet with reward on this earth, nor is vice here always punished, and unless there be a time when the equality of justice is established between things, there would be no adequate sanction for the moral order. As a truth, however, that can be shown by natural reason, man's present life is not his final state; he is destined for something beyond and above the present and transitory order, and if a future and permanent condition of things be ignored, the problem of present existence becomes incapable of solution; if man's destiny were "of the earth earthly," the application of the moral law would require considerable modification.

As a fact, however, human nature is differently constituted; there is an end which is the befitting and final complement of our being, and this end is none other than beatitude, perfect happiness; hence, practically that action is morally good which is conducive to this end, happiness, and that action is morally wrong which averts us from it. Our end is the practical standard to which we refer our moral actions. The truth of this matter is peculiarly well stated by Aristotle, and the following reflections from his *Ethics* on the natural destiny of man are unanswerable: "In fine, we call that completely perfect which is always eligible for its own sake, and never on account of anything else. Of such a kind does happiness seem in a peculiar manner to be; for this we always choose on its own account and never on account of anything else. But honor, and pleasure, and intellect, and every virtue we choose partly on their own account (for were no further advantage to result from them, we should choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, because we suppose that we shall attain happiness by their means; but no one chooses happiness for the sake of these, nor in short for the sake of anything else."[1]

Not only did this eminent philosopher conclude that perfect happiness was the essential destiny of man, but his reasoning as to what precisely constitutes perfect happiness is acute and profound; so true, indeed, are his arguments, that although subjected to the keenest disputation of scholastic ages they withstood the test, and were finally adopted as incontrovertible. Viewing our human nature as composed of matter and spirit substantially united, he inquires whether man's ultimate end—which is beatitude—can consist of a life shared in common with either the vegetable or the

[1] Bk. I., chap. vii.

animal. This he answers in the negative; since, were it true, then both the vegetable and the animal could acquire beatitude. He concludes, therefore, that man's ultimate end must consist essentially of that life which distinguishes him from irrational creatures, viz., the rational life, the life of an intelligent being. Now, since every being is perfect, in so far as it is in act or operation, *i. e.*, removed from a state of mere potentiality, it follows that beatitude, or man's final perfection, will consist essentially of intellectual operation, and not of this merely, but of such a kind as is elicited "according to perfect virtue," or "with the highest excellence." The befitting and adequate object, however, of intellectual activity transcends the finite, and is nothing less than the infinite. The constituents of beatitude, or of man's natural destiny, are first, the most perfect object, and second, the most perfect possession of that object. In brief, beatitude consists in the most perfect exercise of man's noblest faculties in regard to the most perfect object.

Such was the teaching of Aristotle, and thus also was he understood by a kindred mind, St. Thomas of Aquin, who is at once representative of the scholastic doctrine, and whom a natural aptitude, perfected by rigid discipline, had rendered thoroughly conversant with the writings of this illustrious pagan.

After observing generally that beatitude consists of action or operation as opposed to a dormant and inactive state, St. Thomas reasons thus: "Since beatitude implies ultimate perfection, according to which different beings capable of acquiring beatitude attain to different degrees of perfection, it is necessary to distinguish different applications of this term. To God, beatitude is essential, because His existence is His operation, and He Himself is the object of His own happiness. In the angels, beatitude is ultimate perfection as arising from that operation by which they are united to uncreated good, and this is their sole and unending action. Man in the present state of existence is ultimately perfected by the operation which unites him to God, but this is not continuous, and consequently it is not the sole action of man since it is interrupted: and, accordingly, perfect beatitude cannot be attained in the present life. Hence, Aristotle calls the beatitude of this life imperfect, and finally concludes thus: 'We call them blessed as men.'"[1]

[1] "Ad quartum dicendum quod cum beatitudo dicat quandam ultimam perfectionem, secundum quod diversæ res beatitudinis capaces ad diversos gradus perfectionis pertingere possunt: secundum hoc necesse est quod diversimode beatitudo dicatur. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per essentiam quia ipsum esse ejus est operatio ejus, quia non fruitur alio sed seipso. In angelis autem beatitudo est ultima perfectio secundum aliquam operationem qua conjunguntur bono increato; et hæc operatio est in eis unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem secundum statum præsentis vitæ est ultima perfectio secundum operationem qua homo conjungitur Deo: sed hæc operatio nec continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia operatio interscissione multi-

From the explanation of St. Thomas, and from the sentences cited above, it is plain that when Aristotle says beatitude is an operation of the soul according to virtue, he is not considering virtue under its moral aspect, but as a quality or physical perfection superadded to intellect to enable it to elicit its most perfect operation in respect to that object whose possession renders us blessed. Intellectual action, as assisted by this perfecting quality, is the highest of its kind, and the intellect is then said by Aristotle to act according to virtue. This being the case, the objection raised by Mr. Spencer to Aristotle's view of our ultimate end is not well founded. The author of the *Data of Ethics* is of opinion that Aristotle places virtue as the supreme end of human actions, defines happiness in terms of virtue, *instead* of defining virtue in terms of happiness. This is, however, a misunderstanding of Aristotle's meaning. The mind of the Grecian philosopher was too acute to place moral virtue, however ennobling, as the final end of our being; he saw and taught clearly that virtue is a means to an end, not the end itself, and hence he says: "We choose (the virtues) partly on their own account (for were no further advantage to result from them, we should choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, because we suppose that we shall attain happiness by their means; but no one chooses happiness for the sake of these, nor in short for the sake of anything else."[1] Now, when he says that man's chief good is "an operation of the soul according to perfect virtue," he is using the term virtue in the sense of a positive perfection, which renders the action of the soul in which it is present more excellent than it would otherwise be.[2] Since, ignorant of revelation, he had no conception of a supernatural beatitude divinely illumining man's intellect, but regarded this perfection or virtue as something naturally acquirable by exercise and repeated action, it was, therefore, a habit which gave facility and excellence to the action of which it was partially the cause. Upon truths of the necessary and unchangeable order, the views of Aristotle have received little or no subsequent improvement, and his sayings in these matters are regarded by St. Thomas—the greatest mediæval doctor—as conclusive.

There is a tendency in the writings of Mr. Spencer, and others of the same school, to reduce the moral order to the physical; to

---

plicatur, et propter hoc, in statu præsentis vitæ perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest. Unde Philosophus in I. Ethic ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens: 'Beatos autem dicimus ut homines;' sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta quando erimus sicut angeli in cœlo," etc.—I. 2, Q. 3, Art. 2.

[1] Eth., Bk. I., chap. vii.

[2] "Est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura." (Cic. de Seg., 1, 8.)

regard the one as differing perhaps from the other, but only in degree, not in kind. Now, while there is some analogy between the two, arising partly from internal and partly from external reasons, yet in the final analysis there is an essential difference between the two orders. There is analogy in this respect, that, while action of some sort forms the subject-matter with which both are concerned, and since all of our knowledge is derived either directly or implicitly from the senses,[1] the manner of thought and the predicates which we apply to moral and abstract matters all give evidence of their sensible origin; yet while this is true, while we clothe even the most abstract thought in sensible imagery, still we are aware that such thought is then but imperfectly representative of its object, whose adequate conception would strip the mental term of the last vestige of material coloring. Furthermore, the term of all action, whether physical or moral, is good, and therefore in general the same; still what is morally good, and what is good only physically, are as such specifically different, so much so in fact, that what is physically evil is sometimes morally good, and *vice versa*. To confound these two orders, so essentially distinct, is to destroy the dignity of our rational nature, and to eliminate entirely the element which gives meaning to the terms right and wrong; to ignore this distinction is to divest morality of its intrinsic and absolute character, to make of it something relative and variable with its incidental effects.

A little reflection upon this subject will make plain (1) that the moral rectitude of an action cannot be estimated properly by its consequences considered merely physically and as related to man's present condition; and (2) what is morally evil[2] cannot be appropriately defined by its physical effects, which are oftentimes good. The moral character of an upright action results finally from its being done freely in accordance with an absolute and unalterable standard, and an action that is wrong is such finally, because of a defection from this same standard, which is the ultimate law of morality. This standard or norma may be viewed either as it is in itself or objectively, or it may be considered as informing the intellect of a rational being. Objectively considered, it is nothing else than that order which arises from the natures of things as intrinsically related to God, and to free and intelligent creatures. Objects possess in the last analysis a certain moral character, and

[1] "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu."

[2] Evil is here spoken of as a cause, but properly it is only a quasi cause, since it is never a cause *per se*, but always *per accidens*. "Malum agit in virtute boni deficientis, si enim nihil esset ibi de bono, neque esset evis neque agere posset: si autem non esset deficiens, non esset malum, unde et actio causata est quoddam bonum deficiens: quia secundum quid est bonum, simpliciter autem malum." I. 2, Q. 18, A. 1, ad. 1.

being thus constituted, they have, both to themselves and to intelligent beings, essential and immutable aspects or relations, which form the objective basis of the moral order. It is evident, therefore, that the principles of morality are absolutely immutable in the same sense that the natures of things are immutable.

There is to be considered also the second aspect of the moral order, viz., as known by and perfecting an intelligent being. As a perfection of the divine intellect it gives rise to the eternal law; and communicated to the creature's intellect, it becomes substantially the natural law. Our reasons, whose nature it is to know the truth, and which are themselves perfect as faculties from the hands of their author, necessarily give their assent to the evident truths of morality, whose reception is at once congenial and universal; and the upright dictate of our rational nature as enunciating the immutable principles of morals is certain and authoritative. Our reasons do not create, but simply declare, the right and the wrong, as the mirror does not make but reflects the image thrown upon its surface. The enunciation of moral matters is, however, put forth in a manner peculiar to the intellect whose characteristic it is to base its primary cognition on sensible objects, and gradually to rise to the conception of things wholly supersensible and abstract. And of such kind are the general truths of morality.

If the foregoing argument be true, the following question may occur: Even granting that there is an essential and intrinsic distinction between right and wrong, whence arises my obligation to observe it? I may admit the abstract and speculative truth of the position just advanced, but this would not settle the practical question of duty. To answer this satisfactorily, it is necessary to notice a characteristic of obligation in general.

An obligation is something which an intelligent being owes; it is, of its nature, a debt. Now the cause or reason of a debt is, to use a legal term, a consideration; and as it is impossible to conceive an effect without a cause, so is it impossible to conceive an obligation strictly such without some good either received or to be received which is the cause of the obligation. The consideration or the good which founds the debt we call obligation may not actually be received, as would be the case, for instance, where the artist engages to produce a portrait for a certain sum of money. The good which originates the obligation in the artist to execute the given work is not actually received, but it is something certainly to be received, and upon its receivable quality depends the entire obligation to perform the undertaking. This being true, the answer to the question proposed above may be short and effectual. I am obliged, in the strict sense of the term, to do right, because I am the actual and expectant recipient of a good which

is fully commensurate with the obligation originated; practically, my duty is to do right because I thereby acquire my supreme good, the ultimate perfection of my being, and by failure to do what is right, I miss my final end; in addition to this there is also punishment in store for the wrongdoer, which is likewise part of the sanction set upon morality.

Although there is presupposed to obligation a correlative good which founds it, or gives it its stringent character, yet what is right should be done, and what is wrong should be avoided even were actual obligation destroyed; right and wrong are logically anterior even to the obligation to observe the one and avoid the other; what is right is absolutely befitting to a rational nature, and what is wrong is unbecoming. However, to do the right for its own sake, and to avoid the wrong simply because it is such, is a concept really above the practical order, and is more abstract than the ordinary motive of human beings, who require the accession of rewards and punishments effectually to determine their course of action in the right path. Examined, however, speculatively, or in a purely philosophical light, what is right ought to be done simply because it is right, and what is wrong avoided because it is wrong; but the usual manner of conceiving obligation is as a derivation from law, which supposes a superior who can bind the will.

In expounding the utilitarian and intuitive theory of morals, Mr. Lecky[1] has some remarks well worthy of consideration. According to him, "a theory of morals must explain, not only what constitutes duty, but also how we obtain the notion of there being such a thing as duty. It must tell us not merely the course of conduct we ought to pursue, but also what is the meaning of this word 'ought,' and from what source we derive the idea it expresses." And farther on he says: "If we ask what constitutes virtuous and what vicious actions we are told (by those who base morals upon experience) that the first are those which increase the happiness or diminish the pains of mankind, and the second are those which have the opposite effect. If we ask what is the motive to virtue we are told that it is an enlightened self-interest."

This last remark contains the pith of the doctrine maintained by one school of moralists in regard to the motive for virtue. Is the motive for virtue an enlightened self-interest? This question we cannot readily answer either in the affirmative or the negative.

All the action of man, whether physical or moral, is on account of an end which is good, and in respect to this end his action is necessitated, not free; the sphere of morality, therefore, or of man's free actions, does not embrace the simple and indeterminate good

[1] Hist. Europ. Morals, vol. i., chap. i.

which is the essential object of the will. Morality is concerned only about the means to this end. Now, if by an enlightened self-interest be meant the possession of that good which is the term of man's actions and which constitutes bliss, then it may be granted that an enlightened self-interest is the last practical motive for virtue. But the language would then be inaccurate, because there are other and more appropriate terms to express this idea. If, however, by enlightened self-interest as the motive for virtue it be meant that virtue is such only in so far as it is conducive to man's temporal well-being, then the assumption is not true; and, indeed, in the ordinary sense, this proposition would reduce virtue to something variable and relative, since what in my view may be only enlightened self-interest may be really injustice to another; the right, consequently, becomes nothing more than my view of what is to my material interest.

Right is something independent of my opinion of it, and wrong is still such, even though I thought it right; the intrinsic distinction between the two would be as much a truth of the intelligible order, even were no creatures in existence, just as it would still be true, whether we understand it or not, that parallel lines can never meet.

It was previously stated that man's final end must consist essentially of the most perfect operation of his superior faculties in regard to the most perfect object. Let us here examine the reasons upon which this statement rests, and see, moreover, whether it is a truth discoverable by natural reason. For this purpose, let us look at the manner in which the subject is treated by Aristotle. The seventh chapter of his *Ethics*[1] begins thus: "If happiness be an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is according to the best virtue; and this must be the virtue of the best part of man. Whether, then, this best part be the intellect or something else, which is thought naturally to bear rule and to govern, and to possess ideas upon honorable and divine subjects; or whether it is itself divine, or the most divine of any property which we possess; the energy of this part according to its proper virtue must be perfect happiness; and that this energy is contemplative has been stated. This also would seem to agree with what was said before, and with the truth; for this energy is the noblest; since the intellect is the noblest thing within us, and of subjects (objects) of knowledge, those are noblest with which the intellect is conversant."

Aristotle assumes in this argument (because he has demonstrated it previously) that happiness is sought for its own sake, and that

---

[1] Book X.

all other things are sought on account of happiness. Noticing, with his usual acuteness, this principle of our nature, he proceeds to determine what happiness essentially is. Since man alone of the beings on this earth is susceptible of happiness, it must be in virtue of a superior principle which elevates him above other terrestrial beings: this principle is his rational nature, the soul, whose noblest faculty is intellect. Beatitude, then, or perfect happiness, is an activity of the soul, especially as eliciting its most perfect operation, which is the contemplation of truth: its action, as in this manner perfected, is *according to virtue, i. e.*, is elicited under the influence of a permanent quality acquired by repeated acts in regard to the same object, thus enabling the power to operate with promptness and facility. Placing contemplation of the truth as the highest action of which man is capable, the Grecian philosopher next considered the nature of the truth which contemplation regards. Evidently this must be truth of the most perfect order; it must adequately satisfy the capacity of man's intellect for knowing, that is, it must leave nothing ulterior and more worthy to be sought after, it must, in short, be supreme truth. Having carried the argument to its final conclusion, the philosopher has the following significant passage descriptive of a perfectly happy or blessed life: "But such a life would be better than man could attain to; for he would live thus not so far forth as he is a man, but as there is in him something divine.[1] But so far as this divine part surpasses the whole compound nature, so far does its energy surpass the energy[2] which is according to all other virtue. If, then, the intellect be divine when compared with man, the life, also, which is in obedience to that, will be divine when compared with human life. But a man ought not to entertain human thoughts as some would advise, because he is human, nor mortal thoughts because he is mortal; but as far as it is possible, he should make himself immortal, and do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best principle in him; although it be small in size, yet in power and value it is far more excellent than all. Besides, this would seem to be each man's 'self,' if it really is the

[1] The translator, R. W. Browne, M.A., has here selected the following happy quotation from Cicero: "Vitæ autem degendæ ratio maxime quidem illis placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum; quæ quia Deorum erit vitæ simillima sapienti visa est dignissima, atque his derebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio." "The manner of life most pleasing to them (the Stoics) was the quiet one consisting in the contemplation and knowledge of things: it seemed the most worthy of a wise man, because it was most like the life of the gods; and in this matter their language is both beautiful and remarkable."

[2] "Energy" would seem not to express the meaning of the term ἐνέργεια as well as operation or action. St. Thomas, who understood Aristotle's mind thoroughly, translates this word by "operatio;" "Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in I. Ethic. quod felicitas est *operatio* secundum virtutem perfectam." I. 2, Q. 3, Art. 2.

ruling and better part. It would be absurd, therefore, if a man were to choose not his own life but the life of some other thing. And what was said before will apply now; for that which peculiarly belongs to each by nature is best and most pleasant to every one; and consequently this life, according to intellect, is most pleasant if intellect especially constitutes man. This life, therefore, is the most happy."

Aristotle's language here embodies a true and profound conception of man's nature and destiny; his reasoning, at all times acute, is admirable in this matter, which is naturally somewhat obscure, and being nearly related to the practical affairs of life, it is liable to be tinged with prejudice, which sways the will and darkens the understanding. The dignified views of this enlightened pagan, so free from the gross and materialistic theories of many of his contemporaries, would do honor to the Christian philosopher; and, indeed, the lustre of truth which shines through his pages casts into the shade the systems of many philosophers who pass by that name. It seems to have been the peculiar merit of this remarkable man to look at things with the calm eye of reason, and to build a system of thought only after mature reflection and searching analysis; the generalizations proposed by him in speculative matters have remained undisturbed, because they state with precision the necessary predicates of all being, the intrinsic nature of man, and the true character of his ultimate end. Unlike his illustrious teacher, the genius of the poet never overshadowed the accuracy of the philosopher; and while the writings of the one are admired for their beauty, those of the other are studied for the truth.

GLADSTONE'S LATEST BLUNDER.

MR. GLADSTONE'S action in causing the arrest of Charles Stewart Parnell has created a profound sensation in this country, as well as in Ireland and England. In the latter country it is the subject of congratulation for the moment to the supporters of the Gladstone administration, and also to the Conservatives, who on other questions are opposed to Mr. Gladstone's policy. It is very probable, however, that even among those who are now rejoicing over the arrest, regret will take the place of the feelings they now express. Reflection and a perception of consequences that, it is almost certain, will quickly ensue, will convince them that the act was ill-advised and rash, and that instead of its being, as Mr. Gladstone, in his speech at Guildhall to the citizens of London, asserted, "the first step toward the vindication of law and of order, of the rights of property, of the first elements of freedom, of political life, and of civilization," it will prove to be the climax of the tyrannical and imprudent movement of the English Government in needlessly intensifying hatred and passionate opposition and resistance to its authority among the people of Ireland, while professedly endeavoring to calm those feelings. In the speech of Mr. Gladstone, from which the foregoing quotation is made, he further says: "The present agitation (in Ireland) is not in any degree connected with what is called in Ireland 'home rule,' or with the local self-government of that country," which latter system he declared he "would be delighted to see established, provided it would not break down or impair the supremacy of imperial control." If Mr. Gladstone is sincere in these statements, which we read with unqualified surprise, as coming from his lips, he has certainly taken a strange way to create confidence in them. If the present agitation had "no connection with the desire of the Irish people for self-government," Mr. Parnell's arrest will make that connection, will spread and intensify the agitation, and will bring into closest union in minds in which the union previously did not exist, Mr. Parnell personally, and Mr. Parnell's policy, with both the industrial and the political rights of the Irish people.

In Ireland, it scarcely need be said, there is imminent danger that the arrest will precipitate a crisis, the deplorable consequences of which no one can foresee or estimate. It will multiply outrages against property and life; it will furnish the perpetrators of those outrages, and the persons who encourage and assist them, with a pretence of excuse and justification for continuing them. It will drag into the ranks of the lawless peaceable and moral citizens

who otherwise would have refused to join them. It *may* plunge five millions of people, long oppressed and suffering from cruelly hostile and unjust legislation, into virtual anarchy, and may precipitate a desperate, though unequal conflict, which, whatever be the final result (though of that result personally we have no doubt), would cause immense and needless destruction of life and inexpressible misery to the people of suffering Ireland; and would immensely increase, too, the embarrassments, international, social, political, and industrial, of England, which already have become too great to be easily borne, and are too complicated for any one to foresee their solution.

If these consequences do not follow, it will be because they are not the natural consequences of Mr. Gladstone's action, but because of the prudence of the very persons who are charged with and have been arrested for (one of them now released) "inciting" the Irish people to lawlessness, and because of the wonderful power of self-control and self-restraint exercised by the Irish people under repeated provocations, though with singular disregard of plain evidence to the contrary the imputation of fickleness and undue excitability is constantly made against them.

Mr. Parnell, immediately upon his arrest, and before he was taken to prison, telegraphed to the Kildare Convention: "I cannot be with you, but I rely on you as true, sterling men to act as though I were with you. Act manly, steadily, prudently, without disturbance and without fear, completely maintaining your organization under those you can trust, relying on the justice of your cause and the certainty of ultimate triumph."

Mr. Dillon and other influential leaders of the Land, Labor and Industrial League all concur in counselling their followers to calmness combined with firmness and a determination to keep their movements strictly within the limits of constitutional law, and to avoid giving the British Government any occasion for the employment of military force.

The attitude of the people of Ireland corresponds with these suggestions. It is that of intense indignation, but of indignation held under control; of expectancy as to what else Mr. Gladstone will do, mingled with a feeling of gladness that by his rash and arbitrary imprisonment of Mr. Parnell, he has placed himself and his policy so palpably in the wrong, that the sympathies and support of thousands will be enlisted who otherwise would have remained indifferent spectators of the struggles of the people of Ireland for industrial and civil rights.

This abstention of the Irish people from violent and futile resistance of the authority of the British Crown and Parliament plainly is not what Mr. Gladstone expected would follow Mr. Parnell's arrest,

and in this there is every reason to believe he feels greatly disappointed. Resistance of the law, tumultuous uprisings and riots, would have served to cover over the utter failure of his measures as regards Ireland, and to shift from himself over upon the Irish people the responsibility of that failure. The movement of military forces, the "proclamation" of parts of Ireland heretofore excluded from the operation of the Coercion Act, and other measures, plainly show that Mr. Gladstone expected, it is scarcely too much to say hoped, would plunge Ireland into such confusion as, for the time being, would place in abeyance all questions of civil policy. He has been foiled in this; and there is no room to doubt that he will soon perceive that his idea of arresting the movement of the Irish people towards industrial and civil freedom by arbitrarily imprisoning their leaders is a huge blunder, as well as an act of needless tyranny. His own personal experience, his failures to crush the Land League or even retard its progress by previous arrests, ought to have taught him that the arresting of Mr. Parnell would be equally futile to intimidate or deter the people of Ireland from continuing a movement to which with resolute determination they are committed.

Our opinions on this point are confirmed by the fact that the natural effect of tumultuous uprisings and defiance of law in Ireland would be to put the new Land Law in abeyance as an operative measure, to turn public attention away from a consideration of its merits or defects, and thus avert the unfavorable criticisms which it is evident Mr. Gladstone fears, and to which he has shown a morbid sensitiveness inconsistent with the position he holds and with the character of a prudent and firm ruler.

Mr. Gladstone's criminal blunder has its origin, in great degree, we believe, in the fact that he is a *doctrinaire*, a characteristic which necessarily unfits its unfortunate possessor from becoming a real statesman. Evolving his measures from his own personal theories, instead of adapting them to the circumstances and conditions of those whom his measures will affect, the legislative enactments of a *doctrinaire* lack the simplicity necessary to useful, effectual, remedial action, and, as a rule, are failures from the very start, because both of their complexity and their impracticability. Along with this, too, egotistic adherence to their own ideas, and unwillingness to change them and suit their measures to the exigencies of the case, commonly characterize *doctrinaires*. They legislate for what in their judgment *should be* the interests of the people instead of what actually *are*, for what *they* think the people *should* need instead of what they *do* need. If their legislation is not accepted they endeavor to make it effectual by compulsory means; if it fails to produce beneficial

results, the cause of the failure is attributed to the obstinacy of the people, instead of the want of true sagacity in themselves.

Hence Mr. Gladstone's impatience and his unwillingness to wait until time and the action of the Land Commission had shown how far his new Land Act would fairly meet and solve the question of land tenures in Ireland. Had he been ruled by the true spirit of statesmanship he would have *waited.* There was every reason for his doing it. The archbishops and bishops of Ireland at their meeting at Maynooth had declared that "the new Land Act was a great benefit to the tenant class and a large instalment of justice, for which the gratitude of the country" was due "to Mr. Gladstone and his government and to all who helped to carry the measure through Parliament."

They prudently abstained from an unqualified approval of the act, but with like prudence, they "earnestly exhorted their flocks to avail themselves of the advantages derivable from the Act, believing that if rightly used it will bring present substantial benefit, and help them to obtain the rights, social and political, which they justly claim." The influence of this declaration of the bishops of Ireland upon the tenants could scarcely be overrated had Mr. Gladstone given time for it to produce its intended effect, and had he not practically neutralized it by the intense excitement he has fomented in Ireland, turning public attention entirely away from the Land Act and its provisions.

Moreover, the very action of the Land League, which appears to have precipitated Mr. Gladstone's invoking anew the provisions of an odious and tyrannical law,—the Coercion Act,—should have caused him to *wait;* and had he been a true statesman, or had he possessed the courage of conviction, he *would* have waited. The Land League advised the Irish tenants to defer appealing to the Land Commission until the actual operation of the Land Act could be tested by cases representing the different classes of grievances complained of. The League, furthermore, advised the tenants to united, rather than separate individual action, in their appeals to the Land Commission, and proposed to furnish the money necessary to carry the litigation through all the stages and processes necessary to a thorough test of the meaning and practical operation of the different provisions of the Act.

A true statesman, and one who believed in his legislation as an effectual remedy for admitted wrongs, would have regarded this as a fair challenge; and with the fairness and courage of real conviction would have promptly accepted it. He would have said, in effect, to his opponents: "I am as desirous as you are to put my legislation to the test of practical application. I believe it will stand the test. If it will not, it is worthless, and in that case I will join with

you in repealing it and in legislating anew. If my legislation is defective on any point, I wish its defects to be discovered as soon as possible, that they may be cured by supplementary legislation. My object is to abate wrongs and to promote and protect rights. Beyond that I care nothing for the new Act I have imposed."

That would have been the answer of a true statesman, of a man who thoroughly believed in the remedial efficacy of the new law he had had enacted, and his action would have accorded with his words. But that was neither the answer nor the action of Mr. Gladstone. In effect he has said: "I am unwilling to submit my act to the exhaustive test proposed. I fear the exposure of its weakness and defects. I will prevent that exposure if I can. The tenants of Ireland shall accept the Act as it stands, or else continue subject to all the wrongs and oppression of their former condition. I am unwilling to meet hostile criticism, and to brook interference with or opposition to my measures. You must take them as they are, and for what they are worth. I will employ the whole power of my government against you, and if, in the excitement or disturbance thus caused, my new law is forgotten or becomes inoperative, it will at least escape the effects of your hostile criticism."

This, substantially, has been Mr. Gladstone's answer to the action of the Land League. It is the answer of a *doctrinaire* and of a despot. Mr. Gladstone is, as we have already said, a *doctrinaire*. He is, or affects to be, a *litterateur*, a political economist, a speculative philosopher, and a theologian, as well as a politician and a statesman. He is so wedded to his own theories, that, regardless of what *is*, and carried away with admiration of his own ideas of what *ought to be*, he imagines that he is a philanthropist, while in reality he is acting the part of a tyrant. History records many such instances.

That Mr. Gladstone really believes he can compel the people of Ireland to quietly acquiesce in this, we cannot even suppose. The character and history of the Irish people forbid any such idea, as does, too, their action since the previous arrests under the miscalled "Peace Preservation Act." They inspired the Irish people with new determination instead of fear. They enlisted in support of the land tenure movement thousands who before were not in sympathy with it and gave it no assistance. The day has gone by, if ever it existed, when efforts to intimidate the people of Ireland by suppressing freedom of discussion, freedom of consideration of public measures; by prohibiting freedom of public conventions to counsel lines of action upon those measures; by elevating suspicion into the place of evidence, and accusations unaccompanied by proof into that of conviction; by arresting popular leaders and denying them the right of trial by jury—can force the people of Ireland to tamely

acquiesce in what their judgment disapproves. If Mr. Gladstone thinks he can, he has read Irish history with less of profit, and is more obtuse in his perception of the effect of his previous crowding the cells of Kilmainham jail with "suspects," than we can believe possible.

We can discover, therefore, no other reason for Mr. Gladstone's action (putting aside as unworthy the imputation of personal malice against Mr. Parnell and other leaders of the Land League movement) than that it is a piece of strategy designed to prevent expected exposures of defects in his new Land Act, by creating in Ireland a condition of affairs which will throw that Act and all questions it was intended to decide into abeyance, and occupy public attention with other subjects.

Mr. Gladstone cannot but know that his action will not only widen and deepen the existing agitation in Ireland, but will divert it from the land tenure controversy to other subjects, and that the natural effect of his arrests of the leaders of the Land League, and of his measures to suppress it (should not the people of Ireland be held back by their own prudence and firmness of purpose, and by moral and religious considerations), will be to increase lawlessness and outrages against persons and property, and to excite riots, tumults, and violent resistance of law.

We hope and believe that in this Mr. Gladstone will fail; that the people of Ireland will control their just indignation, and thus keep out of the trap that has been set to catch them. United, unshaken in their determination to move forward within the lines of acknowledged principles of constitutional law, and abstaining from anything that can furnish the Gladstone Cabinet with an excuse for employing military force, they will ultimately, and at no distant day, win from the British Government, reluctant though it be to grant them, the industrial and civil rights they are striving for.

Mr. Gladstone may suppress the Land League as respects its present form and organization, but all his measures will be futile to crush that which the Land League represents. Under other forms, and in other ways, the desires and the just demands of the people of Ireland for the removal of the present incubus upon their industrial action, for the acquisition by them of civil and religious rights and equality before the law, and of local self-government, will continue to make themselves felt, and so effectually felt that in the end they will be acceded to.

The only danger that we fear, and it is a danger which Mr. Gladstone's action greatly increases, is that by declaring the Land League an unlawful association, and prohibiting it from open, public action, numbers of the people of Ireland may be driven into union with secret organizations, the consequences of which it is

needless to dwell on. That they will be preserved from this we hope and trust; and the basis of our hope is the firm religious faith of the Irish people, the trust they repose in their clergy and bishops, their reverence for the obligations of religion, and their obedience to those who are placed over them in the Church. Ireland's faith, Ireland's adherence to the Catholic religion, is Ireland's surest safeguard against the crisis that has been precipitated upon her. Availing herself of it now, as she has in times past, she will pass safely through the perils that surround her, and cover her enemies with shame.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE THEORY OF PREACHING: LECTURES ON HOMILECTICS. By *Anson Phelps, D.D.*, late Bartlett Professor of Sacred Rhetoric in Andover Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881.

In Protestant religious services the sermon occupies the principal place, all the other exercises being subordinated to it. Hence it is necessary for Protestant ministers to expend their time and strength upon the preparation and effective delivery of their pulpit discourses. Their own reputation and the prosperity of their congregations depend almost entirely upon their power to attract and interest their hearers.

Hence a greater importance is attached to pulpit eloquence and oratorical power by Protestant ministers than is usually attributed to them by the Catholic clergy. In Catholic services the sermon has a less prominent place. It may or may not form part of the exercises of public worship, according to the occasion and its attendant circumstances. It is less important, and felt to be so by both clergy and people, than visiting the sick, hearing of confessions, administering the sacraments (not to speak of the offering up of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass), which more imperative duties necessarily occupy the larger part of the time of Catholic priests. Owing to this, as a rule, less time and labor are expended on the preparation of their sermons, and less care is exercised as to the manner of delivery, by the Catholic clergy than by Protestant ministers.

But while the facts just referred to furnish a valid reason for this difference, they do not justify the neglect which prevails among many of the clergy to make reasonable preparation, both as regards the matter and the form of their discourses, and a carelessness as to the manner of delivering, amounting, in some instances, to uncouthness and slovenliness. There might have been a partial excuse for this in past years in the United States, owing to the circumstances in which both clergy and laity were placed. The clergy were overburdened, borne down by fatigue, and their time was entirely occupied by the labors inci-

dent to their attending numerous distant missions, the members of which were widely scattered over extensive districts of country, by the necessity of making long and frequent journeys to administer the last sacraments to the dying, instructing children, and often adults, ignorant even of the simplest elements of Catholic doctrine, and duties of a like nature required in sparsely settled regions where Catholics and Catholic churches were few in number and far distant from each other. The Catholic laity, too, of those times were, many of them, rude and uncultured; and rude language and manner of utterance were not as offensive to them as they are to the educated and refined.

But this condition of things no longer exists in the United States. The clergy now have audiences who need for their instruction and edification discourses of a very different and higher character, at least as regards form of expression and manner of delivery, than was required not many years ago. They have more time, too, to devote to the preparation of their discourses, and to acquiring an impressive style of delivery. The fact that the sermon is subordinate to the more solemn acts of Catholic worship, is no reason why it should not be made as effective as care and study in its preparation and power of delivery can possibly make it. It should be remembered, too, that, though the preaching of a sermon by the priest, and the hearing of it by the people, are not direct acts of divine worship, yet that it is the duty of the priest to preach, and of the people to hear and to heed. It is true that preaching includes instruction in Christian doctrine in other ways than that of set public discourses; but it is in the form of sermons that the people can be reached in largest numbers, and that many can be reached in that way who can be reached in no other, to instruct, reprove, warn, and exhort them. That the Church understands and recognizes all this, is shown by the importance she has always attached to public preaching, and by the action of the Council of Trent making it obligatory upon pastors of churches. Since, therefore, the obligation to preach is plain and imperative, it is also plainly the duty of those upon whom the obligation rests to employ the means available, and to observe all the conditions necessary to secure to their sermons the utmost possible effect.

The Fathers of the Church well understood this. While they denounced the cultivation of rhetoric for its own sake, and condemned theatrical and affected manners in the pulpit, they diligently and carefully employed all the aids with which rhetoric could furnish them, to make their sermons, in form as well as matter, as excellent as possible, and their delivery attractive and impressive. Their exhortations to candidates for the priesthood were in perfect accordance with their own practice. They spoke of the employment of all the resources and aids of human science and human culture in the service of religion, as "spoiling the Egyptians of their treasures," and cutting off "Goliah's head with his own sword."

In confirmation of these remarks, it is only necessary to mention the names of Cyprian, Basil, the Gregories, Athanasius, Cyril, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, and a host of other saints and doctors of the Church, who made their discourses as perfect as possible in matter, arrangement, expression, and delivery, in order to promote the glory of God by attracting within their reach those who otherwise would remain beyond it, and by more effectually instructing, convincing, persuading, rebuking, exhorting, and encouraging those who made up their audiences. Passing to our own age, the learning and care expended by the late Cardinal Wiseman upon his public discourses, and his ability, by

means of them, to attract and interest non-Catholics as well as Catholics, enabled him to obtain a respectful hearing from bitter enemies of the Church, to dispel prejudices, to remove misapprehensions, to place the Catholic religion in a more favorable position in the minds of non-Catholics, and powerfully to influence public opinion in England, and to ward off a probable actual persecution of the Church, the danger of which at one time seemed imminent.

We might also refer, as an equally pertinent instance, to the influence for good which the late Bishop England exerted in South Carolina, and his success in building up the Church there, as being due, humanly speaking, not only to the influence of his consistent Christian example, and his genial, courteous manners, but also to his power as a writer and speaker. In like manner we might refer to what Cardinal Manning has done and is doing in England, and what the Right Rev. Bishop of Richmond is accomplishing in Virginia,—in regions the great majority of the people of which never before saw a Catholic bishop, and never before heard a Catholic sermon; yet attracted only, it may be, by the desire to see and hear the bishop, after having heard him, go away, if not convinced or converted yet instructed, and with favorable impressions of the Catholic religion in place of previous bitter prejudices.

The examples adduced are surely sufficient to prove that though divine truth is not to be preached in words of human wisdom, yet the aid of eloquence, both as to language and delivery, is not to be despised or neglected by those who, as ministers of Christ, are charged with the duty and invested with the authority to preach His gospel. By a want of method as regards the matter of sermons; by incorrect, low, rude language; and by unanimated, awkward, or uncouth delivery, they will degrade their office, dishonor God, whose ambassadors they are, depreciate His divine word in the minds of their hearers, give them a distaste and contempt for the divine message they are delivering, repel them from coming in future to hear their discourses, and will convict themselves of carelessness and slovenliness in the performance of an imperative and very important duty.

Such were the reflections suggested by an examination of the volume before us. In Protestant theological seminaries, in addition to the care and time employed in rhetorical training throughout the general course of study, one of the professorial chairs is usually devoted exclusively to homiletics. The work before us is a digest of the lectures delivered on this subject by one who as an efficient and successful teacher has attained high eminence among Protestants. Looked at from the point of view from which Protestants regard preaching it is a useful work; clear in statement and arrangement of topics, sensible in its suggestions, and sound as regards the general principles of rhetoric. But here our commendation must cease. To Catholic students it is valueless, owing to the erroneous position from which the sermon is regarded, and the erroneous ideas respecting its nature and purpose, and the relation of the preacher to his hearers. It is marred, too, by the coarse manner in which the author's prejudices, seemingly uncontrollable, against the Catholic religion are profusely expressed, frequently without any pertinency to the topic he is discussing. Misrepresentations of historical facts, perversions of Catholic doctrine, and misstatements of Catholic practices are to be found in every chapter. The words "Romish," "Popish," along with the ordinary changes rung upon the "superstitions," "corruptions," "tyranny," etc., of the "Romish" Church will serve as specimens of the author's style of expression whenever he refers to the Catholic religion.

THE BIBLE AND SCIENCE. By *T. Lander Brunton, M.D., D.Sc., F.R.S.*, etc., Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians; Assistant Physician to St. Bartholomew's Hospital, etc. With illustrations. London: Macmillan & Co. 1881.

The number of books published on the subject indicated by the title of this work, and on kindred topics, is legion. Every month one writer or another deems it important to enlighten the public with his "views" on the bearing of scientific discoveries upon religious doctrines, and the manner in which these discoveries, real or supposititious, affect the meaning he or others attach to certain parts of the Bible. Under the influence of the erroneous ideas prevalent respecting the purposes of the Sacred Scriptures, and the right and authority to explain them, it is not at all surprising that such a copious stream of publications on the topics already mentioned should be pouring from the press; that physicists should constantly invade the domains of metaphysics, of moral philosophy and of theology; and that Protestant students of the Sacred Scriptures, claiming that the Bible contains the entirety of divine revelation, and that every individual is to interpret it for himself, should put forth their individual speculations as to how the Mosaical record is to be explained so as to conform to the facts and phenomena of the material world, and to the generally received theories of scientists as to its genesis and mode and conditions of continued existence.

Thus, theories of natural scientists and theories of Protestant theologians are constantly clashing. The necessary result is, endless confusion and collision of ideas; and as Protestant believers in the inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures have no other foundation for their belief than that of opinion, it is to them a matter of vital and ever-continuing necessity to endeavor to find some means for harmonizing these opinions, and to discover some way by which the inferences of scientists may be "*reconciled*" with the supposed meaning of the Mosaical writings. Hence the multitude of works constantly published with this design. For every new scientific hypothesis respecting the genesis of the universe or of the earth that can set up a plausible claim to probability, and every newly proposed way of explaining the language of the first few chapters of the Bible requires, in the Protestant mind, new attempts to reconcile antagonisms between their theories of what the Bible means and the newer theories of scientists.

To the Catholic who understands that truth in the natural and the supernatural orders is unchangeably one, and in virtue of that unity and of its divine source and origin cannot be at variance with itself, these supposed antagonisms of the Bible and of Science cause no anxiety. He knows that the imagined antagonism is in reality nothing else than the conflict of the opinions of self-constituted interpreters of divine revelation on the one side, and of the inferential conclusions of scientists on the other. Hence he views and studies, with the curiosity and interest of an intelligent observer, but without the slightest apprehension as to the result, the fierce battles of opposing schools, and the well-intended but unnecessary efforts of the more irenically disposed on each side to reconcile what needs no reconciliation, because never at variance—truth in the supernatural order with truth in the natural.

The work before us, according to its title and the statements of its author in his preface, is such an attempt. Its title, however, is a misnomer, and its prefatory statements are delusive. The last two or three chapters, it is true, do deal, to some extent, with the "doctrine of evolution," and endeavor to explain the author's idea of what evolution presupposes and includes into harmony with his interpretation of the meaning of certain passages of Sacred Scripture. But even in those

chapters his discussions run into a multiplicity of other topics, the relevancy of which to his professed theme is, to say the least, obscure and remote. Such subjects as "Predestination," "Causes of Intemperance," "Cooking Classes," "Beer Houses and Coffee Taverns," "Rain and Rheumatism," "Rain Areas and Pain Areas," "Epilepsy and Drunkenness," all of which are touched upon in the last chapters, are certainly not immediately connected with a discussion of the professed theme of the book, *The Bible and Science.*

The first three chapters are designed to be introductory to the main body of the work. They are made up mainly of descriptions, interesting to general readers, but containing nothing new to students respecting the geography of Egypt, its soil and climate, the customs and history of the ancient Egyptians, the employments of the Israelites, the Exodus; respecting Palestine, past and present; with an attempt to prove that the words of Joshua (ch. x, v. 12), respecting the sun and moon not moving, are mistranslated, and should be rendered "Be dark;" resolving the miracle into a natural eclipse, which the author contends would have been more favorable than would have been the prolongation of daylight for the discomfiture of the Amorites by the Israelites.

Without any obvious connection of these introductory chapters with those that follow, the author passes on to what forms the real substance of his work. This consists of eleven lectures on the Natural History of Plants and Trees, their Structure and Growth, and Mode of Reproduction; on the Relation of Plants and Animals; A General Sketch of the Animal Kingdom,—its chief divisions; invertebrata and vertebrata; cold-blooded animals, fishes, amphibia, and reptiles; warm-blooded animals, birds, mammals, and man; with a general summary, containing the author's ideas on the Relation of Plants and Animals in Time, Simplicity of Primitive Forms, Gradual Progression, Intermediate Forms, Spores and Ova, Development Within and Without the Egg, Differentiation Before and After Birth, Similarity of Immediate Predecessors, Increasing Unlikeness of Early Forms, Artificial Selection, Survival of the Fittest; with a few pages devoted to the discussion of Milton *versus* Darwin, and the opposing ideas of the upholders of a Special Creation, and of Evolution.

The scientific parts of the work, which make up three-fourths of the book, and which should have been published as an independent treatise, are worthy of high commendation. They are clear, well-arranged, and admirably written explanations and discussions of the subjects on which they respectively treat. Students of natural history, and also intelligent general readers, will find them highly interesting. They contain, in brief compass, the results of the latest investigations and studies of scientists, and their explanatory statements are made still more clear by numerous well-executed engravings, which illustrate the text of almost every page.

The Life of Mother Frances Mary Teresa Ball, Foundress, in Ireland, of the Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary. By *Henry James Coleridge*, of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. Dublin: M. Gill & Son. 1881.

The Church, in accordance with her divine mission, is unceasingly active in bringing forth, in the holy lives of her faithful and devoted children, the fruits of justice. This activity is displayed not only in the lives of her individual members, but also in the religious associations and orders established from time to time, and untiringly devoted to prayer and meditation, to subduing and sanctifying in themselves the impulses

of our common nature, cultivating the graces of the Holy Spirit, and thus setting examples of sanctity to others, ministering to all the material, intellectual and spiritual wants of poor, wounded, fallen humanity, and alleviating the miseries to which it is subject.

While some of these religious orders can count their years by centuries, and appear to have a perpetual mission, for though venerable with age they are constantly renewing their youth, others are of recent origin, and owe their foundation to the divinely given power of the Church to adapt her action to the ever-changing conditions, circumstances, and needs of peoples and of times. Hence the inexhaustible stream of charity continually supplied to the Church from its divine source in Christ and continually pouring forth upon mankind, though always the same in its nature, opens for itself, from time to time, new channels, through which it may minister to the wants of humanity, relieve its sufferings, stanch and bind up its bleeding wounds.

Were proof needed of the divine constitution of the Church, and of the unchanging inexhaustible charity which is inherent in her, the fact just adverted to would furnish it. To those, too, who look with apprehension upon the inroads made by the spirit of the age into territories that centuries ago acknowledged the obligations of religion, but now have cast them off, the new religious orders that have been founded in modern times, and are zealously working alongside of the older orders which still maintain their pristine vigor, should dispel their fears. For the religious orders of the Church constitute the towers of its impregnable fortress, in which continually remain chosen bands of valiant soldiers and servants of Christ, ever on the alert to repel the assaults of the enemies of Christ; or, to change the figure, they are select companies of the Christian host, trained by severer drill and discipline than others, and inured to greater hardships, who, dividing the work between them and occupying different points in the field the Church must cultivate, strive—some in dispensing to the temporal wants of the poor and ministering to the sick, some in carrying on the work of Christian education, higher or lower, and others in various other ways—to let their light so shine before men, that even disbelievers in our holy religion may be compelled to see their good works and constrained to glorify God.

The volume before us is a biography of the foundress in Ireland of one of these modern orders. It is more, however, than a mere biography. Mother Mary Teresa's life was so closely connected with the order which, under the guidance of Providence, she was the chief instrument of introducing into Ireland, that it was scarcely possible to write her biography without also sketching the early history of the Institute, the difficulties encountered and surmounted, the firm faith and untiring labors of the members of the Institute, and the abundant success which crowned that faith and zeal in the introduction of Catholic higher education among the Catholic ladies of Ireland, to whom a higher education was necessary to enable them to fulfil the requirements and discharge the duties of their social position.

The correspondence in time of the founding of the Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Ireland with the needs of the higher classes of Irish Catholic ladies, is a striking illustration of the means which God's unerring Providence employs to provide in all ages for the ever-changing circumstances of His Church and for the ever-varying wants which those circumstances create. As the Most Reverend Archbishop of Dublin well remarks in his beautiful introductory letter to the work, up to the very time when the thought of devoting herself to a religious life entered the mind of Frances Ball, Catholics in Ireland, because of their religion, were

compelled, so far as wicked laws could accomplish it, "to wear the badge of slavery," and "if society tolerated the class of which Mother Mary Teresa Frances Ball came, it was by a sort of condescending patronage almost more galling than the bonds of slavery itself. But the great deliverer came whom God sent to level the stronghold of usurped ascendency, and to proclaim to the nations, that before the laws of the land and of society, as well as before the laws of God, the Catholics of Ireland must tolerate no inferiority, and that henceforth they must take their proper places in their various social orders, not by patronage or toleration, but by their own unchallenged right." This constituted a trying crisis for the Catholic ladies of Ireland, and one which it was all-important they should be prepared successfully to meet and pass through. "Unfair contrasts and sharp criticisms were sure to await their appearance amongst their hitherto more highly favored countrywomen, who for ages monopolized the seats of female learning and culture."

To prepare them as Christian ladies to disarm and put to shame, by their higher Catholic education and culture, those who were inclined to indulge in invidious criticisms and draw disparaging contrasts, was the special mission of the Institute which the subject of the volume before us, under the guidance and approval of Dr. Murray, Archbishop of Dublin, introduced into Ireland. How successfully the writer of the work, Father Henry James Coleridge, S. J., brings before the reader the character of Mother Mary Teresa, her humility and obedience, her untiring labors, her faith and zeal, her prudence in administration and management, her firm but gentle government, her strictness of rule united with unvarying tenderness, and the fruits of all this in the growth and usefulness of the Institute, it is needless to say. Father Coleridge's power and success as a writer are too well known to require commendatory mention, and as a biographer his eminent ability is especially conspicuous. The style in which his work is written is that of unaffected simplicity, and this very simplicity of language invests his narrative with an interest as well as a dignity which no glitter of labored rhetorical composition could give it.

PHILOSOPHIA LACENSIS, SIVE SERIES INSTITUTIONUM PHILOSOPHIÆ SCHOLASTICÆ. Edita a Presbyteris Societatis Jesu in Collegio quondam. B. Mariæ ad Lacum, Disciplinas Philosophicas Professis.

INSTITUTIONES PHILOSOPHIÆ NATURALIS SECUNDUM PRINCIPIA *S. Thomæ Aquinatis*, ad usum scholasticum accomodavit. T. Pesch, S.J. Friburgi Brisgoviæ: Herder. 1880. 8vo., pp. xlix–752.

All who are interested in the advancement of truth have reason to rejoice at the progress which Catholic philosophy has made since the publication of the Holy Father's memorable Encyclical, "Æterni Patris." Besides the new periodicals which have sprung up in defence and development of that philosophy, and the increased vigor which the older ones devoted to the same cause have assumed, besides the numerous books bearing on the same subject which have appeared in Italy, Germany, France, and Spain, no less than three works have been begun, and in part published, neither of which has been hitherto rivalled by any modern predecessor of its kind, and each of which deserves to be, and seems destined to be, "monumentum ære perennius." We refer to the "Philosophia Lacensis," mentioned above, F. Harper's "Metaphysics of the School," and F. De San's "Metaphysica Specialis."[1]

[1] Institutiones Metaphysicæ Specialis, auctore P. L. De San, S.J. Tom. I. Cosmologia. Pars I., pp. x., 606. Lovanii. Car. Fonteyn. 1881. Three more volumes are to follow.

The "Philosophia Lacensis" is to comprise six volumes, viz., Logic, Natural Philosophy, Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and a History of Philosophy. These volumes will appear "parvis temporum intervallis," and each of them, though forming part of the "course," will be complete in itself, and can, therefore, be had and used independently of the rest. The only volume which has thus far been published is the one before us, Philosophia Naturalis, by F. Pesch. An apology for placing it first in the series, instead of Logic, lies in the special needs of our day, when the "natural sciences," though so universally, and from a purely experimental point of view, so successfully pursued, are yet in a truly philosophical light such fruitful sources of error and abuse. Physics can never reach true success, nor subserve the final end of all science, without a solid basis of sound metaphysics. This basis is given in the present volume. It brings the principles of Catholic philosophy to bear on the physical sciences,—not on those sciences as known to the mediæval doctors, but as brought to their highest degree of much-vaunted perfection by their most recent professors. It holds up their latest discoveries and theories in the light of those principles, and after most careful testing, approvingly receive their entire or partial truth, and rejects their entire or partial error.

F. Pesch defines Natural Philosophy thus: "Scientia considerans corpora naturalia prout subsunt rationibus metaphysiis."

In considering bodies we may logically inquire: "quid, qualis, unde sint." Hence the entire treatise naturally falls into three parts: 1. On the Essence, Nature, and Principles of Corporeal Substance. (Book I., pp. 14–374.) 2. On the Attributes of Corporeal Substance. (Book II., pp. 375–540.) 3. On their Origin and Dissolution. (Book III., pp. 541–694.) A fourth part is added, on the Order and Laws of Nature. (Book IV., pp. 695–729.) These books are subdivided into disputations, the latter into sections, under which come the theses, of which there are in all sixty-eight, with the "status quæstionis" carefully explained, the "argumenta" neatly divided and titled, and the "dubia," or "difficultates" solved. The perfect arrangement of parts, the disposition of different styles of print to facilitate study, the three indexes (thesium, partium, rerum) make the book a model for the class-room. To this use, however, the size of the volume might constitute an objection, but, as the author shows, an objection which is entirely under the control of the professor.

As we hope to recur to the work again in a future number of the Review, we shall here but direct the reader's attention to a summary of F. Pesch's teaching on the much-vexed question of the Constitutive Principles of Bodies. After a thorough exposition of the existence and nature of two constitutive principles, matter and form, and a refutation of the systems opposed to the scholastic, the author thus sums up his doctrine (p. 315, sq.): The hylomorphical or physical system; 1, as regards its first principles is absolutely certain; 2, it is likewise certain as regards its immediate consequences; 3, as explanatory of chemical changes it is probable (omnium optima); as to the facts on which it rests, recent discoveries may, without detriment to the system, be substituted for the less accurate hypotheses of the ancients.

1. The first principles of this system are: *a*, that in every body there are two constitutive principles, the material and the formal; *b*, that the formal principle, both in organic and in inorganic bodies, constitutes an "ens per se unum," the form determining the matter to a certain species; *c*, that the form in organic and in inorganic bodies is really distinct from the matter. The certainty of these three prin-

ciples the author proves at length in the preceding disputation. (Pp. 109–276.)

2. The immediate consequences of these principles are: *a*, that in any body there can be but one substantial form; *b*, that there is in bodies matter which is not only relatively, but also absolutely, first; *c*, that material forms are not created but educed by the agency of natural causes. These three consequences are also shown to be certain in the preceding disputation.

3. In order that an hypothesis may be called probable, it is necessary; *a*, that it be not in itself absurd; *b*, nor contrary to observations and experiments; *c*, that it readily explain the facts which it proposes to explain. Now these three conditions are verified in the hylomorphical system in regard to chemical changes. It may, therefore, be styled probable.

4. The hypotheses of the ancients which may yield to recent discoveries are those which regard the essential difference between celestial and terrestrial bodies, the four primary elements of the latter, the four primary qualities, the transmutation of the elements, etc.

An admirable feature in F. Pesch's treatment of this subject,—a feature which we have noticed in his handling of various other no less difficult questions,—is his careful discrimination between the certain, the probable, and the untenable; thereby guarding the student, who is unable of himself to make the essential distinction, from pushing his assertions too far, or of needlessly contracting them within too narrow limits.

We hope F. Pesch's volume will receive the universal acceptance it undoubtedly deserves, and that his colaborers in the "Census Lacensis," may speedily give us the benefit of their share in this truly great work.

CARLYLE'S ESSAYS. Popular Edition. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1881.

In the light of the *Reminiscences*, these essays bear a sad import. The revelations of that book have forever shorn from the name of Carlyle the illusions that gave it a false value and made it appear of a magnitude out of all proportion with its shrunken reality. He who had been striking at cant with the hammer of Thor, we discover to have been talking cant all his life. He who, for half a century, had been indicting his age as a sham and a fraud, turns out to be the most perfect type of the shams and the frauds in which the age abounds. Men, in his opinion, were thick-headed, stupid, thoughtless, and he himself could never realize the worth of a single one among the galaxy of contemporaries by whom he was surrounded, and with whom he came in contact. He lived and died in the heart of literary activity, as inadequate to estimate men and measures, as blind and deaf to real worth, as though he had spent his whole life in his old Scottish home at Annandale. The centre of all his thoughts was Carlyle; their horizon was Carlyle; his sole criterion was Carlyle. His very nature was permeated with an adamantine provincialism that no intellectual force or personal influence could ever penetrate. Unable to form a just estimate of any of his contemporaries, he undertook to give the springs of action and reveal the secret thoughts of the great ones of the past. Now, this is sheer pretension. If he goes so wide of his mark in making estimates of those whom he sees and hears, how can he judge of the living soul that lies behind the mere word of other days and another order of thought and sentiment? Can his estimates be taken upon trust? Will they endure the test of sound criticism? We think not. We think they will be found both factitious and ficti-

tious. A powerful imagination was his; so also a strong, unbending nature, that had deeply implanted the barbarian's love and admiration of force and power. All his readings were fused and remoulded in the white heat of his brilliant imagination, and he threw off his thoughts with so intense a force that the readers could not resist the spell of his utterances. They fired his imagination, and he read and re read till the refrain resounded through his mind. But has it occurred to the reader how hollow were those phrasings? Carlyle was simply a loud-mouthed croaker. He found fault with his age and with every system and every institution in his age. There is much to blame in everything human, and so he had the appearance of right on his side. In fact there are two sides to every issue, and according as you look to the one side or the other will you be impressed. Carlyle chose to look upon the dark side, and found only inanities in things, fools in persons, cant in speech, and frauds in institutions, schemes, and projects. Occasionally through these essays there runs a higher and a nobler strain, but they are not Carlyle's. They are Jean Paul's soarings, or they are Fichte's dreams, or they are the inspired impulses of Goethe in his best moments.

Carlyle's chronic disposition of mind was such that he lacked the first essential quality of the truth-seeker, namely, that of knowing how to unlearn. He stood by first impressions to the last. His estimate of men and things once formed he never changed. The whole world might differ with him, a greater pity for the world. Facts might contradict his theory or his statement, so much the worse for the facts. Carlyle hath spoken; what were facts before his word? And men were found to echo, "what indeed?" Paltry things of time, how dare facts array themselves against thought, Carlyle's thought, the child of the everlasting eternities; and all the while it never occurs to Carlyle that his thoughts are simply phases of the ever-vanishing inanities! Weigh them, and you find them wanting. Everywhere you meet with exaggeration and wordiness. It has been said of Addison, that he has nothing to recommend him but his style. This is equally, if not more, true of Carlyle. Take away the style, the forcible manner of putting things, and you have almost nothing left. Declamation is not literature; neither is croaking; neither is nicknaming. The burden of these essays, so far as they speak the author's conviction, is that the whole world is made up of fools, and everything goes wrong. But is it so? Is the whole world made up of fools? Are men not now as wise as they ever were? Are they not as good? Does any man of sane mind regret that he has fallen upon these latter days? Certainly not. That there are shams and frauds; that dishonesty and hypocrisy abound; that the good, and the true, and the beautiful are identified with the pretty, and the pleasing, and the sensual, are facts. But was there ever an age in which they were not facts? And if not, why complain? Why not make effort to right the wrong? It seems to us that the mission of fault-finding is not a heaven-sent mission; therefore, it is that so little good comes of it all. Rather, in cheerfulness is health; in sunshine is life; in hope is effort; in encouragement is progress; in charity is fruition. Throughout all Carlyle's writings you look in vain for hope, or charity, or cheerfulness, or encouragement. In the stead you find yourself wading constantly through the slough of despondency mid an everlasting wail.

Mr. Froude may not have done the wisest thing for Carlyle and Carlyle's friends, but he has given the world that which the world has the right to know, namely, the man as he was.

The present edition is very complete. It contains appendices to various essays not found in the edition that Emerson reproduced in this

country about forty years ago, and which is the edition usually reprinted. The insertion of Carlyle's prefaces to other books is of doubtful value. They contain nothing that has not been better said in one or other of the essays. Carlyle never learned how to overcome his first impressions.

THE CHURCH OF THE PARABLES AND THE SPOUSE OF THE SUFFERING SAVIOUR. By Joseph Prachensky, Priest of the Society of Jesus. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co. 1880.

In this volume Father Prachensky sets forth in a plain and simple manner the various lessons taught by the parables of the Good Samaritan, of the Good Seed and the Cockle, of the Leaven, of the People, of the Net, and of the Scribe, of the Prodigal Son, and of the Marriage Feast, with special reference to the truth that they are all figurative or analogical delineations of the Church, her divine mission, and the manner in which she fulfils that mission in the world. His remarks are addressed as well to earnest, inquiring Protestants as to Catholics, and will be of invaluable assistance to those who are sincerely desirous of finding the truth. He shows that these parables are, each in a different way, so many pictures of the Church of Christ, of her divine constitution, her unity and Catholicity, and her power to heal the wounds of humanity caused by sin, to deliver men from its punishment and guilt, to fortify them against temptation and the assaults of their spiritual enemies, and encourage and strengthen in the practice of Christian virtues, to lead them into a knowledge of the truth, and keep them from error. He shows that in the light of this general truth the parables are clear and easily explained, and that a beautiful unity, consistency, and simplicity runs through them all, while, on the other hand, when attempted to be explained independently of this, they become, as it were, obscure riddles, to which those who attempt to explain them give a thousand varying and diverse solutions.

In pursuance of his plan, Father Prachensky judiciously first sets forth the positive truths taught by the parables, and then incidentally and inferentially points out the antagonistic errors which they condemn. His book is valuable to Catholics, both as furnishing edifying reflections upon these words of wisdom which our Saviour has given to the Church as the guardian and dispenser of "the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven," to interpret and to teach. It will also be serviceable to them as furnishing arguments with which to answer Protestants and other errorists in their assaults upon the Catholic faith.

THE ORIGIN OF PRIMITIVE SUPERSTITIONS, and Their Development into the Worship of Spirits, and the Doctrine of Spiritual Agency among the Aborigines of America. By *Rushton M. Doran.* Twenty-six Illustrations. Philadelphia. J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1881.

This book, the writer tells us, was written in order "to reduce to a system of religious belief ideas that have germinated among uncultured peoples." He says that "the laws of evolution in the spiritual world can be traced with as great precision as in the material world." That the higher phases of belief and worship have been the most ancient and have been debased into lower forms is, in his opinion, "a sheer delusion." "All primitive belief is polytheistic." "The principles that control all religious thought among primitive peoples will work themselves out in polytheism among those people in lower stages of culture, or in pantheism among those of a higher culture." "The American savages

agree in their religious views with the savages of other continents," but "they have not received those views from the people of the Old World, neither can they be understood if we attempt to derive them from thence." "Their origin is to be found in human nature."

These statements furnish a fair idea of the author's theory. For proof of it, however, we look in vain through his volume, or rather the introduction to it. For, after passing beyond the introductory chapter, the author appears to drop his theorizing and to confine himself to statements of the various superstitious notions and practices entertained among the aboriginal people of America. These the author has searched out and collected with great industry and pains, and has classified and arranged under proper titles.

Persons interested in investigations into the origin and history of myths and superstition, and their relation in one direction to the habits and customs, and intellectual and moral condition of the people among whom they prevail, and, in another direction, to the truths of Christianity, will find in this volume materials for study and reflection. The author's theory we do not concur in. But that theory has very little to do with the contents of by far the larger part of the work.

The Graded Catholic Educational Series. First, Second, and Third Readers. New York: P. O'Shea, Agent. 1881.

We are of the opinion that the importance of selecting the best text-books is not as deeply felt as it should be by many of those who are engaged in conducting Catholic schools. This, we believe, is especially the case with the books intended to exercise the pupils in reading. Some of those in use in Catholic schools are objectionable, on account of defects in plain arrangement, and other details; others because of the character of some of the matter contained in the lessons as regards its moral and religious influence on the susceptible minds of children. Many of the selections are tainted with a morbid naturalism, which it is the tendency of our age to put into the place of the spiritual. From this and kindred objections the series of readers before us is free. In their moral and religious bearings the contents appear to us entirely unobjectionable. Their plan, too, and the manner in which the plan is carried out, of conducting the child onwards by simple and easy steps, impress us very favorably. We question, however, whether it is of advantage to introduce script letters and words in the *First Reader*. We are inclined to think the *Second Reader* would be quite soon enough for them. The pictorial illustrations are much superior to what are usually found in books of this character.

Maidens of Hallowed Names. College of the Sacred Heart, Woodstock, Md. 1881.

The purpose and design of this volume is well stated in the preface. It is intended specially for young women. Accordingly it consists of the lives of saintly maidens, who, either in the home-life of girlhood, or engaged in different avocations, and surrounded by different circumstances, withstood the trials and overcame the temptations of the world, and preserved to the end their virginity and their purity of heart. These lives, it is true, contain lessons that well may be learned by all; but in the work before us they are presented chiefly for the benefit of young women wishing good counsels and examples, that they may learn how dear to heaven is their spotless purity, and what means they should employ to keep it unsullied in the midst of surrounding dangers.

The saints selected, thirteen in number, are well chosen for the purpose of the work. The sketches of their lives, though necessarily concise, are animated and interesting. Introducing them there is a chapter on virginity, and following them one containing general reflections and edifying suggestions to the reader. An appendix contains some prayers and practices for the preservation of holy purity.

RITUALE ROMANUM PAULI V., PONTIFICIS MAXIMI. Jussu editum et auctum et castigatam cui novissima accedit Benedictionum et Instructionum Appendix. Editio secunda accuratissima A Sacr. Rituum Congregatione adprobata. Ratisbonæ, Neo Eboraci et Cincinnatii. Sumptibus, Chartis, et Typhis, Fr. Pustet, S. Sedsi Apost. et Sacr. Rituum Congr. Typogr., MDCCCLXXXI.

The general arrangement of this edition of the *Romanum Rituale* is the same as that of Messrs. Pustet & Co.'s previous edition, and as that published in Baltimore in 1873 by Murphy & Co. It has the advantage, however, of containing a number of new and approved "Benedictions." The typographical make-up of the work is admirable, and adds new lustre to the renown of a house already well known to the Catholic world for the beautiful editions of the *Missale Graduale* and *Breviarium Romanum* it has put forth. Chevalier Pustet leaves nothing undone to secure correctness and accuracy in all his Liturgical publications. The Chart accordingly has been submitted to a severe censorship before being printed, and may be safely relied on as correct. Taken all in all, this is the finest and best edition of the *Rituale Romanum* that has come under our observation. It has the "Imprimatur" of the Bishop of Ratisbonne.

CHRIST IN HIS CHURCH. A Church History, from the original of Rev. L. C. Businger. By *Rev. Richard Brennan, LL.D.* Together with a History of the Church in America. By *John Gilmary Shea, LL.D.* New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Bros., 1881. 8vo., pp. 426.

This is not a History of the Church in the technical sense of the word, where her eventful life through human centuries is given in the order of time. It is rather a series of sketches, representing Chrich in His Church, as founder, teacher, and finisher of her faith, and as leading her through battles to triumph. Mr. Shea's account of the Church in America is like everything from his pen, well written, accurate, and instructive. We wish he could be induced to give us in full some day that of which he has here given an abridgment.

THE ILLUSTRATED CATHOLIC FAMILY ANNUAL, 1882. With Calendars calculated for different Parallels of Latitude, and adapted for use throughout the United States. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company.

While this annual fulfils the purposes of an almanac, it is also a very readable and interesting volume. The calendars form its smallest part, the greater part consisting of biographical and historical sketches, well chosen as regards their subjects, and well written; and of reading matter on subjects of general interest. The *Annual* is made still more attractive by numerous portraits of distinguished prelates and other eminent persons, and by well-executed engravings of noted edifices, ruins, and shrines.

NOTE.—In consequence of the serious illness of Very Rev. Dr. Corcoran, and his consequent absence from the city, he has not been able to complete his second article on the recent revision of the New Testament, promised for this number. The readers of the REVIEW *will be glad to learn, however, that the Doctor is already sufficiently convalescent to justify the expectation that he will soon be able to resume his editorial labors, and that the article referred to will be ready by January.*

PERIODICAL

70739

DOES NOT CIRCULATE

THIS BOOK MAY NOT BE
TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM